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SUMMARY
The cyber threat landscape is quickly changing and it is of vital importance
to stay abreast of emerging threats and to proactively work to improve security.
At the same time, piecing together a complete landscape of attacks by identifying
the strategies and capabilities of the adversaries requires establishing links among
individual observations. Also, defending against these attacks requires automatically
generated semantics-aware policies to complement manual analysis. While using data
processing techniques and semantic-aware inspection to address security problems is a
promising approach to evaluate security risks and to provide cyber intelligence, there
exists a gap between the security ontology and generic data processing techniques
primitives needed for such an approach. This gap tends to be domain-sensitive,
language-specific, and computationally intensive which further complicates the use of
such an approach.
In this dissertation, data processing techniques and semantic-aware inspection
were applied in three componemts of the modern security system: cyber threat gath-
ering, cyber threat analysis, and cyber threat detection. From the developed modern
security system, three techniques are suggested as contributions: (1) we present an
innovation solution for fully automated IOC extraction. It solved a name entity
recognition problem for the security domain through an innovative graph mining
technique. Running on 71,000 articles collected from 45 leading technical blogs, this
new approach demonstrates a remarkable performance: it generated 900K OpenIOC
items with a precision of 95% and a coverage over 90%, which is way beyond what
the state-of-the-art natual language processing techniques and commercial indicator
of compromise (IOC) tools can achieve, at a speed of thousands of articles per hour.
x
Further, by correlating the IOCs mined from the articles published over a 13-year
span, our study sheds new light on the links across hundreds of seemingly unrelated
attack instances, particularly their shared infrastructure resources, as well as the im-
pacts of such open-source threat intelligence on security protection and evolution of
attack strategies. (2) we analyzed emerging cyber threats on cloud platform using big
data analytics techniques. We identified a set of collective features, which uniquely
characterize malicious cloud repositories. These features were utilized to build a
scanner that detected over 600 malicious cloud repositories on leading cloud platforms
like Amazon, Google, and 150K sites, including popular ones like groupon.com, using
them. Highlights of our study include the pivotal roles played by these repositories on
malicious infrastructures and other important discoveries include how the adversary
exploited legitimate cloud repositories and why the adversary uses bad cloud repos-
itories in the first place, which has never been reported. These findings bring such
malicious services to the spotlight and contribute to a better understanding and ul-
timate elimination on this new threat. (3) we developed a semantic-based technique,
called Semantic Inconsistency Search (SEISE), for efficient and accurate detection of
the promotional injections on sponsored top-level domains (sTLD) with explicit se-
mantic meanings. Running on 403 sTLDs with an initial 30 seed irrelevnt bad terms,
SEISE analyzed 100K fully qualified domain names (FQDN), and along the way auto-
matically gathered nearly 600 IBTs. In the end, our approach detected 11K infected
FQDN with a false detection rate of 1.5% and over 90% coverage. Our findings further
bring to light the stunning impacts of such promotional attacks, which compromise
approximately 3% of the FQDNs in the .edu, .gov domains and over one thou-
sand gov.cn domains, including those of leading universities such as stanford.edu,
mit.edu, princeton.edu, havard.edu and government institutes such as nsf.gov
and nih.gov. We further demonstrate the potential to extend our current technique





Every day, about 20 new cyber vulnerabilities are released and reported [5]. It comes
up with around 110,000 new cyber attacks per hour. In recent years, cyber secu-
rity becomes a more complex and multifaceted problem because of the fast-evolving
threat landscape. The threat environment is quickly changing and it is of vital impor-
tance to stay abreast of emerging threats and to proactively work to improve security.
Traditional methods for cyber security system design focus on understanding and ad-
dressing each of vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and configurations separately, which are
insufficient to defend against the quickly increasing cyber threats. Effective defense
against current and future threats requires the addition of a balancing, outward focus,
on understanding the adversarys behavior, capability, and intent.
However, piecing together a complete landscape of attacks by identifying the
strategies and capabilities of the adversaries requires establishing links among in-
dividual observations through a large amount of cyber threat data analysis. Also,
defending against these current or future attacks requires automatically generated
semantic-aware cyber intelligence to complement manual analysis. For example, with
cyber intelligence, cyber defenders can understand and characterize things like what
sort of attack actions have occurred and are likely to occur; how can these actions
be detected and recognized; how can they be mitigated; who are the relevant threat
actors; what are they trying to achieve; what are their capabilities, in the form of
tactics, techniques, and procedures they have leveraged over time and are likely to
leverage in the future; what sort of vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, or weaknesses
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they are likely to target; what actions have they taken in the past; etc.
While using data-oriented design and semantic-aware techniques to address secu-
rity problems is a promising approach to evaluate security risks and to provide cyber
intelligence, there exists a gap between the security ontology and general data pro-
cessing techniques (such as machine learning techniques, natural language processing
techniques) needed for such an approach. This gap tends to be domain-sensitive,
language-specific, and computationally intensive which further complicates the use
of such an approach. For example, when adapting machine learning techniques in
security detection tools, robust security domain features should be carefully selected
to consider the potential evasion by the adversary: for example, an adversary can at-
tempt to fool classifiers by purposely modifying their behavior. Another challenge to
adopt natural language processing technique in security application is that we found
that the Stanford name entity recognition (NER) tool cannot be directly applied to
recover indicators of compromises (IOC, e.g., malware signatures, botnet IPs) from
online blogs, since it resulted in a precision (around 70%) and recall (below 50%) far
below what is expected for a security application (e.g., signatures for an Anti-Virus
scanner) [81]. Additionally, cyber attacks are global and could require an investigation
across a large amount of data in different languages.
In this dissertation, we applied data-driven security design and semantic-aware
techniques in a modern security system. We have created a set of methods in each
component of a modern security system that enable the system to evaluate security
risks and provide cyber intelligence automatically.
1.2 Modern Security System
Cyber Threat Gathering. To enable an organization to determine its responses
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels [99], the first step to designing a
modern security system is cyber threat gathering. Cyber threat gathering is to collect
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and identify information that details the current and emerging security threats. An
example output of cyber threat gathering is Indicator-of-compromise (IOC), which
elaborates the forensic artifacts of an attack and can, therefore, be used to analyze the
attack once it happens or counter it during its execution. An IOC includes not only
individual data fingerprints involved in a specific attack, such as an attack domain,
the MD5 of the malware delivered, but also the context of the attack and an analysis
of the adversary’s behavior, like the type of the attack or the specific technique
deployed (e.g., change to the Windows Registry). To find out such information,
cyber threat gathering includes identification of the adversary’s tools, techniques
and attack procedures, which, together with the fingerprints, helps an organization’s
security team to understand their security posture, detect early signs of threats and
continuously improve their security controls.
The sources for cyber threat gathering can be closed, e.g., a corporation’s inter-
nal network traces, or public, such as technical blogs or online forums. Examples of
public sources include the blogs of AlienVault, FireEye, Malwarebytes, and Webroot.
With the surge of cyber attacks in recent years, a large number of attack artifacts
have emerged, which has been extensively reported by the public online sources and
aggressively collected by different organizations. To bootstrap our research on auto-
matically cyber threat gathering, we reached out to a security company and obtained
a list of 45 blogs which were operated by renowned organizations and practitioners.
These blogs altogether covered major security incidents in the world.
We monitored these 45 blogs and were able to download as many as 71,000 articles.
Also noteworthy is that the number of cyber threat-related articles there continued
to grow in the past 13 years (2003/01 to 2016/04), from 20 to 1,000 per month, with
an increased rate of 500% (see Figure 5(a)). While the volume of articles we have
collected is substantial, it only constitutes a small piece of the IOC landscape. Rapidly
collecting and sharing such information, and deploying it to various security systems
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is the key to quickly detecting, responding and containing different kinds of security
threats organizations face, which requires the descriptions of the cyber threat to be
standardized and machine-digestible. To this end, various cyber threat information
sharing frameworks have been proposed, including OpenIOC [18], STIX [17] and
yara [22], with each format easily convertible to the others.
OpenIOC is an extensible XML schema created by Mandiant to record technical
characteristics that identify a known threat, an attacker’s methodology, or other ev-
idence of a compromise. As an example, Figure 1 shows how to use the OpenIOC
format to describe a family of POS malware, Alina [69]. Such a description includes
two components, a header and a definition. The header part has a summary of the
attack (under the description tag) and the source of the information (under au
thored by and authored date). The definition contains a set of indicator items (un-
der Indicator Item), each representing an IOC (Content) and its context (Context).
Two such items are illustrated in Figure 1. In each of them, the document attribute
under Context gives the main category of an IOC (e.g., process, event, file, registry,
etc.) and search elaborates on its subcategory using an iocterm, essentially a con-
catenation of common terminologies (e.g., process, name, etc.) security professionals
use to describe the IOC. The OpenIOC standard provides 600 such iocterms, covering
various types of artifacts left by different attacks, such as cookie history, DNS entry,
Email information, Hook items and others. The examples of iocterms related to IP,
hash and datetime are shown in Table 1. For example, In the case of IP, its iocterms
describe 15 different contexts, such as spammer’s IP (Email/ReceivedFromIP), IP in
malicious infrastructure (RouteEntryItem/Destination), or C&C attack’s remote
IP (ProcessItem/PortList/PortItem/remoteIP).
In Figure 1, the two indicator items record the registry change made by the
Alina malware: the first shows the location where the change happens, i.e., the path
Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the context RegistryItem/KeyPath, and the
4



























second identifies the name of the code dropped there, i.e., ALINA.
Cyber Threat Analysis. In cyber threat analysis, cyber threats were modeled
by analyzing cyber threat information. Cyber threat analysis seeks to understand
the nature of relevant threats, identify them, and fully characterize them such that
all of the relevant knowledge of the threat can be fully expressed and evolved over
time. This relevant knowledge includes threat-related actions, behaviors, capabilities,
intents, attributed actors, etc. From this understanding and characterization, the
analyst may then specify relevant threat indicator patterns, suggest courses of action
for threat response activities, and/or share the information with other trusted parties.
For example, in the case of a potential phishing attack, a cyber threat analyst may
analyze and evaluate a suspected phishing email, analyze any email attachments and
links to determine if they are malicious, determine if the email was sent to others,
assess commonality of who/what is being targeted in the phishing attack, determine
whether malicious attachments were opened or links followed, and keep a record of
all analysis performed.
In recent years, the popularity of cloud platform has brought with new challenges
to cyber threat analysis: incidents of developing new blackhat techniques for cloud
platforms or utilizing reputable cloud platforms to serve their malicious online activ-
ities have been reported. Cloud hosting is a type of infrastructure as a service, which
is rented by the cloud user to host her web assets (e.g., HTML, JavaScript, CSS, and
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image files). A key feature of cloud hosting is built-in site publishing [59], where the
web assets in the cloud repositories can be served directly to users via file names in
a relative path in the cloud repositories (i.e., cloud URL). For instance, JavaScript
files hosted in the cloud repositories can be directly run in the browser. Also, the
pay-as-you-go hosting is well received as an economic and flexible computing solution.
As an example, Google Drive today offers a free web hosting service with 15GB of
storage, and an additional 100GB for $1.99/month and GoDaddy’s web hosting starts
at $1/month for 100GB.
Although there have been indications of cloud hosting misuse, analyzing the cyber
threat in cloud platforms is challenging: the service providers are bound by their
privacy commitments and ethical concerns. Hence, they tend to avoid inspecting
the content of their customers repositories in the absence of proper consent. Even
when the providers are willing to do so, determining whether a repository involves
malicious content is by no means trivial: nuts and bolts for malicious activities could
appear perfectly innocent before they are assembled into an attack machine; examples
include image files for Spam and Phishing. In our research, we analyze the critical
and emerging cyber threats that the adversary who tries to use cloud repositories
on legitimate cloud platforms as service repositories for illicit activities. For this
purpose, the attacker could build her malicious cloud repositories or compromise
legitimate ones, and store various attack vectors there, including Spam, Phishing,
malware, click-hijacking and others. These cloud repositories are connected to front-
end websites, which could be malicious, compromised or legitimate ones contaminated
only by the malicious cloud repositories.
Cyber Threat Detection. After modeling cyber threats, a cyber threat detection
system is designed to detect cyber threats automatically and accurately. At a high
level, a cyber threat detection system must be efficient, accurate, and adaptive to an
6
environment that can drastically change over time. Considering efficiency, it is impor-
tant the detection system scale favorably with large, possibly infinite datasets. The
system should thus use an online detection algorithm for detecting from a streaming
data source. Also, cyber threat detection system should be accurate. Both false pos-
itives and false negatives need to be taken into account to evaluate the performance.
Furthermore, both the cyber content and the threats attackers vary drastically over
time. As new exploits are discovered, or old vulnerabilities are being patched, the
cyber threats change over time. The detection system should thus be able to learn
the evolution of these threats.
Nowadays, most online information is generated and consumed by humans, and
many of todays cyber threats directly target individual humans. A prominent example
is Internet fraud, in which fraudulent content carried by web pages, phishing emails,
or user interfaces of malicious apps often cannot be captured without understanding
its semantic meaning. The need for such deep understanding has prompted recent
efforts on semantics-aware cyber threat detection, which leverages large-scale semantic
processing of text content to create new security defenses. For example, if you Googled
“site:stanford.edu pharmacy” a few months ago, you would have found Stanford
University web pages displaying advertisements (ads) for cheap Viagra. This was the
result of a promotional infection for underground advertising [80]. Such infections
affected a large number of .edu and .gov domains, including mit.edu, princeton.
edu, havard.edu, state.gov, nih.gov, and even nsf.gov (for link Spam) [80]. The
infections remained unnoticed for months, owing to their similarity to legitimate ad
injections. We detected them only with a semantics-aware inspection [80], using
Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to expose the discrepancy between
ads and typical content for such sponsored top-level domains (sTLDs).
The challenge of semantics-aware cyber threat detection comes from the diversity
of security domains, ranging from fraud to malware to threat intelligence to privacy,
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each with different objectives and datasets. This diversity makes it hard to set a uni-
fied target and share research findings and new techniques across domains. Further
complicating the situation is the gap between the requirements for security protection
and the capabilities of generic NLP primitives, which tend to be domain-sensitive,
language-specific, and computationally intensive. For example, we found that the
Stanford NER cannot be directly applied to recover indicators of compromises (IOC,
e.g., malware signatures, botnet IPs) from online blogs, since it resulted in a precision
(around 70%) and recall (below 50%) far below what is expected for a security appli-
cation (e.g., signatures for an Anti-Virus scanner) [81]. Additionally, cyber attacks
are global and could require an investigation across a large amount of data in different
languages. A multilingual and scalable design is demanded such an investigation.
1.3 Data-driven Security Design
To automatically evaluate security and provide cyber intelligence, we leveraged a set
of data processing techniques (such as machine learning and natural language pro-
cessing) in modern security system design. Also, due to the unique characteristics
of this open problem in the security domain, the general data processing techniques
cannot achieve good performance for our tasks, and therefore we also applied se-
curity domain knowledge to optimize data processing techniques to achieve better
performance in the security application. These data processing techniques are briefly
introduced here.
Dependency parsing. Dependency parsing is an NLP technique for describing
grammatical relations between words in a sentence. Such relations include a direct
object, determinant, noun compound modifier and others. Also, the content of a
relative clause is further analyzed to identify the dependencies between the words
it includes. For example, the sentence in Figure 2 is parsed into dependency rela-
tions, such as the determinant relation between “trojan” and “the”, det(Trojan-2,
8
the-1) (where the number shows the position of the word in the sentence), and the
nominal subject relation between “trojan” and “download”, nsubj(downloads-3,
Trojan-2). Each of the formulae represents a binary relation between a governor
(the first term) and a dependent (the second one).
Such dependency relations within a sentence form a directed and weighted graph
(V,E,W ), where each token is a vertex in V , and the relation between them is rep-
resented by a set of edges in E. Each arc connecting two tokens can also be assigned
a weight W to differentiate the relation between them from others. Figure 2 further
illustrates the dependency graph for the example sentence. The state-of-the-art de-
pendency parser (e.g., Stanford’s typed dependencies system [39]) can achieve a 92.2%
unlabeled attachment score in discovering the grammatical relations in a sentence.
In our research, we utilized the relations discovered by the parser to capture the se-
mantic links between context terms and an IOC token. For example, the dependency
of clickme.zip on “attachments” in the sentence “all e-mails collected have had
attachments clickme.zip” reveals a compound relation between the terms (the con-
tent of the “attachment” is clickme.zip), which falls in line with the descriptions
typically explaining the security issues related to email attachments.
Content term extraction. Another set of techniques extensively utilized in infor-
mation extraction is content term extraction, which automatically determines impor-
tant terms within a given piece of text. It includes parts-of-speech (POS) tagging that
labels a word corresponding to a particular part of speech (such as nouns and verbs),
and phrase parsing that divides sentences into phrases logically belonging together.
Specifically, after parsing phrases from the given content, a POS tagger labels its ter-
minological candidates, such as syntactically plausible terminological noun phrases.
Then, these candidates are analyzed using statistical approaches (e.g., point-wise
mutual information) to find out important terms.
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Graph mining. Our approach tailors graph mining techniques to analyze the depen-
dency graphs constructed from sentences of interest. Graph mining is a structural
data mining problem with the purpose of identifying distinguishing characteristics
(such as common subgraph) of graphs. The problem can be stated as follows. Given
a dataset of graphs Gi ∈ D, with i = 1...N , each graph Gi = (Vi, Ei) is a collection
of vertices Vi = {vi1, · · · , vin} and edges Ei = {(va, vb)|va, vb ∈ Vi}. Gi may also have
labels on its nodes and edges, which are drawn from a common label set of the whole
dataset D. Also, each graph Gi is in a class with a label ci ∈ C. The goal of the
graph classification problem is to learn a model f : D → C that predicts the class
label for any graph, that is, classifying the graph to a class based on its similarity to
other graphs as measured by various graph kernel methods, such as direct product
kernel [54] and subtree kernel [95]. In our research, we utilize graph mining to deter-
mine whether a sentence involving context terms and an IOC token indeed contains
IOC.
Word embedding (skip-gram model). A word embedding W : words → V n
is a parameterized function mapping words to high-dimensional vectors (200 to 500
dimensions), e.g., W (‘education′) = (0.2,−0.4, 0.7, ...), to represent the word’s rela-
tion with other words. Such a mapping can be done in different ways, e.g., using
the continual bag-of-words model and the skip-gram technique to analyze the context
in which the words show up. Such a vector representation ensures that synonyms
are given similar vectors and antonyms are mapped to dissimilar vectors. Also in-
terestingly, the vector representations fit well with our intuition about the semantic
relations between words: e.g., the vectors for the words ‘queen’, ‘king’, ‘man’ and
‘woman’ have the following relation: vqueen − vwoman + vman ≈ vking. In our research,
we utilized the vectors to compare the semantics meanings of different words, by mea-
suring the cosine distance between the vectors. For example, using Wikipedia pages
as a training set (for the context of individual words), our approach automatically
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identified the words semantically-close to ‘casino’, such as ‘gambling’ (with a cosine
distance 0.35), ‘vegas’ (0.46) and ‘blackjack’ (0.48).
1.4 Contribution
The contributions of the dissertations are summarized below:
First, we present an innovation solution for fully automated IOC extraction. Our
approach is based on the observation that the IOCs in technical articles are often de-
scribed in a predictable way: being connected to a set of context terms (e.g., “down-
load”) through stable grammatical relations. Leveraging this observation, iACE is
designed to automatically locate a putative IOC token (e.g., a zip file) and its context
(e.g., “malware”, “download”) within the sentences in a technical article, and further
analyze their relations through a novel application of graph mining techniques. Once
the grammatical connection between the tokens is found to be in line with the way
that the IOC is commonly presented, these tokens are extracted to generate an Ope-
nIOC item that describes not only the indicator (e.g., a malicious zip file) but also
its context (e.g., download from an external source). Running on 71,000 articles col-
lected from 45 leading technical blogs, this new approach demonstrates a remarkable
performance: it generated 900K OpenIOC items with a precision of 95% and a cov-
erage over 90%, which is way beyond what the state-of-the-art NLP technique and
industry IOC tool can achieve, at a speed of thousands of articles per hour. Further,
by correlating the IOCs mined from the articles published over a 13-year span, our
study sheds new light on the links across hundreds of seemingly unrelated attack
instances, particularly their shared infrastructure resources, as well as the impacts
of such open-source threat intelligence on security protection and evolution of attack
strategies.
Second, we took the first step toward understanding and detecting this emerging
threat. Using a small set of “seeds” (i.e., confirmed malicious cloud repositories),
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we identified a set of collective features from the websites they serve (e.g., attempts
to hide malicious cloud repositories), which uniquely characterize malicious cloud
repositories. These features were utilized to build a scanner that detected over 600
malicious cloud repositories on leading cloud platforms like Amazon, Google, and
150K sites, including popular ones like groupon.com, using them. Highlights of our
study include the pivotal roles played by these repositories on malicious infrastruc-
tures, and other important discoveries include how the adversary exploited legitimate
cloud repositories and why the adversary uses Bars in the first place that has never
been reported. These findings bring such malicious services to the spotlight and
contribute to a better understanding and ultimately eliminating this new threat.
Third, we developed a semantic-based technique, called Semantic Inconsistency
Search (SEISE), for efficient and accurate detection of the promotional injections on
sponsored top-level domains (sTLD) with explicit semantic meanings. Our approach
utilizes NLP to identify the bad terms (those related to illicit activities like fake drug
selling, etc.) most irrelevant to an sTLD’s semantics. These terms, which we call
irrelevant bad terms (IBTs), are used to query search engines under the sTLD for
suspicious domains. Through a semantic analysis on the results page returned by the
search engines, SEISE can detect those truly infected sites and automatically collect
new IBTs from the titles/URLs/snippets of their search result items for finding new
infections. Running on 403 sTLDs with an initial 30 seed IBTs, SEISE analyzed
100K FQDN, and along the way automatically gathered nearly 600 IBTs. In the end,
our approach detected 11K infected FQDN with a false detection rate of 1.5% and
over 90% coverage. Our study shows that by effective detection of infected sTLDs,
the bar to promotion infections can be substantially raised, since other non-sTLD
vulnerable domains typically have much lower Alexa ranks and are therefore much
less attractive for underground advertising. Our findings further bring to light the
stunning impacts of such promotional attacks, which compromise FQDNs under 3%
12
of .edu, .gov domains and over one thousand gov.cn domains, including those of
leading universities such as stanford.edu, mit.edu, princeton.edu, havard.edu
and government institutes such as nsf.gov and nih.gov. We further demonstrate
the potential to extend our current technique to protect generic domains such as .com
and .org.
1.5 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the back-
ground information and literature review; Chapter 3 presents an automatic cyber
threat gathering system; Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 show cyber threat analysis of the
emerging online crime in the cloud platform; Chapter 7 presents an effcient and ac-




This chapter provides the background literature study in data-driven and semantic-
aware modern security system design. In particular, the first section presents the
recent studies in cyber threat gathering, including threat intelligence exchange, and
natural language processing techniques for security system design. The next section
discusses the related work of cyber threat analysis for blackhat search engine opti-
mization. The third section provides a literature review of injected websites detection.
2.1 Cyber Threat Gathering
Threat intelligence exchange. To help the organizations and security commu-
nity defend against the fast-evolving cyber attacks, there have been great efforts on
threat intelligence sharing. Facebook ThreatExchange [52] and Defense Industrial
Base voluntary information sharing program (dibnet) [6] are platforms developed for
exchanging IOCs between certified participants. Meanwhile, AlienVault OTX [30],
OpenIOC DB [1] and IOC Bucket [67] are established to share public (unclassified)
IOCs. Regardless of the type of platform, public sources like blogs still contribute a
big portion of IOCs. Our approach, iACE, will contribute to the establishment of a
fast tunnel between these public sources and exchange platforms and help the partic-
ipated organizations receive IOC updates timely. As far as we know, AlienVault [30]
and Recorded Future [26] are the only two IOC providers that support automatic IOC
extraction. Even though Recorded Future (which does not provide public services)
utilized NER techniques [96], both tools are simply looking for IOC entities with-
out linking them to attack context, and therefore cannot generate machine-readable
OpenIOC items. Instead, iACE customized graph mining techniques to capture the
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relation between entities, which produces high-quality IOCs and their attack context
with high accuracy. IOC extraction from other sources were also studied recently.
Catakoglu et al. [38] demonstrated a framework to extract external components (web
IOCs) from web pages served in honeypots, which compared with our approach, is
more in line with the work on automatic signature generation. Sabottke et al. [100] de-
veloped a warning system to alert the user of the ongoing attacks reported by tweets
(i.e., looking for the tweets with Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)).
This is different from our work, which aims at generating machine-readable IOCs
from attack reports.
NER/RE. NER today mainly relies on a sequence of words to identify the pres-
ence of pre-defined entities (such as PERSON, LOCATION). For example, Stanford
NER [53] utilize a Hidden Markov model to find the most likely sequence of entities
from unstructured text. Other examples include Illinois NER [41] (based on super-
vised learning) and LIPI [29] (based on n-gram character language models, etc.).
When it comes to Relation Extraction (RE), today’s approaches use the tree ker-
nel with support vector machine (SVM) [47], heuristic matches with self-supervised
learning [122], open pattern templates [102] and other techniques to detect specific
relations between two known entities. By comparison, iACE leverages the unique
features of IOC-related articles, using the relation detection to help identify true
IOCs and their context. This combines both NER and RE steps together, which has
never been done before. Our customized graph mining algorithm also enriches the
RE techniques.
NLP for security and privacy. Compared with its application in other areas
(e.g., bioinformatics), NLP has only been recently used for security and privacy re-
search. Prior work utilized NLP for analyzing web privacy policies (by extracting its
key terms) [127], generating privacy policies for Android apps [126], analyzing app
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descriptions to infer required permissions by Android apps [94, 92], detecting compro-
mised websites [80] and identifying sensitive user input from apps [65, 88]. Our work
showcases a new application of NLP, demonstrating that innovative NLP techniques
need to be developed to address real-world security challenges.
2.2 Cyber Threat Analysis
Study on blackhat SEO. Among the malicious activities performed by a pro-
motional infection is blackhat search engine optimization (SEO, also referred to web-
spam), which has also been intensively studied. For instance, Wang et al. investigated
the longitudinal operations of SEO campaigns by infiltrating an SEO botnet [119].
Leontiadis et al. conducted a long-term study using 5 million search results cover-
ing nearly 4 years to investigate the evolution of search engine poisoning [74]. Also,
Wang et al. examined the effectiveness of the interventions against the SEO abuse
for counterfeit luxury goods [117]. Moore et al. studied the trending terms used in
search-engine manipulation [85]. Also, Leontiadis et al. observed .edu sites that were
compromised for search redirection attack in illicit online prescription drug trade, and
briefly discussed their lifetime and volume [71]. In our paper, we conduct a more com-
prehensive measurement on 403 sTLD, and multiple illicit practices beside drug trade
were involved.
Affiliate Program. Recent studies have investigated spam affiliates that send spam
through their own email delivery infrastructure and receive a cut of the final revenue
for every purchase they bring to the spam-advertised sites [40][75][101]. McCoy et al.
analyzed customer demand and overhead in the spam cost model by using transaction
logs of pharmaceutical affiliate programs [82]. Caballero et al. infiltrated malware
distribution affiliates and measured the pay-per-install market [37]. We supplement
prior research by characterizing the affiliates and affiliate networks abusing cloud web
hosting services.
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Search poisoning. Miscreants use search poisoning attacks to falsely increase the
rank for their web sites. Previous studies have examined the lexical patterns of the
page content [90][114], the hyper-link structure from site to site [62][121], or the
combination of the aforementioned features as well as network-level features [116].
deSEO used URL signatures to identify malicious SEO campaigns of fake pages hosted
on compromised web servers [68]. Leontiadis et al. did an in-depth analysis of search
poisoning attacks which redirected traffic to online pharmacies and found that the
conversion rate was higher than email spam [72]. They further used data collected
over four years to investigate the evolution of search engine poisoning, which showed
that search poisoning attacks have steadily grown. A potential bottleneck is the
relatively small set of traffic redirectors was highlighted by Leontiadis et al. [73]. In
this paper, we focus on long-tail search-result manipulation based on cloud-hosted
pages.
2.3 Cyber Threat Detection
Detection of injected sites. How to detect injection of malicious content has been
studied for long. Techniques have been developed to analyze web content, redirection
chains and URL pattern. Examples of the content-based detection include a DOM-
based clustering systems for monitoring Scam websites [49], and a system monitoring
the evolution of web content, called Delta [34], which keeps track of the content and
structure modifications across different versions of a website, and identifies an in-
fection using signatures generated from such modifications. More recently, Soska et
al. works on detecting new attack trends instead of the attacks themselves [110].
Their proposed system leverages the features from web traffic, file system and page
content, and is able to predict whether currently benign websites will be compro-
mised in the near future. Borgolte et al. introduces Meerkat [35], a computer vision
approach to website defacement detection. The technique is capable of identifying
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malicious content changes from screenshots of the website. Other studies focus on ma-
licious redirectors and attack infrastructures. Examples include JsRED [77] that uses
a differential analysis to automatically detect malicious redirect scripts, and Shady
Path [111] that captures a malicious web page by looking at its redirection graph.
Compared with those techniques, our approach is different in that it automatically
analyzes the semantics of web content and looks for its inconsistency with the theme
of the hosting website. We believe that the semantics-based approach is the most
effective solution to promotional infections, which can be easily detected by checking
the semantics of infected sites but hard to identify by just looking at the syntactic
elements of the sites: e.g., both legitimate and malicious ads can appear on a website,
using the same techniques like redirections, iframe, etc. Further, we do not look into
web content or infrastructure at all, and instead, leverage the search results to detect
infections. Our study shows that this treatment is sufficient for finding promotional
infections and much more efficient than content and infrastructure-based approaches.
Similar to our work, Evilseed [66] also uses search results for malicious website
detection. However, the approach is only based upon searching the URL patterns
extracted from the malicious links and never touches the semantics of search results.
Our study shows that focusing only on the syntactic features such as URL patterns is
insufficient for accurate detection of promotional infections. Indeed, Evilseed reports
a huge false detection rate, above 90%, and can only serve as a pre-filtering system.
On the other hand, our technique inspects all the snippet of search results (not just
URLs), automatically discovering and analyzing their semantics. This turns out to be
much more effective when it comes to malicious promotional content: SEISE achieves
low FDR (1.5%) at a detection coverage over 90%.
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CHAPTER III
TOWARD AUTOMATIC GATHERING OF
OPEN-SOURCE CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE
3.1 Introduction
According to Gartner, Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is defined as “evidence-based
knowledge, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable
advice, about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to assets that can be used
to inform decisions regarding the subject’s response to that menace or hazard” [99].
Such knowledge is essential for an organization to gain visibility into the fast-evolving
threat landscape, timely identify early signs of an attack and the adversary’s strate-
gies, tactics and techniques, and effectively contain the attack with proper means.
Given its importance, CTI has been aggressively collected and increasingly exchanged
across organizations, often in the form of Indicators of Compromise (IOC) [91], which
are forensic artifacts of an intrusion such as virus signatures, IPs/domains of botnets,
MD5 hashes of attack files, etc. Once collected, these IOCs can be automatically
transformed and fed into various defense mechanisms (e.g., intrusion detection sys-
tems) when they are formatted in accordance with a threat information sharing stan-
dard, such as OpenIOC [18], that enables characterization of sophisticated attacks
like drive-by downloads. The challenge, however, comes from the effective gathering
of such information, which entails significant burdens for timely analyzing a large
amount of data.
Finding IOCs online: challenges. While IOCs can be extracted from traditional
blacklists, like CleanMX [42] and PhishTank [12], the information delivered by such
IOCs is rather thin: only a small number of IOC classes are covered (URL, domain,
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<OpenIOC xmlns:xsi= … … >




















“Alina makes use of the HKCU\Software\Microsoft
\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key”
Figure 1: Example of OpenIOC schema.
IP and MD5), the relation between IOCs is not revealed and no context information is
provided (e.g., the criminal group behind malfeasance). Analyzing the cyber-attack
campaigns and triaging incident responses become quite difficult when relying on
such information. Instead, IOCs from articles in technical blogs and posts in forums
are more favorable to security practitioners and extensively harvested, since com-
prehensive descriptions of the attack are often found there. Such descriptions are
typically informal, in natural languages, and need to be analyzed semantically to re-
cover related attack indicators, before they can be converted into the standard IOC
format such as OpenIOC, as illustrated in Figure 1. For years, this has been done
manually by security analysts. Increasingly, however, the volume and velocity of the
information generated from these sources become hard to manage by humans in a
cost-effective way. As an example, in our research, we studied over 71,000 articles
from 45 technical blogs extensively used by security professionals and found that the
number of articles posted here has grown from merely a handful back 10 years ago
to over 1,000 every month since last year (see Section 6.3.2). Note that these blogs
are just a drop in the bucket: for example, Recorded Future is reported to utilize
over 650,000 open web sources in 7 languages to harvest IOCs [97]. With the huge
amount of information produced by those sources, new technologies are in dire need
to automate the identification and extraction of valuable CTI involved.
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Automatic collection of IOCs from natural-language texts is challenging. Sim-
ple approaches like finding IP, MD5 and other IOC-like strings in an article, as to-
day’s IOC providers (AlienVault, Recorded Future) do, does not work well in prac-
tice, which easily brings in false positives, mistaking non-IOCs for IOCs: e.g., as
illustrated in Figure 2, although three zip files show up in attack-related articles,
MSMSv25-Patch1.zip is clearly not an IOC while the other two are. Further, even
for a confirmed IOC, we need to know its context, e.g., whether it is linked to drive-by
download (ok.zip in the figure) or Phishing (clickme.zip), in order to convert it
to the IOC format and help an organization determine its response. This can only
be done by establishing a relation between the IOC token and other content in the
article, such as the terms “downloads”, “attachment” in the example.
Identifying semantic elements (called Named Entity Recognition or NER [87]) and
extracting relations between them (called Relation Extraction, or RE [32]) have been
extensively studied in the Natural Language Processing (NLP) community. However,
existing NLP techniques cannot be directly applied for IOC and its context discovery.
NER systems are known to be brittle, highly domain-specific — those designed for
one domain hardly work well on the other domain [104]. So far, we are not aware
of any NER techniques developed specifically for recognizing IOCs and a direct use
of the state-of-the-art tools like Stanford NER [53] leads to low precision (around
70%) and recall (less than 50%) (see Section 3.3). Further, the current study on RE
focuses on the relation between two known entities, which are typically nominals [47],
whereas the relations between an IOC and the terms describing its context (which
we call context terms) are way more complicated: e.g., “downloads” and ok.zip
has a verb-noun relation. Also important, the accuracy and coverage offered by the
existing RE tools are typically low. For example, the classic tree kernel approach [47]
reports a precision between 50 and around 90% and a recall between 10 and 50%. As
another example, a recent proposal for extracting events among genes and proteins
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from biomedical literature [104] has a precision and recall around 50%. This level of
performance cannot meet the demand for high-quality IOCs, which could go straight
to a security system to offer immediate protection for an organization.
iACE. A key observation from the open intelligence sources producing high-quality
IOCs is that technical articles and posts tend to describe IOCs in a simple and
straightforward manner, using a fixed set of context terms (e.g., “download”, “at-
tachment”, “PE”, “Registry”, etc.), which are related to the iocterms used in Ope-
nIOC to label the types of IOCs [18]. Further, the grammatical connections between
such terms and their corresponding IOCs are also quite stable: e.g., the verb “down-
loads” followed by the nouns “file” and ok.zip (the IOC) with a compound relation;
“attachments” and clickme.zip also with the compound relation. This allows us
to leverage such relations to identify an IOC and its context tokens, combining the
NER and RE steps together. To this end, we developed a new approach, called iACE
(IOC Automatic Extractor), in our research, which tailors NLP techniques to the
unique features of IOC discovery. More specifically, after preprocessing articles (us-
ing topic-term classification to find those likely involving IOCs and converting figures
to text), iACE utilizes a set of regular expressions (regex) and common context terms
extracted from iocterms to locate the sentences within the articles that contain pu-
tative IOC tokens, such as IP, MD5-like string. Within each of such sentences, our
approach attempts to establish a relation between the IOC token and the context
term: it converts the sentence into a Dependency Graph (DG) to describe its gram-
matical structure and extracts the shortest paths linking each pair of a context token
and the putative IOC token; over each path, a graph mining technique is applied to
analyze the relation between the tokens, which cannot be handled by existing RE
techniques, for the purpose of determining whether they indeed include an IOC and
its context.











✓ All e-mails collected have had attachments clickme.zip.
✓ It contains a shellcode at offset 3344 that downloads and execute a PE32 file from the server.
• It’s available as a Free 30 day trial download.
• Microsoft has already released an out-of-band patch MSMSv25-Patch1.zip
• The malware does not modify AndroidManifest.xml in such a way.
Figure 2: Examples of sentences with/without IOC.
to locate potential IOC-carrying sentences and the predictable relations among them
to capture IOCs, avoiding the complexity of direct application of existing NLP tech-
niques, which needs to solve the NER first to identify an IOC token before addressing
the RE problem to find its context. Our evaluations on a prototype we built show
that this new technique is very effective in practice: it achieved a precision of 95% at
a coverage over 90%. In the meantime, our system is also highly efficient, capable of
analyzing four articles per second even with a single process.
Our discoveries. Running on all 71,000 articles collected from the 45 blogs (includ-
ing AlienVault, Malwarebytes, Webroot, etc.) in the past 13 years (from 2003/01 to
2016/04), iACE automatically extracted 900K IOC tokens together with their con-
text. By inspecting these items and correlating them across different blogs over the
long time frame, we were able to gain an unprecedented understanding of the relations
between different attacks reported, the impact of open-source threat intelligence on
attack evolutions, the defense responses it triggered, as well as the qualities of these
blogs and effectiveness of the IOCs they document. More specifically, we found that
some apparently unrelated attack instances were actually connected, sharing the same
attack assets and infrastructures such as command and control (C&C) hosts. Partic-
ularly, by linking together 396 articles and more than 7,000 IOCs, our study reveals
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that a C&C campaign continued to evolve over a four-year span, changing the tar-
gets of exploits from one vulnerability (CVE-2010-1885) to another (CVE-2013-0422).
Also interestingly, we observed that the attackers might adjust their strategies in re-
sponse to the release of IOCs: e.g., we found that the IOCs receiving intensive reports
tend to be short-lived, typically disappearing after a month.
On the other hand, organizations do not seem to react quickly to the release
of IOCs: it could take around 2 days for AV scanners to include the hash of new
malware and over 12 days for web scanners to update their domain and IP blacklists,
after related information was made public by the blogs. Also, we found that a buffer
overflow vulnerability CVE-2012-0158 was first reported by AlienVault in April, 2012
for APT attacks on the military and aerospace industry and then showed up again in
an article on TrendMicro, September 2012, for an attack on political organizations;
later the same vulnerability was found in malware distribution (2013) and Spear
Phishing campaigns on the film industry (2014) and banks (2015), indicating that
such a long-standing IOC was not adopted timely.
In terms of the qualities of open-source intelligence, we found that Hexacorn and
Naked Security often provide timely and comprehensive information about new at-
tacks. For example, articles from Naked Security first reported three malicious name
servers m.sea.sy, mod.sea.sy and sea.sy under the control of the Syrian Electronic
Army for DNS hijacking. Also, some IOCs apparently are more predictive than oth-
ers. An example is the name server “132.248.49.112”, which was reported by 19 blogs
for the multiple-theme Spear Phishing attack and remained unchanged for 140 days.
Contributions. The contributions of the work are as follows:
• Novel IOC discovery technique. We present iACE, the first fully-automated tech-
nique for generating OpenIOC compatible, semantic-rich intelligence, which addresses
the emerging challenge in the effective analysis of massive open-source data for timely
CTI gathering. Our approach leverages the unique features of IOCs and the way
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they are described in mainstream technical articles to come up with a specialized,
scalable information extraction technique that achieves high accuracy and coverage.
Our evaluation shows that iACE can effectively recover valuable attack indicators
from popular technical blogs and convert it into industry-standard, machine-readable
threat intelligence, which cannot be done by any existing techniques, to the best of
our knowledge.
• New findings. Running iACE on over 71,000 articles from 45 most popular tech-
nical blogs across 13 years, our study sheds new light on the effectiveness of such
open-source intelligence exchange, and the impact that it may have on the secu-
rity industry and the adversary’s strategies. The new understandings are invaluable
for improving the IOC release, discovery and utilization process, contributing to the
better protection of organizations’ information assets.
3.2 Design and Implementation
Although the generic problem of information extraction from natural language text is
hard, particularly when high accuracy and coverage are required, articles documenting
IOCs tend to utilize common technical terminologies (e.g., IP, process, etc.) and
present the artifacts and their context in a predictable way (e.g., utilizing compound
dependency, see the example in Figure 2), thereby making identification of IOCs more
manageable. These unique features were fully leveraged in the design of iACE, which
utilizes high-confidence context terms from iocterms and a set of regexes to locate
the sentences likely containing IOCs. Then iACE analyzed the relations just between
those anchors (the context terms and the putative IOC token) against a model learned
off-line to accurately and efficiently capture IOCs. Below we present the high-level
design of this technique and explicate how it works through an example.
Architecture. Figure 3 illustrates the architecture of iACE, including a blog scraper
(BS), a blog preprocessor (BP), a relevant-content picker (RCP), a relation checker
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(RC) and an IOC generator (IG). The BS first automatically collects (“scrapes”)
technical articles from different technical blogs, removing irrelevant information (e.g.,
advertisements) from individual blog pages. These articles are then inspected by the
BP, using NLP techniques to filter out those unlikely to contain IOCs. For each article
considered to be IOC-relevant, the RCP converts all its content, including pictures,
to text when possible, breaks the content into sentences and other special content
elements (tables and lists) and then searches among the sentences for those likely
involving IOCs with a set of context terms and regexes, which describe the formats
of IOCs such as IP addresses. The context terms here are automatically extracted
from iocterms and can also come from other manually labeled sources, and the regex
is built specifically for each IOC type and its consistency with the content terms
is first checked before the sentence is selected. For each sentence, the RC analyzes
its grammatical structure connecting the context anchors (context terms) and the
IOC anchor (the string matched by the regex), using a learned model to determine
whether the latter is indeed an IOC, and if so, mark the IOC and the context terms.
Using such labeled content, the IG automatically creates the header and the definition
components, including the indicator items for all the IOCs identified, according to
the OpenIOC standard.
An example. Here, we use the excerpts of an article posted on Trustwave (Figure 1)
to go through the whole IOC extraction procedure. From the title and other keywords
identified from the article, using content term extraction (an NLP technique), iACE
detects that the article is likely to contain IOCs for a malware infection, and then
marks the link content and summarizes the article using TextRank [83] to construct
the header component. After that, it converts the figures in the article into text using
Tesseract [11], and searches for the context terms and IOC token on each sentence.















































Figure 3: The architecture of iACE.
fitting the description of a key path of registry, along with the context terms “reg-
istry” and “path”: “It includes the addition of the registry value on the path HKCU\
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run that virus use to maintain per-
sistence.” This sentence is then analyzed against the IOC recognition model built
through relation analysis, which confirms that the connection across the terms and
the IOC anchor here (“HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run”
) is indeed commonly used to describe the key path of an injected registry item. As a
result, these terms and the IOC are labeled. From such content, the technical details
of the attack reported by the article are automatically extracted and presented in the
OpenIOC format (Figure 1).
Assumptions. The current design of our system is for analyzing technical blogs,
under the assumptions that the blog writers present their findings in a professional
fashion. Such assumption is reasonable intuitively, as the blogs are written by se-
curity professionals and their purpose is to quickly share technical details to their
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peers1. It was also confirmed by our analysis of the labeled dataset DS-Labeled . All
their descriptions of IOCs were found to be in line with our assumptions, involving
professional terms and predictable grammatical structures. On the other hand, the
effectiveness of the technique on other types of IOC open sources like online forums
needs to be further studied.
3.2.1 Relevant Content Identification
As mentioned earlier, to automatically extract IOCs from technical blogs, we first
need to scrape related web pages from blog sites, pre-process their content and remove
noise, before filtering out those irrelevant and identifying from the remaining articles
the sentences that may carry IOCs for the follow-up relationship check and IOC
extraction. Here we elaborate on these individual steps.
Blog scraping and pre-processing. Our blog scraper is essentially a crawler de-
signed to continuously monitor a list of technical blogs to collect their articles. For
each blog site, the BS first scraps all its existing articles before it is set to monitoring
mode to look for new ones. Specifically, the scraper performs breadth-first crawling
on the blog, starting from its homepage to explore each link it discovers, until no
new link can be found. A problem here is that the web pages gathered in this way
may not all be articles, and may also contain login pages, contact pages, and others.
To automatically remove these unrelated pages, we leverage two unique observations:
the articles posted on the blog are all framed within the same HTML template, which
is very different from those used by other pages such as login, contact, and others;
also, on any blog site, more article pages are hosted than other types of pages. Based
on the observations, the BS compares each page’s DOM tree with those of others
1Note that asking those professionals to directly post formalized IOCs may not be realistic
in the near future, due to the complexity of manually creating the content and their intent
to get humans involved in the discussion. As a supporting evidence, we examined all 45
blog sites and found only one of them export IOCs in some articles (AlienVault).
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to find out a small set of pages framed over the templates unlike the ones used by
the majority of the pages. These pages are considered to be outliers and dropped
from the dataset scraped from the blog site. In our implementation, the BS uses
the python library beautifulsoup [2] to extract from each page its HTML template
(with tags and attributes but no content) and groups the pages using their templates’
hash values to identify those unrelated to articles (the ones outside the group).
Even on those indeed relevant web pages, there still is content unrelated to the
technical articles, such as blog contributors’ pictures, advertisements, featured con-
tent, etc. Such content needs to be removed before the pages can be used for IOC
identification. This purpose is served by another pre-processing step the BS takes to
get rid of such non-UGC (user-generated-content) data from each page. Specifically,
our approach compares all pages’ DOM trees to find out the nodes with the non-
UCG, characterized by their largely unchanged content across these pages (e.g., blog
contributors’ photos will be the same across different articles). This is different from
the article content generated by the user, which varies significantly between pages.
Such a difference is captured by an information-theoretic metric called composite im-
portance (CI) [125] that is used by the BS to measure the uniqueness of each node on
each page’s DOM tree with regards to other pages: the nodes found to be less unique
(rather common across different pages) are discovered and dropped from the DOM
tree, using an algorithm proposed in the prior research [125].
Under such a “sanitized” DOM tree, still some content cannot be directly analyzed
by our text-based approach, including images and embedded PDF files. So, the last
pre-processing step is to convert such content into text, if it indeed involves text
information. To this end, we incorporated into our implementation of an optical
character recognition engine Tesseract. Tesseract [11] is capable of discovering texts
within an image with an accuracy of 99% in general. However, for the images collected
from blogs, we found that the accuracy went down to merely 70%, due to the low
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quality of the images and the non-dictionary words they often have. To address this
issue, we used Gimp [8] to resize the blog image a for better image quality, and add
to Tesseract the new words (e.g., IP, MD5, HTTP) discovered from the text of an
article. We tested this approach on 100 randomly sampled images from 10 blogs,
which was found to push the accuracy of Tesseract to above 95%.
Topic filtering. Once all the article pages have been selected and pre-processed,
we start looking into their content, first removing those not including any IOCs.
Examples of such articles are those for product promotion, news or software update,
which we call non-IOC articles. To separate the non-IOC articles from those with
IOCs (called IOC articles), iACE runs the TC, a classifier using a set of features as
described below:
• Topic words : Intuitively, an IOC article focuses on security risks and vulnerabili-
ties, whose theme is reflected by its topic terms (e.g., malware, exploit). These terms
are less likely to appear in a non-IOC article. Topic term extraction is an exten-
sively studied NLP technique. In our implementation, we utilized an open-source
tool topia.termextract [19] to collect the terms within each article. The top 20
terms discovered, together with their frequencies, are part of the features for the
classification.
• Article length: Since the blog sites are meant to be the channels for IOC exchanges,
the IOC article it contains tends to be longer, including detailed descriptions of IOCs
and their context, while non-IOC articles in technical blogs are often news and digests,
and hence tend to be shorter.
• Dictionary-word density : Compared with non-IOC articles, IOC articles tend to
have a lower dictionary-word density, because most IOCs are non-dictionary words
(e.g., IP, hash values, file path). Our implementation employs the enchant library [28]
to find dictionary words in an article. Then, its density within the article is calculated
as the ratio of the dictionary words with regards to all the words the article contains.
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Using these features, we ran a support vector machine (SVM) to train a classifi-
cation model over DS-Labeled, including 150 IOC articles and 300 non-IOC articles.
The model was evaluated through a 10-fold cross validation, and found to achieve a
precision of 98% and a recall of approximate 100%. We further used this TC to ana-
lyze all 71,000 articles from the unknown set DS-Unknown (described in Section 6.3.2)
and manually validated 500 instances randomly selected from the classified results
(Section 3.3.2). The validation shows that the classifier had a high accuracy (96%)
and coverage (99%).
IOC sentence identification. From each IOC article, the relevant content picker
identifies the sentences, tables, and lists likely to include IOCs before they are further
evaluated by the relation checker (Section 3.2.2). Such content is selected from the
article based on the anchors they contain, i.e., context terms and putative IOC tokens.
Specifically, the RCP parses the HTML content of each article, breaking the text into
sentences and detecting tables and lists. From each sentence, we look for the presence
of both the string matched by the regex and its compatible context terms: e.g.,
“hash” goes with an MD5 checksum. From tables and lists, we increase the search
scope for context terms also to table headers, captions and the nearest sentences (see
supplementary material). Figure 2 shows an example.
The OpenIOC standard specifies 600 categories of IOCs using a list of iocterms [18].
We further summarized these IOCs into 19 different data types, including IP, hash,
int, float, and others. The regex for each of these categories was manually con-
structed and carefully examined. As we can see here, such expressions could introduce
false positives (e.g., the string type matching many IOC strings, even though often-
times, we only seek non-dictionary words), if we do not also look at the context terms
and the relations between identified tokens. These terms are automatically collected
from the 600 iocterms through tokenizing dictionary-word elements within each ioc-
term and by removing common terms like “item” . We further used Semanticlink [27]
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Figure 4: Workflow of the relation checker (RC).
















to recover other semantic related terms, e.g., “portable executable” (related to PE).
Altogether, we gathered 5,283 context terms in our research, which were found to
indeed provide good coverage of the common terminologies used by technical blogs.
In our research, we gathered 80 public IOC files and their corresponding blog articles
(according to their description tags) from labeled dataset. By manually inspecting
the sentences carrying the IOCs, we found that all such sentences also contain at least
one context term and all such terms are on the list we created.
3.2.2 Relation Checking and IOC Creation
Although context terms and regexes can find us the sentences likely involving IOCs,
they are insufficient for detecting true IOCs with high accuracy. For example, Fig-
ure 2 shows four sentence pairs collected from two articles posted on AlienVault. As
we can see, each pair contains both context terms, like “download”, and the strings
fitting the descriptions of their corresponding IOCs, such as “3344”; however, the
fifth one does not include any real IOC while the third one does. Fundamentally,
the coincidence of relevant tokens (context term and IOC token) does not necessarily
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indicate the presence of an IOC-related description. Most important here is the con-
sistency between the relation of these tokens and what is expected from the narrative
of IOCs: in the above example, 3344 is supposed to be the offset, not the PE file.
Actually, in the case that such a relation is incorrect, even when the IOC extracted
is indeed an attack indicator, its context can be wrong and as a result, the OpenIOC
record created can be erroneous. The third sentence in the figure is such an example.
As mentioned earlier, identifying IOCs is essentially an NER problem and con-
necting them to their context is an RE issue. In the NLP community, solutions to
the problems are pipelined: individual name entities within a sentence are first rec-
ognized (i.e., NER) and then their relation is established (i.e., RE). For our problem,
however, this pipeline becomes unnecessary, since the putative tokens for an IOC
and its context are already located in a sentence, and all we need to do is check the
consistency of their relation with what is expected to happen between them. In other
words, we are in the position to address both the NER and RE together. On the
other hand, existing RE techniques are inapplicable here, because they are designed
to work on the nominal relation between two nouns, whereas the links between an
IOC and its context terms are more diverse, including nominal, verb and adjective
(e.g., “attachment”, “download” and “injected”). To handle such diverse relations,
we came up with an idea that models the analysis on the grammatical connection
between the IOC candidate and its context as a graph mining problem [45]. This
allows us to apply graph similarity comparisons to detect the presence of the desired
relation, which achieves both a high accuracy (95%) and a high coverage (above 90%)
that the more generic RE techniques cannot attain [47]. Below we present how the
approach works.
Relation representation. To analyze the relation between an IOC candidate and
a context term, our approach first uses a dependency parser to transform a sentence
into a DG. A DG describes the grammatical connections between different linguistic
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tokens, with verbs being the structural center of a clause and other tokens directly
or indirectly depending on the center. Such a dependency describes the grammatical
connection among tokens such as direct object, determinant, noun compound modi-
fier, etc. Formally, a DG is a directed and weighted graph g = (V,E,W ), where words
in the sentence are nodes V , two related nodes are connected by an edge E and the
specific grammatical relation linking them together is modeled as an edge weight W .
In our research, the DG was constructed using the Stanford dependency parser [39],
the state-of-the-art open-source tool that converts text to simplified grammatical
patterns suitable for relations extraction.
Unlike the more generic RE techniques, which work on the DG of the whole sen-
tence, our approach takes advantage of the known anchors to focus on the smallest
dependency graph gni,nc connecting an IOC candidate ni and a context term nc to-
gether. This is because the information carried by this subgraph (called core) is most
relevant to the understanding of the relations between the anchors, which is all we
care about (see an example in Figure 4). Note that we also add negation dependen-
cies as child nodes or sibling nodes of the nodes on the core to capture IOC-related
negative descriptions. As an example, in the fourth sentence in Figure 2, the relation
between the context term “modify” and the IOC token “AndroidManifest.xml” is
affected by the word “not”, which adds a negation dependency on the verb “modify”.
Similarity comparison. Over a dependency subgraph gni,nc modeling the relation
between a context term and an IOC candidate, we want to find out whether another
subgraph is similar, which indicates that the same relation also exists between its
anchors. This similarity comparison is important, since it is the foundation for classi-
fying a sentence, determining whether IOC relations are indeed there to bind anchors
or they are not. Given the fact that now we only need to work on simple subgraphs
with a few labeled nodes (see Figure 4), the focus is to compare the paths linking
corresponding nodes (with identical labels) across the subgraphs. For this purpose,
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we customize a well-known graph mining technique, called direct product kernel, a
function that measures the similarity of two graphs by counting the number of all
possible pairs of arbitrarily long random walks with identical label sequences [54].
Specifically, let g1 = (V1, E1,W1) and g2 = (V2, E2,W2) be directed weighted
graphs. The direct product between g1 and g2 is a directed weighted graph G =
g1 × g2 = (V,E,W ), where
V = {(v1, v2) ∈ V1 × V2}
E = {(u1, u2), (v1, v2) ∈ V × V : (u1, v1) ∈ E1, (u2, v2) ∈ E2}
W =
 1, if W1(u1, v1) = W2(u2, v2)0, otherwise
In other words, for each pair of nodes (u1, u2) and (v1, v2) in the new graph G,
they are adjacent (connected by a directed edge) if and only if an edge with the same
direction and weight exists both between u1 and v1 in g1 and between u2 and v2 in
g2. It is important to note that we bring the weights into the product to compare the
type of the grammatical relation between two nodes (words): only when the adjacent
word pairs in two sentences have the same grammatical relation, will that relation
be preserved in the new graph. Usually, it takes O(|V |4) to compute this direct
product. However, all the subgraphs we consider are just “paths” (after removing the
directions) between a context term and an IOC candidate, whose direct product can
be computed in O(|V |2).
Over the direct-product graph G, we calculate the similarity between the two











where each entry of Al is the number of the walks of length l from vi to vj in the
direct product graph G = g1× g2, hence Al can be calculated as the l-th power of the
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adjacency matrix of G; λ is the decay constant and λ ≤ 1
min(di,do)
with di, do being




Classification. Based on our customized direct-product kernel, we run a classifier
(the relation checker) to determine the presence of IOC relations between a con-
text term and an IOC candidate within a sentence. The classifier is trained over
DS-Labeled with 1500 positive instances and 3000 negative instances. From the
dataset, a model is learned to work on a kernel vector generated from the features
of a subgraph gi: (m1, · · · ,mj, · · · ), where mj = k(gi, tj) and tj is the subgraph for
the jth instance in the training set. In other words, each new instance gi is classified
into the positive set (with the IOC relation) or the negative set (without the relation)
based on its similarity with every instance in the labeled set. This classification is
executed efficiently with multi-threading in our implementation.
The classifier can be trained with different kinds of machine learning algorithms.
Our implementation utilizes logistic regression, since the algorithm works well on
a small labeled dataset. More specifically, it optimizes the log likelihood function
to determine a probability that is a logistic function of a linear combination of the
training dataset, and every training point has a certain influence on the estimated
logistic regression function. In our research, we compared the recall and precision
of five classification models on the labeled dataset through a 5-fold cross-validation.
With the regularization parameter set to 3.0, our logistic regression classifier yielded
the best results. On unknown set DS-Unknown , this classification model achieved a
high accuracy (with a precision of 95% and recall of 90%).
IOC creation. After identifying the IOC and its corresponding context terms, our
IOC generator can automatically convert the CTI content of a technical blog to the
OpenIOC record. Specifically, each indicator item in the record is created by filling in
the search attribute in the Context tag with a context term and the Content tag with
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its corresponding IOC. The content of other fields on the item can be derived from
these two fields. For example, the type attribute of the Content tag and the document
attribute of the Context tag are actually the iocterms of the IOC discovered.
For the header of the record, the IG generates the content for the Description tag
using the open-source automatic summarization tool TextRank to create a summary
for the blog article. Also, the original blog link address is used to fill the link tag,
and the content of authored by and authored date tag are set to our prototype
name and the file generation time.
3.3 Evaluation
3.3.1 Settings
In our study, we ran our implementation of iACE to automatically analyze 71,000
real-world technical articles, on an R730xd server with 40 of Intel Xeon E5-2650 v3
2.3GHz, 25M Cache CPUs and 16 of 16GB memories. Here we explain the datasets
used in the study and the parameter settings of the system.
Datasets. We utilized two datasets in our study: a labeled set for training our topic
classifier (Section 3.2.1) and relation checker (Section 3.2.2), and an unknown set for
evaluating our technique.
• Labeled dataset (DS-Labeled). The dataset contains 80 IOC files and their corre-
sponding blog articles. These IOC files were collected in our research from two public
feeds, iocbucket [67] and openiocdb [1], both providing threat intelligence through
OpenIOC items. Under the description tags of these items, we found the links
pointing to these items’ sources and recovered 150 articles from 22 blogs, including
their HTML pages and image files. Also, we manually gathered, from the same blogs,
300 other articles. Each of them was manually checked to ensure that they do not
have any IOCs but contain some IOC-like strings (e.g., IP addresses, MD5, etc.).
Most of them are technical news or articles for product promotion.
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From these articles, we further extracted two kinds of sentences, those with IOCs
(true IOC sentences) and those without but involving IOC-like strings (false IOC
sentences). More specifically, the 1,500 true IOC sentences were identified using
the context terms and IOC tokens specified in the OpenIOC items we collected,
and further manually inspected to ensure their correctness. The 3,000 false IOC
sentences were those matched by the regular expressions and context terms used by
iACE (Section 3.2.1) but did not include any IOCs, as confirmed by a manual check.
• Unknown set (DS-Unknown). As mentioned earlier, the dataset used for evaluating
our system was gathered from 45 security-related technical blogs. These blogs are well
recognized to be the leading sources for CTI collection, which includes AlienVault,
Malwarebytes, and others (see supplementary material for the full list). On these
blogs, we ran a crawler that scraped 71K articles posted there between 2003/04 and
2016/05. Figure 5(a) shows the increase of the number of the articles per month on
these blogs over 13 years.
Parameter settings. In the experiments, the parameters of our prototype system
were set as follow:
•Kernel decay constant (λ). The decay constant is a parameter for calculating a direct
product when the impact of a long random walk needs to be discounted (Section 3.2.2).
It was set according to the convention of evaluating the kernel function: λ = 0.9 if
1
min(di,do)
= 1 and λ = 1
min(di,do)
otherwise.
• Inverse of regularization strength (C). Regularization is a parameter for reducing
the over-fitting to the labeled data when we built the relation models using logisti-
cal regression. In our implementation, we utilized a C = 3.0, which gave the best
performance among other C values from 0.3 to 15.
• Threshold of sentence length (l). The current dependency parser is limited by its
capability to process long sentences. When a sentence grows longer, the accuracy of
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(a) The number of the articles per month. (b) ROC curve of iACE.
Figure 5: The increase in the number of articles over 13 years and the effectiveness
of iACE.
parsing goes down and its overhead goes up. In our implementation, we set the max-
imum length of the sentence to 200 words. Given IOCs may exist in sentence length
larger than 200 words, we directly extract IOCs from sentences longer than 200 words
without building dependency graphs. In our implementation, we directly extract the
IOCs from sentences longer than 200 words if the sentence has two continuous IOC
tokens or has more than five IOC tokens which were split by short terms (less than 5
characters) (see supplementary material).
3.3.2 Results
Accuracy and coverage. In our study, we first evaluated the topic classifier (i.e.,
TC) over the 450 IOC and non-IOC articles, and the relevant content picker and
the relation checker (i.e., RCP/RC) over 1,500 true IOC sentences and 3,000 false
IOC sentences in DS-Labeled, both using a five-fold cross-validation. Our prototype
achieved a precision of 98% and a recall of 100% in finding IOC articles, and a precision
of 98% and a recall of 92% in identifying true IOCs and its context. Figure 5(b)
illustrates the ROC curve of the RCP and RC.
Further, we ran our system over DS-Unknown across all 71K articles. Altogether,
iACE automatically extracted IOC tokens and their context terms, and further con-
verted them into OpenIOC items. To understand the accuracy and coverage of the
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information extracted, we sampled the unknown set using two different methods: we
first grouped the articles in the unknown set according to their publication time (4
consecutive months per group), and then their publishers (45 blogs), and in each case,
we randomly picked up a few articles from each group. Altogether, in this validation
step, we manually inspected 820 articles and in total, 25K reported sentences, and
concluded that iACE achieved a precision of 95% (23K out of 25K reported IOCs
were correct), and a recall of 90% (across the articles, 90% of IOCs were reported).
Table 3: The number of samples and average accuracy and recall in each method.
Method # of Groups Samples per Group Precision Recall
Time span 39 10 93% 92%
Blog 45 10 96% 91%
To compare our approach with state-of-the-art alternatives, we ran iACE against
the top-of-the-line NER tool Stanford NER [53] and the commercial IOC identifier
integrated within AlienVault OTX [30]. Note that none of them (actually none of
the existing systems we are aware of) can also identify the context for an IOC and
therefore generate machine-readable OpenIOC items. In our experiment, Stanford
NER was trained on our labeled true/false IOC sentences as describe in Section 6.3.2
(the same set for training iACE). For AlienVault OTX, we utilized its API to submit
articles to their web service and retrieve the IOC tokens identified. This study shows
that our relation-based approach is indeed much more effective. Specifically, we ran
all three systems on 500 randomly selected articles from 25 blogs in DS-Unknown
and compared their findings: iACE extracted the IOC items across 427 OpenIOC
categories, such as FileDownload HistoryItem/FileName, Email/ReceivedFromIP,
with a precision of 98% and a recall of 93%, while OTX could only find the IOCs in
8 categories (IP, hash value, domain, etc.) with a precision of 72% and a recall of
56%, a performance mirrored by Stanford NER. Both OTX and Stanford NER tend
to introduce a lot of false positives: for example, OTX treated the reference links of
articles as malicious URLs. Table 4 summarizes the result of this study.
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AlienVault OTX 72% 56%
Stanford NER 71% 47%
Performance. To understand the performance of iACE, we measured the time it
spent on each real-world article in the unknown set and the breakdowns of the over-
head in each analysis stage, BP, RCP, RC, and IG. In the experiment, our prototype
was running on our R730xd server, using 40 threads. On average, it took around 0.25
second to inspect one article, as illustrated in Table 5. This result provides strong
evidence that iACE can easily scale to the level expected for processing a massive
amount of CTI generated every day.
Table 5: Running time at different stages.






In the meantime, considering the DG parser is largely affected by sentence length,
we measure the performance of the RC model in different sentence lengths. Figure 6
illustrates the average running time on sentences of different lengths. We found that
the running time of iACE gradually increases when sentence length increases. This
is because iACE only extracts the shortest paths linking each pair of a context token
and the IOC token, which mitigates the impact of sentence length .
3.4 Measurement and Analysis
The IOCs automatically extracted from the 71,000 articles on 45 blogs present to us
a comprehensive view of the cyber threats that the world has been facing in the past
13 years. By analyzing these IOCs, looking at their relations and evolution over a
large time frame, across thousands of articles, our study brings to light new findings of
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Figure 6: Average running time on the sentences in different lengths.
attacks’ strategies and evolution, as well as new insights into the impact of open-source
intelligence. Particularly, we found that hundreds of apparently independent attacks
were actually related, sharing unique IOCs such as IP address, register’s email and
domain, etc. Among them, a set of command and control (C&C) servers were reported
by 396 articles (with little reference among them) and linked to over 7,000 unique
IOCs over a four-year span, indicating that these separate attacks could all be part
of a massive, previously unknown campaign. Further, through correlating different
articles, we observe that the same vulnerability has been continuously utilized for
a long period of time. Also, the IOCs intensively reported tend to be short-lived,
demonstrating the possible impacts of the CTI on the adversaries. On the defender
side, the response to the IOCs seems less timely than one hopes, taking days to get
IOCs into malware scanners, blacklists etc. Also, our study reveals the quality of the
IOCs reported by different blogs and the ways these blogs react to emerging threats,
which helps better understand the effectiveness of such intelligence sources. Below
we elaborate on the details of this study.
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3.4.1 Landscape
Our study shows that these technical blogs are indeed a gold mine for threat intelli-
gence gathering: altogether, 900K IOCs and their context were recovered from 71,000
articles (20K IOC articles), including 20K exploit hash values, 55K registry key, 58K
malicious IPs, 180K FQDNs etc. Table 6 presents the 10 IOC types (described by
their corresponding iocterms) with the most instances found by iACE. We observe
the largest amount of IOCs with the type PortItem/remoteIP, which was related to
the popularity of drive-by-download, Phishing and other web attacks in the wild.

















We looked into the distribution of IOCs across different articles and blogs, as
illustrated by the cumulative distributions for the numbers of IOCs and iocterms
displayed in Figure 7(a). On average, each article contains 52 IOCs and 70% of the
articles have more than 10 IOCs. Particularly, the blog hpHost has 350 IOCs per
article, the largest one among the blogs we inspected. Also, an article on CyberCrime
talking about a Google redirection Spam reported 3,417 IOCs. When it comes to the
diversity of IOC context, we found that on average, each article includes 6 different
iocterms and 30% of articles have more than 10 different iocterms. Also interestingly,
the blog with more IOCs does not necessarily come with more diverse IOC types: for
example, even though hpHost has the largest number of IOC per article, each article
only has 8 iocterms.
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(a) Cumulative distri-
butions for the numbers
of IOCs and iocterms
per article.
(b) Cumulative distri-
bution of the numbers
of articles and reference
per cluster.
Figure 7: Distribution of IOCs across different articles and clusters across
different blogs.
3.4.2 Understanding Threats
Through mining the IOCs across articles and blogs, we gained new insights into
reported attacks and discovered connections never known before. Such connections
shed new light on the way the adversaries organize their campaigns and adapt their
techniques. Further linking the reported IOCs to auxiliary data sources reveals the
impact of such CTI on the responses to emerging threats.
Correlation analysis. To understand the relations across different attack campaigns
reported by articles, we studied the sharing of critical attack resources in these cam-
paigns, through measuring their common infrastructure-related IOCs, including IP,
register’s email and domain. Specifically, using these IOCs, we were able to group
all the articles into 527 clusters (each group with more than three articles): two arti-
cles were put in the same cluster if they share at least one IOC IP, email or domain.
Note that we removed IP addresses in the private address ranges (10.*.*.*, 172.16.*.*,
192.168.*.* ). To find out whether those in the same cluster actually refer to a com-
mon source, so they essentially talk about the same attack instance, we also looked at
the URLs in each of the articles to identify those pointing to the 45 blogs and other
well-known intelligent sources. Figure 7(b) illustrates the distribution of the clusters
with various percentages of the articles involving such references. It turns out that
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many clusters (including thousands of articles) have low reference percentages: in
other words, the authors of these articles apparently did not realize that the attacks
they were documenting were related to other instances.
We further picked out 5 clusters with at least 25 articles but at most 5% of them
include references to others. None of such reference-carrying articles were found to
mention the relations among the attack instances reported by other articles in the
same clusters. Also, a sampling of these articles did not show any references to
other blogs not on our list. This indicates that the infrastructure relations linking
all these attacks together have never been reported before, which was confirmed by
our additional search for related literature across the Internet. Table 7 provides the
information about those clusters. Most interestingly, we found that for the IOC
“132.248.49.112”, a shared IP reported by 19 blogs, turned out to point to a C&C
campaign’s name server. We believe that all the independently documented attacks
actually belonged to a massive campaign whose scale was not known before. Note
that this correlation effort is highly important because it informs us of the critical
resources attackers share, which are likely to be their weakest link.
Table 7: The 5 Clusters.





# of IOCs of total
# of ref-
erences
1 396 7,363 10,533 21
2 178 4,271 8,110 3
3 30 215 960 0
4 28 897 1,302 0
5 25 897 1,222 0
Evolution. Looking into the C&C campaign reported by 396 articles and related
to 7,000+ unique IOCs, we were surprised to find that it lasted for a long time
(2009-2013), and continued to adapt its attack strategies and techniques. Specifically,
it distributed malware by sending Spam emails to users, compromising legitimate
websites, and others, and the vulnerabilities it exploited evolved from CVE-2010-1885
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to CVE-2013-0422. In the meantime, the campaign utilized a small set of IPs for its
C&C servers, and some of them share the same register email “gkook@checkjemail.
nl”. Apparently, taking down these servers could significantly affect the effectiveness
of this long lasting, large-scale attack.
Another step we took to correlate the attacks reported by different articles was
to cluster them according to the indicators of their attack vectors, including malware
hash, vulnerability CVE and the content of the registries. The purpose is to under-
stand the evolution of the vectors with regard to the releases of related IOCs. To this
end, we looked at the shortest period of time, in terms of the number of consecutive
months, during which a specific IOC (e.g., 132.248.49.112) was continuously covered
by new articles. This period, which we call “decay time”, demonstrates how long the
attack instances related to the IOC continue to pop up before they can be stopped
(at least temporarily). As illustrated in Table 8, in general, we found that the IOCs
reported by a large number of articles tend to disappear quickly, indicating that either
the related problems were quickly fixed or the adversaries reacted to the reports to
change their strategies. However, there are long-lasting IOCs even though they are
well known: as a prominent example, a buffer overflow vulnerability CVE-2012-0158
kept showing up in blog articles for four months, and after a few recesses, continues
to appear in other attacks over a four year period! Specifically, it was used in APT
attacks on the military and aerospace industry (2012/04), and then on political or-
ganizations (2012/09), generic malware distribution (2013), and more recently Spear
Phishing attacks on the film industry (2014) and banks (2015). This clearly shows
that organizations have not done their due diligence to adequately respond to the
problem.
IOC impacts. Further, we studied the impact of such open-source intelligence on
security protection: whether the security industry (e.g., anti-virus service providers)
quickly responded to the reports of IOCs. To this end, we estimated the possible
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time intervals between the first release of the IOCs and their adoption by anti-virus
(AV) tools and web scanners. In our research, we submitted a set of IOCs, including
IPs and domains of malicious sources, and the hashes of malware to VirusTotal [20],
a platform that hosts 56 mainstream AV scanners and CleanMX [42], an IP/URL
scanner. From VirusTotal, we collected the time stamps for the first time when the
submitted IOCs were seen by at least one of the AV systems. For CleanMX, we
fetched its IP/URL blacklist database archived from 2009/01 to 2015/04. We found
that 47% of the IOCs were updated to these systems before they were reported by the
blogs. For the rest of them, Figure 8(a) shows the distributions of the duration after
such an IOC was released and before it was first used for a scan. We observed days of
delay before the IOCs were put in place for protection, if indeed the uploading time
(or the time when the IOCs were first used for a scan) was close to the moment when
the IOCs (IP, domains, hashes) were added to the systems. Particularly, for IPs and
domains, the whole process often took more than 12 days. On the other hand, the
malware hashes were often quickly added, in most cases within 2 days.
3.4.3 Understanding Intelligence Sources
The availability of the longitudinal data (the IOCs collected over a span of 13 years)
also enables us to investigate the qualities of the indicators produced by different
sources and their timeliness against new threats, as reported below.
Timeliness. Using the aforementioned attack clusters (see Table 7), we analyzed the
distribution of the articles first reporting the attacks over different blogs, as shown
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(a) Distributions of the
duration after an IOC
was released and before
it was uploaded for a
scan.
(b) Cumulative distri-
butions for the numbers
of first-reported blog
per cluster.
Figure 8: IOC impacts and timeliness of blog.

















Dancho Danchev 42% 62% 14% 84%
Naked Security 43% 55% 54% 45%
THN 38% 38% 41% 51%
Webroot 54% 79% 13% 84%
ThreatPost 26% 37% 52% 29%
TaoSecurity 57% 61% 31% 68%
Sucuri 34% 35% 43% 52%
PaloAlto 39% 44% 15% 87%
Malwarebytes 32% 48% 26% 72%
Hexacorn 49% 57% 59% 76%
in Figure 8(b). We found that 10 blogs were responsible for the first report of 60%
the clusters (each cluster likely to be a campaign). For example, the blog Dancho
Danchev first report 12 clusters, each time involving 45 IOCs on average, which later
also showed up on other blogs.
Table 9 shows the average percentage of IOCs first reported among all the IOCs
finally discovered from a cluster (i.e., the number of first-reported IOCs and those
only reported once vs. the total number of IOCs in a cluster). We found that most
IOCs reported first by Hexacorn and Naked Security were also mentioned by other
blogs later. Also, they provide a large amount of IOCs not documented by other blogs.
We observed that even though Webroot only has an average of 13% of the earliest-
reported IOCs for the clusters we monitored, 84% of its IOCs were not reported by
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other sources.
Completeness. On the other hand, the early reports often only contain a small
portion of IOCs. In our study, we measured the percentages of the IOC tokens and
their iocterms for different attack clusters that were included in the first report: 6
blogs reported more than 40% of the IOC tokens and 9 blogs covered more than 50%
of iocterms (related to attack behavior) per cluster. We further checked the blogs
whose articles give the most complete descriptions of attack clusters. Altogether,
TaoSecurity were found to have the largest number of such articles.
Robustness. In our research, we compared the robustness of different IOC tokens,
in terms of their stability across the whole period of an attack cluster (the clusters
in Table 7). From the data mentioned above, we found that the name server, C&C
server, registry email are the most robust indicators, which remained unchanged in
10 to 30 percent of the clusters we analyzed (see Table 9). Using such information,
we further measured the blogs likely to report these tokens: the top blogs providing
most of such tokens (i.e., the number of robust IOCs vs. the number of total IOCs in
a cluster) are in Table 9. Interestingly, looking into the IPs of these servers, we found
that many of them actually shared the same IP prefixes, which makes us believe that
they might all come from a small set of malicious Autonomous Systems.
3.5 Discussion
Our study shows that iACE makes an important step toward fully automated cyber
threat intelligence gathering. This is significant not only for the convenient collection
of information, but also for effective analysis of such information, as demonstrated
by our measurement study. With a large amount of IOCs automatically recovered
from the wild and converted into a machine-readable form, their intrinsic relations
can be quickly discovered and effectively utilized to counter emerging threats. For
example, knowing the sharing of C&C servers across multiple attack instances could
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enable the defender to disable or block the servers to stop the attacks. On the other
hand, our current design is still preliminary. Here, we discuss the limitations of our
systems and potential follow-up research.
Error/missing analysis. Our study shows that iACE has a high accuracy and
coverage, well beyond what standard NLP techniques can achieve. However, still our
technique introduces some false discoveries and misses some IOCs. These problems
mostly come from the limitations of underlying tools we use and abnormal ways of
presentation. Specifically, Tesseract, the optical character recognizer, is less than
perfect, and its accuracy affects the outcome of our analysis. Also, the state-of-the-
art dependency parser still cannot maintain its accuracy when sentences become too
long. Even though iACE only works on the shortest path between an IOC and its
context token, which mitigates the problem, still there are sentences too long for the
parser to understand the dependencies between words correctly. Also, adding to the
complication are typos: as an example, in the case that one forgets to put a space after
the period, a sentence becomes stuck with the follow-up one, which could cause an
error in IOC sentence identification. Another interesting observation is that in some
articles, authors deliberately misspell URLs to prevent the readers from inadvertently
clicking on them: e.g., changing “http” to “hxxp” or add “[]” among dot in a URL.
iACE includes a list of typical obfuscation tricks to recognize such transfers. However,
there are always approaches we do not recognize, making IOC tokens fall through the
cracks. Furthermore, a large amount of polluted original contents of articles might
also lead to false discoveries. For example, an active attacker can compromise the
blog websites and inject fake IOCs into the articles, so as to trigger iACE to report
false IOCs. Further effort is needed to better address these issues.
Other intelligence sources and standards. The current design of iACE is for
gathering threat intelligence from technical blogs, based on the unique ways that IOCs
are described. We believe that it will also work well on other equally or more formal
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sources, such as white papers and other technical articles (e.g., research papers),
though further study is certainly needed here. What is less clear is the technique’s
effectiveness on less formal sources, like technical forums (e.g., Google groups [9],
SecurityFocus [13]). The writing styles there are bit different, particularly, the use of
more diverse context terms and the sentences with irregular grammatical structures.
Extending iACE to this setting needs further effort. Also, the intelligence sources
we use to feed iACE are all English articles. Considering the intelligence sources of
other languages, iACE should import new modules for language translation of context
terms and re-trained dependency parser of different languages. Further, as mentioned
earlier, iACE is meant to support the OpenIOC CTI model. Although there are other
models such as STIX [17] and yara [22], tools exist to convert the information across
these standards.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present iACE, a novel technique for automatic extraction of IOCs
from unstructured text. iACE is designed to specialize NLP techniques to threat
intelligence gathering, combining the NER and RE steps together based on the unique
features of IOCs and the technical articles describing them. By anchoring a sentence
with putative IOC tokens and context terms, our approach can efficiently validate
the correctness of these elements using their relations, through a novel application of
graph similarity comparison. This simple technique is found to be highly effective,
vastly outperforming the top-of-the-line industry IOC analyzer and NER tool in terms
of precision and coverage. Our evaluation of over 71,000 articles released in the past
13 years further reveals intrinsic connections across hundreds of seemingly unrelated
attack instances and the impacts of open-source IOCs on the defense against emerging
threats, which highlights the significance of this first step toward fully automated
cyber threat intelligence gathering.
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CHAPTER IV
CHARACTERIZING LONG-TAIL SEO SPAM ON CLOUD
WEB HOSTING SERVICES
4.1 Introduction
Long-tail Search Engine Optimization (SEO) provides an opportunity for online ad-
vertisers to target niche markets. Instead of traditional SEO that targets a single
keyword or shorter keyword phrases, long-tail SEO targets longer and more specific
keyword phrases that tend to be directly related to specific products and locations.
For example, a furniture marketing web page using long-tail SEO might target a
more specific keyword phrase “contemporary Art Decoinfluenced semicircle lounge”
rather than targeting “furniture”. The advantages of long-tail SEO are that there
is less competition for higher search rankings and it has been shown that specific
searches are far more likely to convert to sales than generic searches [76]. As with
most profitable online segments, long-tailed search results are being polluted by search
engine spammers that manipulate search engine results using blackhat long-tail SEO
techniques.
While long-tail SEO spamming has been an ongoing issue, the emergence of cloud
web hosting services, such as Amazon S3 and Google Drive, provides a new and effec-
tive platform for dispersing long-tail SEO spam. The attractiveness of cloud hosting
is that it offers fast, reliable and cheap (sometimes free) hosting. In addition, they
provide a domain name that is shared by many of their users. This makes it infea-
sible to blacklist all content from a cloud hosting provider, which causes blacklist
maintainers to expend more effort to build finer grained blacklists. Figure 9 shows
an example of long-tail poisoning utilizing Google Drive, in which the second search
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Figure 9: Example of long-tail poisoning utilizing cloud hosting platform. The
second result returned here are doorway page hosting on Google’s cloud hosting
platform Google Drive.
result obtained from the long-tail keyword query “Salvatore Ferragamo Bali Rosso
Footwear” is a doorway page with no useful content and affiliate links that are cat-
egorized as search spam by most search engines. Although there are indications of
the presence of long-tail SEO spam in cloud hosting, characterizing the details of how
such a spam attack is mounted, its effectiveness and spammers’ ability to evade cloud
platform’s countermeasures have not been documented.
In this paper, we conduct the first measurement study of long-tail SEO spam
hosted on cloud platforms. We bootstrapped our study by identifying spam cloud
directories on cloud hosting platforms, in which doorway pages have largely homo-
geneous content in terms of their keywords and DOM structures. This enabled us to
locate 930 spam cloud directories on Amazon S3 and 672 spam cloud directories on
Google Drive, as well as other cloud platforms. Our analysis of the doorway pages’
content revealed that they were utilizing relatively unsophisticated blackhat SEO
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techniques, such as keyword stuffing (which is the repetition of keyword phrases mul-
tiple times) and keyword spam (which includes unrelated keywords). Also, we found
that the SEO spammers made use of evasion techniques, such as link shorteners and
obfuscated client-side JavaScript to hide affiliate links when cloud platforms do not
support server-side scripting.
In order to understand the effectiveness of these long-tail SEO spam campaigns,
we monitored 236,368 long-tailed keyword searches over the course of one year. Based
on our analysis, we observed that 6% of the cloud-hosted doorway pages polluted the
top 10 search results of long-tail keywords, and 32% of the top 100 search results.
These doorway pages indicate the high-level of effectiveness of polluting long-tailed
search results. We also found that almost all of the doorway pages were monetized
by including links to reputable affiliate programs such as Prosperent, ClickBank and
VigLink.
To understand the profitability of long-tail SEO spam on cloud hosting platforms,
we analyzed the estimated revenue and click-through rate for a single campaign, which
showed spammers were earning a modest sum of approximately $400 USD each per
month. In addition, we noted that their click-through rates were increasing by 20%
over time. Finally, we monitored ongoing interventions by the cloud service providers.
We found that service providers’ efforts to detect and remove doorway pages had
limited effectiveness, as long-tail SEO campaigns remained active. Doorway pages
on cloud hosting platforms have an average lifetime of 7 weeks, which is much longer
than those hosted on traditional platforms (i.e., 1 week [60]).
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to present a comprehensive
understanding of long-tail SEO spam on cloud web hosting platforms and its effects.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
1. We propose a methodology to identify cloud directories containing long-tail SEO
spam, which discovered 3,186 abusive cloud directories on 10 mainstream cloud
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platforms.
2. We conduct a measurement study of long-tail SEO spam on the cloud, which
provides insights into its effectiveness, its use of cloud resources, network char-
acteristics and revenue models.
3. Our empirical study shows that the cloud service provider’s efforts to prevent
these abusive usages are yet to be effective.
4.2 Abusive Cloud Directory Identification
In this section, we explain the methodology used in our study for abusive cloud
directory identification. In the data collection stage, we first selected SEO targeted
keywords to feed the search engine to identify the doorway pages on the cloud hosting
service. Then, we utilized the directory structure of cloud hosting service to find other
doorway pages. In the abusive cloud directory identification stage, since the long-tail
SEO campaigns show high similarity in page contents in the same directories, we
trained a classifier to identify the cloud directories hosting long-tail SEO spam.
4.2.1 Data Collection
In the data collection stage, we first collected the ‘seed’ web pages on the cloud host-
ing service. Specifically, we fed the SEO targeted keywords to the search engine,
and used the Google Web Search API to pull the links that appeared in the search
results. Second, since the web pages on the cloud platforms are organized into di-
rectories, we also crawled additional web pages in the same directories. Then, a web
crawler followed the links in the page, collected their redirection chains, and stored
the intermediate URL information in our local database.
Seed Data Collection. Selecting appropriate keyword phrases to feed the search
engine is critical for obtaining representative results. To analyze the long-tail SEO
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spam in cloud hosting services, we first choose ‘hot’ keyword phrases and spammy
keywords phrases. These keywords reflect what people are searching for and what
SEOs are targeting. Further, we use the Google Web Search API to pull the top 100
search results for each term from the Google search engine. In this paper, we analyze
the long-tail SEO spam on 10 leading cloud hosting services as listed in Table 10.
This set of crawled pages is defined as a seed dataset Ds, which contains 32,177 cloud
URLs and 20,328 cloud directories.
For the first set of search terms, we employ popular trending keywords from Google
Trend hot keywords [55]. We collect the top 20 popular search terms in 64 categories
across various search interests including entertainment, education and technology.
For the second set of search terms, we target some specific keywords which spammers
also target. We utilized a spam trigger word list [44], which includes 200 spammy
words such as “payday loan” and “casino no deposit”. In addition, we gathered 20
pharmaceutical keywords, including a number of the most-prescribed and best-selling
product terms from IMS Health [64]. Note that to restrict the search results to
each cloud platform, we included the query “site:cloud service’s domain name” (e.g.,
site:s3.amazonaws.com) before the aforementioned keyword phrases.
56















Directory Dataset Collection. On the cloud hosting service, the web pages are
organized as directories. For example, a typical URL of a web page in cloud hosting
service is as follows:
scheme : //dir name.domain/file name
where scheme is the protocol, e.g., HTTPS; the dir name is the name of the directory
shown as sub-domain; and the file name is the path of the file in the cloud directory
which is customized by the user. All pages from the same directory have the same
dir name component.
As the pages are organized as a directory in the cloud hosting service, the crawler
further explores the web pages in the cloud directories which house the pages in a seed
dataset Ds. Specifically, we extract the directory names from cloud URLs in the seed
dataset, and then conduct another search engine query to restrict the search results
to each cloud directory. Specifically, we use the keyword “site: dir name.domain”
(e.g., site:abc.s3.amazonaws.com) for the search engine query.
In this way, we generated an expanded dataset Dd, which contains 1,073,642
URLs. Ideally, the expanded dataset Dd should include all the cloud directories in
the seed dataset Ds. However, as cloud platforms took action to delete the doorway
pages during the course of our study, we found that 4,554 cloud directories expired.
Table 11 shows the summary of the collected data.
To analyze the behavior of these cloud pages, we ran a dynamic crawler (as a
Firefox add-on) to visit each cloud web page with the Referrer as google.com, and
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recorded the web activities it triggered, including network request, response, and
browser events. For this purpose, we deployed 20 dynamic crawlers, which were
hosted on Redhat Virtual Machines with distinct IP addresses.
4.2.2 Abusive Cloud Directory Classification
Automated spam page identification on large-scale web pages is an open research
question and there are no clear rules for absolute positive identification [50][86]. From
the quality guidelines from Google [57], the four categories that indicate spam pages
are as follows: (a) Pages generated by an automated tool or automated processes, such
as Markov chains. (b) Pages optimized for a specific keyword or phrase, that then
funneled users to a single destination. (c) Pages with product affiliate links on which
the product descriptions and reviews are copied directly from the original merchant,
without any original content or added value. (d) Pages dedicated to embedding
content such as video, images, or other media from other sites without substantial
added value to the visitor.
A set of heuristics were used to developed a classifier, and to detect the cloud
directories used for long-tail SEO. (1) The web pages in the abusive cloud directories
were optimized for a series of similar long-tail keywords. This is because to promote
a targeted content, the long-tail SEO web pages utilize several long-tail keywords
generated for a specific content. For example, to promote the web pages for “green
coffee bean”, the corresponding long-tail keywords could be “green coffee bean cap-
sules australia”, “green coffee bean capsules uk” and “green coffee bean amazon uk”.
(2) The web pages in the abusive cloud directories show high similarity in content
and sometimes funnel visitors to the same destination websites. This is because the
abusive long-tail SEO web pages are typically generated from automatic tools with
a limited number of templates, and thus the web pages in the cloud directories are
very similar in their DOM (i.e., document object model) structure.
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Our classification began by labeling the abusive cloud directories and non-abusive
directories for training. To label the cloud directories for long-tail SEO spam, we
sorted the cloud directories by the number of files in the directories and manually
examined the web pages. In this way, we identified 100 abusive cloud directories
(10 directories on 10 cloud platforms) meeting the aforementioned definition of long-
tail SEO spam. To label the non-abusive directories, we extracted the second-level
domains of the URLs embedded in the cloud web pages and sorted them by their
frequency of appearance. We manually examined the pages and their corresponding
cloud directories with the bottom 500 second-level domains from different directories
to label the non-abusive directories. Also, for those pages without an embedded URL
or JavaScript, we checked if their corresponding cloud directories were non-abusive.
In this way, we label 100 non-abusive cloud directories.
We extracted features from the labeled dataset in an automated fashion. Specifi-
cally, we used two sources of inputs for features: the directory features and the web
pages in the directories. For the cloud directory features, we observe that the file
names in the abusive cloud directories show greater similarity. This is because key-
words in URLs can increase the clickthrough rate in the search engine result pages
[70], and the abusive user tends to make the long-tail keywords visible in the URLs.
Hence, highly similar long-tail keywords in URLs show as similar file names in the
abusive cloud directories. To calculate the file names’ cosine-similarity, we extract
the file names from the path component of the cloud URL, and then tokenize them
into words using separators such as ‘-’ and ‘_’. Then, the words in each file name
is converted into a sparse vector, and we calculate cosine-similarity for the vectors in
the same cloud directories.
For the web page in the directories, the main reason we extract features from the
raw HTML is that long-tail doorway pages in the abusive cloud directories shows
59
high similarity in page content, such as meta keywords, page title and page tem-
plate because of automatic page generation. To extract HTML source features, we
follow a conventional n-gram approach. Particularly, we choose to build 3-gram fea-
tures. The rationale is that a 3-gram can capture the structure for a sequence (e.g.,
affid=12345) very well. Each Meta keyword, URL and script in the web page is
segmented into words so that each word is either one of the reserved characters in
‘! * ’ ( ) ; : @ & = + \$ , / ? \% # [ ] ’ , or contains no reserved charac-
ters. We convert each word into a sparse vector with the dimensions of the same
number of 3-grams. On each dimension, the value is proportional to the frequency of
the corresponding n-gram. Each vector is normalized to have the L1 norm [93].
Subsequently, we trained a SVM (i.e., support vector machine) [93] classifier over
the training set. We evaluated the predictive accuracy of the classifier by perform-
ing 10-fold cross-validation on the labeled dataset, yielding a 92% rate of successful
classification. In the end, the algorithm classified 3,186 abusive cloud directories.
To validate these predictions, we manually inspected additional subsets of unlabeled
examples. Without loss of generality, we utilize Chernoff Bounds [84] to estimate the
number of pages to be sampled. We set the trust interval δ = 0.01 and the error
probability λ = 0.01 to obtain the number of sampled cloud directories n = 500.
After manually inspecting the sampled cloud directories, we find that around 12 of
the cloud directories are false positives which is consistent with the predicted 92%
rate.
4.2.3 Ethical concerns
In order to avoid unintentionally advertising for abusive actors, we do not include
the actual names of abusive cloud directories and vendors. Instead of including the
raw URL of spam directories and doorway pages, we adopt the naming convention of
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Figure 10: Number of abusive cloud directories on each cloud platform.
<cloud provider>_<affiliate program+number> to minimize the impact on pri-
vacy. When including content from these doorway pages we redact all raw identifiers,
such as URLs, identifying comments and other potentially identifying information.
Also, we limit our analysis to public URLs that are indexed by a search engine for
identification and measurement. We did not try to access the base directory listings
in order to minimize the impact on privacy.
4.3 Long-tail SEO on the cloud
In this section, we study the effectiveness of long-tail SEO spam on cloud web hosting
services, i.e., the prevalence of long-tail SEO spam on cloud web hosting as well as
their impact on organic long-tail keywords search results. We found that 6% of the
long-tail SEO doorway pages we observed successfully poisoned the top-10 search
results for long-tail keywords included in our study. Then, we provide a perspective
of the blackhat SEO techniques and the evasion techniques the abusive user adapted
for the cloud web hosting platforms.
Overview. We start by discussing the prevalence of abusive cloud directories for
long-tail SEO spam on cloud web hosting platforms. Of the 15,774 cloud directories
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we collected, we found that 3,186 directories (318,470 doorway pages) were long-tail
SEO spam.
Figure 10 illustrates the number of abusive cloud directories on each cloud plat-
forms. Among them, Amazon S3 is the most popular (28%) in our dataset, followed
by Google Drive (22%). The result shows that the abusive cloud directories for long-
tail SEO is being hosted on cloud platforms. Note that of these 10 cloud platforms,
eight of them provide free hosting services (e.g., 5GB for Amazon S3, 15GB for Google
Drive), and therefore are ideal platforms for low-budget abusive users. These users
also take advantage of the pay-as-you-go feature of cloud hosting to conduct low cost
long-tail SEO, which does not require traditional SEO back linking techniques [72][73].
Lastly, long-tail SEO pages hosted on the cloud are more difficult to blacklist since
cloud hosting domains also host a large amount of benign content.
Effectiveness of Long-tail SEO. To analyze the search engine poisoning impact
of long-tail SEO spam on the cloud, we extracted 236,368 distinct long-tail keywords
from doorway pages in the abusive cloud directories we identify, and then crawled
the top 100 organic Google search results of the long-tail keywords from 10/2014 to
10/2015.
To extract the keywords, we implemented a stuffed keyword extraction tool based
on n-grams. We define an N-gram as a contiguous sequence of n words in the
HTML files. First, we extract the text from the DOM tree using an open-source
tool BeautifulSoup and use white space as the token separator. Then, we calculate
the frequency of each n-gram. In our implementation, we set the range of n from 3 to
the length of page title l. After that, we compared the n-gram tokens’ frequencies f
where n ∈ [3, l] and used the n-gram token with the largest keyword density d = n×f
T
as the stuffed keywords, where n is the length of the keyword token, f is its frequency
and T is the number of words in a page.
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(a) Evolution of number of poisoned long-tail keyword.
(b) Long-tail poisoned keyword length distribution.
(c) Evolution of number of doorway pages.
Figure 11: Effectiveness of Long-tail SEO spam.
For example, the owner of the abusive cloud directories on Google Drive uploaded a
keyword stuffing doorway page ‘1403682103503-aclarar-la-piel-para-siempre—oficial.html’
with 775 word phrases. The page has the largest 3-gram token ‘la piel para’ with fre-
quency 47, largest 4-gram token ‘la piel para siempre’ with frequency 42, largest
5-gram token ‘aclarar la piel para siempre’ with frequency 35 and largest 6-gram
token ‘aclarar la piel para siempre oficial’ with frequency 12. The stuffed keyword
extraction tool will extract the long-tail keyword ‘aclarar la piel para siempre’ with
the largest percentage 22.5%.
Surprisingly, we found that the doorway pages in the abusive cloud directories
successfully poisoned the highly specific long-tail keyword phrases. Figure 11(a) il-
lustrates the evolution of the number of poisoned long-tail keywords over time. We
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define the long-tail keywords as poisoned if the abusive cloud directories appeared in
the top 10 (i.e., indicated as top-10 poisoned in figures) or top 100 (i.e., indicated as
top-100 poisoned in figures) organic search results. During the period from 10/2014.10
to 2/2015, 9% of the long-tail keywords were poisoned in the top 10 organic search
results. This number jumped to 42% for top 100. In general, the trend exhibits a
substantial decrease in the number of poisoned keywords, because cloud providers will
remove the doorway pages. We also observe that non-English keywords were easier
to be poisoned, such as ‘como pintar con oleo’, which has the relevant doorway page
ranked as the first search result.
Figure 11(b) illustrates the average length of the poisoned long-tail keywords in
search rank from 1 to 20. Overall, the average length of poisoned keywords increases
while the search ranks of doorway pages become higher. This is because the shorter
keywords have higher competition and is therefore difficult to be polluted. The av-
erage length of the keywords, whose corresponding doorway page’s poisoned search
rank is 1, is around eight. However, when the keyword length is 6, the average search
rank of doorway pages decreases to 10.
Figure 11(c) shows the evolution of the number of doorway pages we found in
the top 10 and top 100 organic search results for the poisoned long-tail keywords.
On average, 6% of the doorway pages are ranked in the top 10, which is 32% in top
100. From Figure 11(c), we can see that the prevalence of the doorway pages in
the organic search results. For an example of SEO effectiveness, 100 doorway pages
in the abusive cloud directories googledrive markethealth successfully poisoned 61
long-tail keywords’ top 100 search results, which will redirect the visitors to the same
online pharmacy vendor, a site that was reported as a scam website by reviewopedia
[98]. Among the 61 poisoned keywords, the doorway pages appeared in 5 long-tail
keywords’ top 5 search results. Examples of the poisoned long-tail keywords include
‘green coffee bean diet does it work’ and ‘green coffee bean cleanse australia’.
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Blackhat SEO technique. We examined the blackhat SEO technique that the
spam campaigns utilized to poison search results. Our research surprisingly revealed
that using simple blackhat SEO technique (e.g., keyword stuffing), doorway pages
were able to successfully poison the search results. In addition to blackhat SEO tech-
niques, such as keyword stuffing and social fraud, targeted blackhat SEO techniques
were also used, incorporating multiple cloud provider related elements such as adding
products as unrelated keywords or misleading visitors by adding the cloud provider’s
logo.
Keyword poisoning is the deliberate manipulation of the search engine’s index for
specific keyword terms. It involves a number of methods such as keyword stuffing
(i.e., the repetition of keywords in the meta tag and page contents), and traffic spam
(i.e., adding unrelated keywords to manipulate the relevance).
Regarding the doorway pages’ keyword densities that we obtain from Section 4.3,
84% of doorway pages have a keyword density larger than 15%, which is less than
3% for web pages in non-abusive cloud directories that we mention in Section 4.2.
As an example of keyword stuffing, in the doorway pages uploaded in the abusive
cloud directory googledrive clickbank, keywords were repeated multiple times in
the content of the pages. To hide the stuffed keywords from human readers, abusive
users set white text on a white background or located the stuffed keywords behind
figures in the doorway pages.
To measure the keywords relevance to identify traffic spam, we studied the door-
way pages with more than one META keywords. We extract the keywords from the
META tag of the doorway pages and query their semantic similarity using DISCO
API. If the keywords have a large semantic gap (semantic similarity¡0.05), we deter-
mine that the doorway page utilizes traffic spam techniques. Using this method we
find that 48,922 doorway pages in 526 abusive cloud directories utilize traffic spam
techniques to manipulate the page relevance. Interestingly, the abusive users include
65
cloud platform-related information as the stuffed keywords or unrelated keywords,
such as Google Plus and Youtube. For example, the doorway pages that masquerade
as an online flower shop utilize “Proflowers Google Plus” or “lotus flower youtube” as
the keyword phrases. We observed that 16% of the doorway pages on Google Drive
use Google product terms as unrelated keywords, which is 5% on Amazon S3.
Evasion technique. Given the prevalence of the doorway pages on cloud hosting
platforms, we examine the evasion techniques used to avoid detection. We found that
the spam campaigns adapted evasion techniques for cloud web hosting platform, such
as link shorteners and obfuscated client-side JavaScript when cloud platforms do not
support server-side scripting.
As the illicit practices of doorway pages and manipulating search rankings can lead
to the pages being removed from the Google index [57], the attackers utilize evasion
mechanisms to avoid detection. However, as most of the cloud hosting platforms
(e.g., Google Drive, Amazon S3) do not support server-side scripting and a simple
client-side script for evasion is easily detected, abusive users make several changes to
adapt to the cloud web hosting platform. Many evasion mechanisms were used by
the abusive users, such as obfuscation, link shortening and redirection cloaking.
1) Mixed redirect cloaking. Cloaking refers to deceiving search engines by provid-
ing different content to the search engine crawlers compared to users clicking on search
results. Cloaking on the traditional platform includes client-side cloaking (e.g., use
client-side scripting to store cookies) and server-side cloaking (e.g., using server-side
scripting to track IP). Compared to client-side cloaking, server-side cloaking is more
concealed and much more likely to circumvent detection [118]. As most of the cloud
hosting platforms do not support server-side scripting, we observed mixed redirection
cloaking, which combined the client-side cloaking on doorway pages and server-side
cloaking on the external server. The abusive user utilized mixed redirection cloaking
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<script type="text/javascript">
if (document.referrer != ""){
var refer_url = document.referrer;
var post_url = "http://www.gatherguideshare.info/product/" + data_loc;




Figure 12: Redirection cloaking used by amazon gatguisha-20
as shown in Figure 12. When the user visits the webpage, a POST request is dynam-
ically generated by the Javascript implementation to report the document.referrer
to the external server gatherguideshare.info. The external sever then operates the
server-side redirection cloaking based on the document.referrer, i.e., the external
sever will respond with status code 302 for the POST request to redirect normal visi-
tors (e.g., those who visit doorway pages by clicking through search engine results) to
gatherguideshare.info, while search engine crawlers receive content crafted to rank
well for targeted query terms (e.g., “compaq armada dock station”).
2) Obfuscation. Obfuscation is the deliberate act of creating code that is difficult
for humans to understand. Obfuscation, as another way to circumvent static analysis
of the client-side illicit script, is also widely used in the doorway pages on cloud
platforms. For example, the redirection cloaking code we mentioned in Figure 12
was obfuscated by the character code. Note that by combining the cloaking and
obfuscation techniques, the doorway pages from s3.amazonaws.com gatguisha-20 have
a longer lifetime (more than 15 weeks we observed) than other doorway pages on
the same cloud platform (average 7 weeks, detailed in Section 4.5). Other forms of
obfuscation were also found, such as word substitution, which separates key phrases
(e.g., campaign ID) into fragments with random order.
URL shortening is another evasion technique used by the abusive users to cir-
cumvent static analysis from the cloud service provider. For the doorway pages
in cloud directory googledrive filepost, a shortened URL was generated dynam-
ically by the Javascript code, which requests bit.ly URL shorten API https://api-
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Amazon 7,663 72 2.4%
viglink 6,272 64 2.0%
prosperent 5,077 52 1.6%
Clickbank 4,689 51 1.4%
MarketHealth 4,177 43 1.3%
ssl.bitly.com/v3/shorten for each doorway pages. In the Javascript implementa-
tion, a long URL was first generated with the parameter in “asin” tag of each page,
and the fixed domain and path. Then, a bitly URL shortener API was called to
return the shortened URL for the original one. Note that the fixed domain and path
were also obfuscated by the BASE64 code and the shortened URL was generated at
run time.
In addition to bit.ly, multiple URL shorteners are utilized by the abusive users
such as t.co (0.6% of doorway pages), goo.gl (1.5% of doorway pages) and tinyurl.com
(5% of doorway pages).
4.4 Traffic Monetization
In this section, we study how the long-tail SEO campaigns monetize traffic. We find
that almost all of the long-tail spam campaigns are monetized by sending visitors
to affiliate programs. Further, we identify five large long-tail spam campaigns and
surprisingly find that they are mainly working for reputable affiliate networks (e.g.,
prosperent.com) or for reputable online vendors’ promotion (e.g., Amazon). Traffic
monetization techniques used by the long-tail spam campaigns were analyzed, fol-
lowed by a revenue analysis.
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Affiliate structure of long-tail spam campaigns. Different from traditional
platforms, doorway pages on cloud platforms share a common second-level domain
and trusted name servers belonging to cloud platforms. Thus, to look at the network
topology, we built network topology graphs Gta for the abusive cloud directories. In
the graphs, each IP of the redirectors and landing servers is regarded as a node, and
the abusive cloud directories are set as the starting nodes. Each edge corresponds to
a redirection between two nodes.
We manually review the network topology Gta of abusive cloud directories and
found that many of them were organized as affiliate programs. For the graph Gta
with 6,012 nodes and 47,398 edges, we surprisingly only found that the long-tail
SEO campaigns on the cloud web hosting platform show great connectivity in network
topology. As hubs in the graph Gta, the top 3 nodes with the largest in-degree in Gta
are amazon.com, prosperent.com and viglink.com. The top three nodes with the
largest out-degree in Gta are clickbank.net, redirectingat.com and dotomi.com.
By reverse DNS lookup, we found that each of them belongs to reputable affiliate
networks.
Next, we utilize the hubs in the graph to give an overview of the affiliate structure
of the abusive cloud directories. Table 12 provides an overview of the top 5 affiliate
networks that host the most abusive cloud directories. Overall, the majority of the
abusive cloud directories come from abusive users that work for reputable affiliate
networks. These affiliate networks mostly collaborate with well-known online ven-
dors that have a policy, based on abuse reports from individuals, to prohibit their
69
affiliates from using the service in conjunction with network abuse or spam. We ob-
serve that the largest amount (2.4%) of doorway pages belong to 72 abusive cloud
directories working for the reputable affiliate network Amazon. Thus, it appears that
even though most of the reputable affiliate networks have policies that govern the
affiliates to prevent abuse and search engine attacks, illicit practices are still found in
these reputable affiliate networks.
Identifying the affiliate ID of the abusive users would help to identify spam cam-
paigns, prevent their spread and efficiently remove the doorway pages. Our idea is to
extract the affiliate IDs from the redirection chains of the doorway pages. To do so,
we designed a semi-automatic common substring-based algorithm to generate regular
expressions to extract affiliate IDs, as follows: (1) We extract a common string from
each directory by the cross-comparison between the redirection chain inner pages and
the redirection chains among the pages in the directory using a generalized suffix
tree [61]. Note that we consider each order of the parameters in the URL query
string, i.e., for both cases example.com/?a=1&b=2 and example.com/?b=2&a=1, we
calculate their common strings. (2) We generate the regular expressions by mapping
the digits and English alphabets in the URL parameter into formal language. (3) We
manually check the correctness of these regular expressions such as accessing the af-
filiate network for marketing URL information and manually inspecting the sampled
pages. In this way, we labeled 2,360 abusive cloud directories with 342 affiliate IDs
(a.k.a., abusive entities), which were associated with 225,008 long-tail SEO doorway
pages. We present the cumulative distribution of the number of cloud directories per
abusive entities in Figure 13. Figure 13 shows that 80% of the abusive entities are
associated with more than one cloud directory. Moreover, 14% of abusive entities
distribute doorway pages on different cloud platforms. This might be because the
abusive entities are concerned about being detected by cloud platforms, and so they
distribute doorway pages into different directories, and cloud platforms.
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Figure 13: Cumulative distribution of number of cloud directories per abusive
entities.
Dissecting traffic monetization techniques. Long-tail spam campaigns mone-
tize traffic through multiple vectors, such as search redirection and social fraud.
Search redirection. The search redirection technique has been regarded as the
blackhat technique to lure traffic. When visitors click the link in the search engine
result pages, they will be redirected to a different site rather than the one pointed
to by the link. Traditional search redirection attackers prompt a site server to con-
duct request redirection via code injection. On the cloud platform, the abusive users
utilize client-side script to redirect visitors, such as iframe, JavaScript (e.g., win-
dows.location) and POST request.
We determine the search redirection with the dynamic crawler (see Section 4.2),
and further analyze the semantics consistency of the source page and the landing
page. Specifically, we utilized Yahoo content analysis API [124] to extract a series
of keywords from the source page and the landing page. If the keyword sets did not
intersect, the search redirection shows semantic inconsistency.
In this way, we find that 63,900 doorway pages in 769 abusive cloud directories uti-
lized search redirection to monetize traffic. Among them, 23% of the doorway pages
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Figure 14: Fake product score shown in the search result page.
redirected visitors to a semantic inconsistency landing page. For example, 280 door-
way pages were uploaded in the abusive cloud directory googledrive.com mediaupdate41
for malware distribution. The doorway pages masquerade as web pages that sell flow-
ers to funnel visitors to a malware distribution website.
Social fraud. Social fraud techniques mislead Google users by manipulating the
search snippets. Google’s Rich Snippets technique [56] allows users to summarize the
content of a page such as a product’s review. Rich Snippets help visitors recognize the
relevancy of their search and trigger potential clicking. However, Rich Snippets can
be directly inserted in the page without validation. Abusive users can thus leverage
this technique to provide fake review scores or irrelevant reviews. For example, the
doorway page in the abusive cloud directories s3.amazonaws.com markethealth makes
up irrelevant reviews using rich snippets which shows in the search result to attract
clicks. Figure 14 shows Rich Snippets that have been abused.
Revenue Analysis. To understand the economic motives behind the abusive ac-
tivities, we analyzed the revenue received by these users. We utilize the following
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revenue model which was proposed in prior research[31][86]: R(t) = Nv(t) · Pa · Ra
, where the total revenue R(t) during the time period t is calculated from the total
number of actions taken (i.e., click-through number [86], Nv(t) · Pa) and the average
revenue per action Ra.
To investigate the increase rate of the click-through number (i.e., Nv(t) · Pa),
we track the number of URL clicks for the doorway pages uploaded by the abusive
user who works for a shady affiliate network called filepost.ml. The affiliate network
filepost.ml hires affiliates to promote its fake free e-book download website which lures
visitors to finish many cost-per-action affiliate programs. The abusive user hosts 384
doorway pages in one cloud directory and hides the marketing URL by using the URL
shortener bitly.com. As Bitly provides an API to count the number of clicks for its
shortened URL, we obtain the click number of the marketing URL in the abusive
doorway pages.
Figure 15 shows the cumulative click-through number of the 384 doorway pages
from Sep. 5, 2014 to Feb. 18, 2015 . Hosting the 384 doorway pages on Google
Drive, the abusive entity will see around a 1,800 click increase every month. The
click increase rate is around 20% per month. Utilizing the same revenue model and
parameter setting Ra = $0.265 as prior works [31][86], we can estimate the revenue for
googledrive.com filepost in October 2014 of R(1 month) = (5249−3754)×0.265 =
$396, which increased to $665 in January 2015. Note that with the evasion technique
we mentioned in Section 4.3, abusive cloud directories have extremely long lifetimes
(i.e., more than 40 weeks), which helps the abusive users gain more profit.
4.5 Intervention
In this section, we monitored ongoing interventions by the cloud service providers.
Since the abusive users violate the usage policies of cloud platforms [57] and poison
search engine results to degrade users’ experience, cloud providers tend to remove
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Figure 15: The cumulative number of clicks of the doorway pages on the abusive
cloud directory googledrive.com filepost.
doorway pages entirely from the cloud platforms. However, as our empirical analysis
shows, these cloud providers’ efforts are far from effective.
To measure the average lifetime of the doorway pages and the abusive cloud
directories, we re-crawled the active doorway pages every three days and used the
lifetime as the time between the first and last time the crawler observed a page.
Figure 16 illustrates the percentage of doorway pages and abusive cloud directories
in different lifetime ranges. We found that the average lifetime of the doorway pages
is around seven weeks, which is much longer than those hosted on the compromised
sites (i.e., around one week [60]). Moreover, the average lifetime of the abusive cloud
directories was extremely long (around 20 weeks). In the empirical study, we observed
that though the cloud providers found and removed the doorway pages, they did not
aggressively remove the corresponding abusive directories, or the doorway pages from
the same abusive entities in different cloud directories.
Then, we analyzed the abuse situation of doorway pages in the cloud web hosting
platform, i.e., the evolution of the newly-appeared doorway pages and abusive cloud
directories. Hence, we resubmitted the hot and shady keywords to the search engine
every three days from 2014.10 to 2015.10. At each measurement point, we crawled
the data in the same way as mentioned in Section 4.2. In this way, we built the
time-period dataset Dt. At each measurement point, the average number of URLs
we crawled was around 500K associated with 3K cloud directories.
Figure 17(a) shows the evolution of the number of newly-appearing abusive door-
way pages, compared with the number of deleted doorway pages we found in Section
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Figure 16: Lifetime of doorway pages and abusive cloud directories.
4.2. The evolution of the abusive cloud directories is shown in Figure 17(b). From
17(a), we can observe that large amounts of doorway pages newly appear, which has
a higher rate of increase than deletion rate by the cloud provider. Also, 23% of the
newly-appeared doorway pages were associated with the known abusive directories,
and the rest of them belonged to the newly-appeared abusive directories. Also, from
Figure 17(b), we observed that the deletion rate of the abusive cloud directories is
much smaller than that of doorway pages. This shows that the detection method used
by cloud platform did not identify a large enough amount of doorway pages for each
abusive cloud directory or remove the abusive cloud directories. Moreover, we observe
an increased deletion rate from 2014.12 to 2015.02, because the cloud provider Google
Drive took more efficient action to remove doorway pages. As the doorway pages can
be easily spread on the cloud web hosting platform, the abuse situation will become
worse if the detection method is not effective enough.
Figure 17(c) shows the prevalence of doorway pages for three abusive cloud cam-
paigns. The trend line shows the number of doorway pages in the 1,520 ‘hot’ keywords
top 10 search results restricted to their cloud platform. For the three abusive cam-
paigns, the number of doorway pages appeared in the top 10 search results did not
75
change much in October and November. For the abusive user amazon beslca0e-20,
more doorway pages poisoned the top 10 search results in November. Figure 17(d)
shows the number of doorway pages that appeared in the deleted page set over time.
Even though the deleted doorway pages will be removed from the top 10 search re-
sults, the active doorway pages from the same abusive cloud directories stay at the
same measurement point, which means that cloud provider did not detect and remove
all the doorway pages from the same campaign.
4.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our study and potential mitigation strate-
gies.
Limitation As mentioned earlier, long-tail SEO spam identification on large-scale
cloud data is difficult, especially for a third party. Our design has a number of limi-
tations imposed by our vantage point, over-restricted features and manual validation.
First, our methodologies’ vantage points are limited to Google’s search results. While
Google is the mainstream search engine targeted for search engine poisoning, the re-
sults we crawled were limited to the cloud web pages that are indexed by Google.
Second, the insight for feature extraction is that the abusive user tends to put several
doorway pages in cloud directories for long-tail SEO spam, and the doorway pages
are auto-generated and hence show similarity. While this insight was validated by
our pre-measurement study on training data, there may be small numbers of abusive
users intentionally increasing the keyword and DOM source diversity to evade detec-
tion. Hence, the over-restricted feature design may bias our technique to low false
positives but relatively smaller coverage. Third, we use manual inspection to validate
abusive cloud directories, which is laborious and may include false positive.
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Mitigation strategies Based on the results of our measurement study, we have
identified several potentially effective mitigation strategies to reduce the impact of
long-tail SEO spam on the cloud hosting platforms. First, search engines, could detect
the highly similar low-quality content of these doorway pages and penalize them in the
search rankings. This would cause these spammers to expend more resources creating
less duplicated, higher quality content. Second, the cloud providers could increase the
cost of establishing accounts on their services and more aggressively detect and remove
spammy cloud hosting accounts. While this can result in an escalating detection and
evasion arms-race, our analysis of these doorway pages found that identifying affiliate
IDs can be done automatically and these can be used to detect and remove large
numbers of accounts hosting doorway pages. Finally, the affiliate networks could
monitor HTTP refers and identify other indications that their affiliates are engaging
in SEO spam. We found that most of the affiliate networks currently have reactive
policies, such as abuse reporting to restrict illicit practices of affiliates. A more
proactive policy might help to mitigate the surge of long-tail SEO spam on cloud
hosting platforms.
4.7 Summary
To the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive overview of the long-tail SEO spam on
the cloud web hosting platform, and measurement study of the abusive activities are
still open research challenges. In this chapter, we conduct the first study to measure,
and analyze the long-tail SEO spam on cloud web hosting platforms. Specifically,
we identified 3,186 abusive cloud directories for long-tail SEO spam from analyzing
approximately 15,774 cloud directories over 10 cloud platforms. Then, we conducted
an in-depth measurement study of the abusive cloud directories for long-tail SEO
spam. As a result of our measurement, we uncover that the abusive users take ad-
vantage of the pay-as-you-go feature of cloud hosting to conduct low cost long-tail
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SEO. Our measurement study provides insights into long-tail SEO spam effectiveness,
blackhat SEO techniques they used, and network characteristics of the long-tail SEO
campaigns. Moreover, the intervention of the cloud provider is analyzed, which is
shown to be far from effective. Our findings for the long-tail SEO spam on cloud
hosting platforms enable us to deeply understand the abusive long-tail SEO spam,
which enable an important step toward effective mitigating of this new type of security
threat.
78
(a) Number of abusive cloud directories over time.
(b) Number of doorway pages over time.
(c) Number of active doorway pages in
Top 10/100 search ranking per mea-
surement point.
(d) Number of deleted doorway pages in
Top 10/100 search ranking per measure-
ment point.
Figure 17: The increasing trends of active pages, deleted pages and doorway pages over
time are shown in Figure 17(a). The corresponding accounts are shown in Figure 17(b).




UNDERSTANDING CLOUD REPOSITORY AS A
MALICIOUS SERVICE
5.1 Introduction
Cloud hosting service today is serving over a billion users world-wide, providing them
stable, low-cost, reliable, high-speed and globally available resource access. For ex-
ample, Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) is reported to store over 2 trillion objects
for web and image hosting, system backup, etc. In addition to storing data, these ser-
vices are moving toward a more active role in supporting their customers’ computing
missions, through sharing the repositories (a.k.a. bucket for Google Cloud [4]) hosting
various dynamic content and programming tools. A prominent example is Google’s
Hosted Libraries [58], a content distribution network (CDN) for disseminating the
most popular, open-source JavaScript resources, which web developers can easily in-
corporate into their websites through a simple code snippet. In addition to benign
users, the popularity of these services has also attracted cybercriminals. Compared
with dedicated underground hosting services, repositories on legitimate commercial
clouds are more reliable and harder to blacklist. They are also much cheaper: for
example, it is reported that 15 GB on the dark net is sold at $15 per month [14],
which is actually offered for free by Google to every Google Driver user. Indeed, it has
been reported [108] that malware distributors are increasingly using the commercial
clouds to process and deploy malicious content.
Understanding bad cloud repositories: challenges. Although there have been
indications of cloud hosting misuse, understanding how such services are abused is
challenging. For the service providers, who are bound by their privacy commitments
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Figure 18: Example of deceptive images in Amazon S3 bucket cicloudfront used
for malvertising. The image was shown at the bottom of a webpage as an update
notification to lure visitors to download malware.
and ethical concerns, they tend to avoid inspecting the content of their customers’
repositories in the absence of proper consent. Even when the providers are willing to
do so, determining whether a repository involves malicious content is by no means
trivial: nuts and bolts for malicious activities could appear perfectly innocent before
they are assembled into an attack machine; examples include image files for Spam
and Phishing as shown in Figure 18. Actually, even for the repository confirmed to
serve malicious content like malware, today’s cloud providers tend to only remove that
specific content, instead of terminating the whole account, to avoid collateral damage
(e.g., compromised legitimate repositories). Exploring the issue becomes even more
difficult for the third party, who does not have the ability to directly observe the
repositories and can only access them through the websites or sources that utilize
the storage services. Further adding to the complexity of finding such a repository
is the diverse roles it may play in attack infrastructures (e.g., serving malware for
one attack and serving Phishing content for another), due to the mixed content a
single repository may host: e.g., malware together with Phishing images. As a result,
existing techniques (e.g., those for detecting dedicated malicious services [78][89])
cannot be directly applied to capture the repository, simply because their original
targets often contain more homogeneous content (e.g., just malware) and contribute
to different campaigns in the same way. So far, little has been done to understand the
scope and magnitude of malicious or compromised repositories on legitimate clouds
(called Bad Repository or simply Bar in our research) and the technical details about
their services to the adversary, not to mention any effort to mitigate the threat they
pose.
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Finding “Bars” online. In this paper, we present the first systematic study on the
abuses of cloud repositories on the legitimate cloud platforms as a malicious service,
which was found to be highly pervasive, acting as a backbone for large-scale malicious
web campaigns (Section 5.3). Our study was bootstrapped by a set of “seeds”: 100
confirmed malicious or compromised buckets [4], each of which is a cloud resource
repository with stored objects (often of different types) organized under a unique
identification key. These buckets were collected from Spam messages or the malicious
URLs cached by a popular malware scanner. Comparing them with those known to
be legitimate, we found that despite various roles each bucket plays in different types
of attacks (due to the diversity in the content it serves), still the websites connecting
to those buckets exhibit prominent common features (see Section 5.2.1), particularly,
the presence of “gatekeeper” sites that cover the Bars (a valuable asset for the ad-
versary) and remarkably homogeneous redirection behavior (i.e., fetching repository
resources indirectly through other sites’ references) and sometimes similar content
organizations, due to the same attack payload the compromised sites upload from
their backend (i.e., the Bars), or the templates the bucket provides to the adversary
for quick deployment of her attack sites. By comparison, a legitimate bucket (e.g.,
reputable jQuery repository) tends to be directly accessed by the websites with highly
diverse content.
Based on this observation, we developed BarFinder, a scanner that automatically
detects Bars through inspecting the topological relations between websites and the
cloud bucket they use, in an attempt to capture Bars based on the external features of
the websites they serve. More specifically, for all the sites connecting to a repository,
our approach correlates the domains and URLs (particular those related to cloud
repositories) across their redirection chains and content features across their DOM
structures to identify the presence of gatekeepers and evading behavior, and also
measure the diversity of their content organization. A set of new collective features
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generated in this way, including bucket usage similarity, connection ratio, landing
similarity and others (Section 5.2.1), are further utilized by a classifier to find out
suspicious buckets. Running the scanner over all the data collected by the Common
Crawl [46], which indexed five billion web pages, for those associated with all ma-
jor cloud storage providers (including Amazon S3, Cloudfront, Google Drive, etc.),
we found around 1 million sites utilizing 6,885 repositories hosted on these clouds.
Among them, BarFinder identified 694 malicious or compromised repositories, in-
volving millions of files, with a precision of 95% and a coverage of 90% against our
ground-truth set.
Our discoveries. Looking into the Bars identified by our scanner, we are surprised
by the scope and the magnitude of the threat. These buckets are hosted by the most
reputable cloud service providers. For example, 13.7% of Amazon S3 repositories and
5.5% of Google repositories that we inspected turned out to be either compromised
or completely malicious1. Among those compromised are popular cloud repositories
such as Groupon’s official bucket. Altogether, 472 such legitimate repositories were
considered to be contaminated, due to a misconfiguration flaw never reported be-
fore, which allows arbitrary content to be uploaded and existing data to be modified
without proper authorization. The impact of these Bars is significant, infecting 1,306
legitimate websites, including Alexa top 300 sites like groupon.com, Alexa top 5,000
sites like space.com, etc. We reported our findings to Amazon and leading organiza-
tions affected by the infections. Groupon has already confirmed the compromise we
discovered and awarded us for our help.
When it comes to malicious buckets, our study brings to light new insights into
this new wave of repository based cyber-attacks, including the importance of Bars
to malicious web activities and the challenges in defending against this new threat.
1We have manually examined and confirmed all those instances.
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More specifically, we found that on average, one Bar serves 152 malicious or com-
promised sites. In one of the large campaigns discovered in our research, the Bar
cloudfront_file.enjin.com hosts a malicious script that was injected into at least
1,020 websites (Section 5.3.1). These Bars sit right at the center of the attack infras-
tructure, supporting and coordinating other malicious actors’ operations at different
stages of a campaign. Interestingly, we found that they could be strategically placed
on different cloud platforms, making them hard to block (due to the popularity of
their hosting clouds like Google) and detect (scattered across different providers),
and easy to share across multiple campaigns. As an example, the Potentially Un-
wanted Programs (PUP) campaign we found first loads a redirection script from a
Bar on Akamaihd (the world’s largest CDN platform) to lead the victim to the attack
website, then fetches Phishing pictures from an Amazon S3 Bar, and finally deliv-
ers the malware stored on Cloudfront to the target systems (Section 6.4.3). In the
presence of such meticulously planned attacks, the cloud service providers apparently
are inadequately prepared, possibly due to the privacy constraints in touching their
customers’ repositories. We found that many Bars remain active during our study,
and survive a much longer lifetime than that of the malicious content hosted on web-
sites (Section 5.3.3). Further complicating the mission of Bar identification are other
evasion techniques the adversary employs, including code obfuscation and use of a
redirection chain and cloaking techniques to avoid exposing malicious payloads to a
malware scanner.
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are as follows:
• New understanding. We performed the first systematic study on cloud repositories
as a malicious service, an emerging security threat. For the first time, our study
reveals the scope and magnitude of the threat and its significant impact, particularly
on the infrastructures of illicit web activities. These findings bring to the spotlight
this important yet understudied problem and lead to a better understanding of the
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techniques the adversary employs and their weaknesses. This will contribute to better
defense against and ultimate elimination of the threat.
• New technique. Based on our understanding of bad cloud repositories, we take a
first step toward automatically detecting them. The technique we developed relies
on the topological relationship between a cloud repository and the websites it serves,
which are difficult to change and effective at capturing malicious or compromised
buckets. Our evaluation over a large number of popular websites demonstrates the
potential of the technique, which could be utilized by both cloud providers and third
parties to identify the threats posed by Bars.
5.2 Finding Bars Online
In this section, we elaborate on our analysis of a set of known Bars (the seed set) and
the features identified for differentiating benign repositories and Bars. These features
are utilized in our research to build a simple web scanner, BarFinder, for detecting
other malicious or compromised high-profile, previously-unknown repositories and the
malicious campaigns in which they serve.
5.2.1 Features of Bad Repositories
Our study is based on a small set of confirmed good and bad repositories and their
related domains, which we analyzed to find out how Bars (bad repositories) differ from
legitimate repositories. In the absence of direct access to these buckets, good or bad,
all we can do is to infer their legitimacy from who use them and how they are used (by
different domains), that is, the features of the domains and their interactivities on the
redirection paths leading to the cloud repository. Of particular interest here are a set
of collective properties identified from the resource fetching chains (a.k.a., redirection
chains) for serving the content of Bars, which is hard to change by the adversary,
compared with the content features of individual Bars. Below, we elaborate on the
way such data was collected and the salient features discovered in our research, which
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describe how the adversary attempts to hide Bars or use them to cover other attack
assets, a redirection pattern never observed on legitimate repositories.
Data collection. To build the seed set, we collected a set of confirmed malicious or
compromised buckets (called Badset) and legitimate buckets (called Goodset) as well
as their related domains, as illustrated in Table 14.
• Badset. We utilized two feeds as the ground truth for gathering bad cloud buckets:
the Spamtrap feed and the CleanMX feed [42]. The former comes from a Spam
honeypot we constructed [63] that receives around 10K Spam emails per day, from
which cloud URLs promoted by the emails were extracted which may include spam
resources such as HTML, images, and scripts. The latter includes the historical data
of CleanMX, a popular domain scanning engine, from which cloud-related URLs were
collected. For both feeds, we further validate them by VirusTotal [115] and manual
inspections (e.g., looking for Phishing content) to ensure that they were indeed bad (to
avoid contaminating the dataset with legitimate buckets used in malicious activities).
Using the collected set of malicious cloud URLs from both feeds, we extracted their
repositories, which led to 100 confirmed Bars.
• Goodset. The good buckets were gathered from the Alexa top 3K websites, which are
considered to be mostly clean. To this end, we visited each website using a crawler (as
a Firefox add-on) to record the HTTP traffic triggered by the visit, including network
requests, responses, browser events, etc. From the collected traffic, we extracted the
HTTP cloud request URLs corresponding to 300 cloud buckets hosted on 20 leading
cloud hosting services like Amazon S3, Google Drive, etc. Note that even though
some of them provide CDN service or DDOS protection, they are all provided hosting
service to act as cloud repository.
• Bucket-served sites and their HTTP traffic. We collected HTTP traffic using the
crawler mentioned above to visit a list of websites using buckets for feature extraction.
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Figure 19: Example of the redirection infrastructure leading to
the legitimate bucket cloudfront.net d24n15hnbwhuhn (a) and the Bar
s3.amazonaws.com cicloudfront (b), which are in RED color.
strategy by crawling the sites found to contain links to the cloud in the past. We built
the site list with the help of Common Crawl [46], a public big data project that crawls
about 5 billion webpages each month through a large-scale Hadoop-based crawler
and maintains lists of the crawled websites and their embedded links. Searching the
Common Crawl [46] dataset, collected in February 2015, for the websites loading
content from the 400 clean and malicious buckets identified above, we found 141,149
websites, were used by our crawler.
Topological features. We first inspected the topology of the redirection infras-
tructure associated with a specific bucket. Such an infrastructure is a collection of
redirection paths, with each node being a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). On
each path, the bucket is either a node when it directly participates in a redirection
(e.g., its cloud URL delivers a redirection script to the visitor’s browser) or simply
a passive repository providing resources like pictures to other domains. Figure 19
illustrates examples of redirection paths leading to two real-world repositories, one
for a legitimate bucket cloudfront.net_d24n15hnbwhuhn and the other for a Bar
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A key observation from our study is that the redirection infrastructure leading
to a Bar tends to include the features for protecting the Bar from being detected by
web scanners, presumably due to the fact that the repository is often considered to
be a valuable asset for the adversary. Specifically, we found that typically, there
are a few gatekeeper nodes sitting in front of a Bar, serving as an intermediary to
proxy the attempts to get resources from the Bar. Examples of the gatekeepers
include fp125.mediaoptout.com and its downstream nodes in Figure 19(b). On
the topology of such an infrastructure, these gatekeepers are the hubs receiving a
lot of resource-access connections from entry sites (the first node on a redirection
path, see Figure 19). Also interestingly, our research shows that some gatekeepers
can access the Bar through multiple paths. For example, in Figure 19(b), krd.
semantichelper.com can either go straight to s3.amazonaws.com_cicloudfront or
take a detour through p306.atemada.com. This structure could be caused by the
cloaking of the gatekeeper for hiding the Bar, or constructed to maintain access to
the repository even when nodes (like 1.semantichelper.com) are down (detected,
cleaned, etc.). Note that such a protection structure does not exist on the paths to
a benign repository (Figure 19(a)): normally, the resources hosted in a repository
(e.g., jQuery) is directly fetched by the website using it, without going through any
redirection; even in the presence of redirections, there will not be any gatekeeper, not
to mention attempts to cloak or build a backup path.
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To identify this unique “protection” structure, we utilize two collective features :
bucket usage similarity (BUS) that captures the topology involving hubs (gatekeepers)
and connection ratio (CR) that measures the interactivities across different redirection
paths (which point to the existence of cloaking behavior or the attempts to maintain
back-up paths to the Bar). Specifically, consider a redirection graph G = (V,E)
(as illustrated in Figure 19), where V is the set of nodes (the FQDNs involved in a
redirection) and E is a set of edges from one node to the next one on individual paths:
E = {ei,j|node i precedes node j on a path}. The BUS is measured by 1− is , where i is
the number of immediate predecessor nodes to a repository (the domains connecting
to the repository) and s is the total number of entries of the repository’s redirection
graph. To find out the CR, we first remove the bucket b and all the edges to which
it is attached (if they exist) to get another graph G′ = G−Gb, where Gb = ({b}, Eb)
and Eb = {eb,j}. Note that each graph G′ is associated with one bucket. Then, from
G′, we find out the number of connected components n and calculate CR = 1 − n|V |
(see Figure 19 for an example).
Both collective features were found to be discriminative in our research. Fig-
ure 20(a) and 20(b) compare the cumulative distributions (CDF) of the ratios between
Bad and Good sets. As we can see from the figures, Bars tend to have higher ratios
than benign ones: the average BUS is 0.87 for the Bars and 0.79 for the legitimate
repositories and the CR is 0.85 for the bad repositories and 0.67 for the good one. As
mentioned earlier, this is caused by the fact that a small set of gatekeepers nodes are
often placed there for protecting the Bars while the redirection chains towards the
good repositories are much more direct and independent: different organizations typ-
ically do not go through an intermediary to indirectly access the public repository like
jQuery, and even within the same organization, use of such a resource is often direct.
Although there can be exceptions, our measurement study shows that in general, the
structural differences between malicious and legitimate repositories are stark.
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(a) Cumulative distri-




tion of connected ratio per
cloud bucket.
(c) Cumulative distribu-
tion of landing similarity
per cloud bucket.
Figure 20: Bars show smaller topological diversity.
Also, we found that occasionally, a Bar itself may serve as a gatekeeper, running
scripts to hide more valuable attack assets, such as the attack server or other malicious
landing sites. When this happens, almost always the Bar leads to a small set of
successors on redirection paths (e.g., attack servers, land sites). This is very different
from the redirection performed by the script from a benign repository, for example,
cloudfront.net_d24n15hnbwhuhn. In such cases, the targets of redirections are often
very diverse. Based on this observation, we further measure the landing similarity,
LS = 1− l
s
, where l is the number of the unique last nodes on the redirection paths
associated with a repository. Again, as illustrated in Figure 20(c), our study shows
that redirection paths involving Bars share fewer end nodes than legitimate ones, and
therefore, the related redirection graphs (for Bars) have a higher landing similarity
(0.94 vs 0.88).
Content and network features. In addition to their distinctive topological fea-
tures, we found that the nodes on the redirection paths attached to a Bar often exhibit
remarkable homogeneity in their content and network properties. Particularly, for the
websites directly connecting to the repository, we found that they typically use a small
set of templates (like WordPress) to build up their web pages, include similar DOM
positions for script injection, carrying similar IP addresses or even having the same
content management system (CMS) vulnerabilities, etc. These properties turn out to
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be very diverse among those utilizing a legitimate cloud repository. For example, all
websites linking to a Google Drive Bar have their malicious cloud URL (for injecting
a script) placed at the bottom of the DOM of each website. In another example, we
found that the front-end sites using a Cloudfront Bar actually all include a vulnerable
JCE Joomla extension.
To better understand the diversity of such websites, we try to compare them ac-
cording to a set of content and network properties. In our research, we utilized the
properties extracted by WhatWeb [120], a popular webpage scanner. WhatWeb is
designed to identify the web technologies deployed, including those related to web
content and communication: e.g., CMS, blogging platforms, statistic/analytics pack-





we obtain the property p as a key-value pair p = (k, v) = (wordpress, opensearch),
which indicates the website using wordpress plugin opensearch.
From our seed dataset, the scanner automatically extracted 372 keys of 1,596,379
properties, and then we clustered the keys into 15 classes such as Analytics and
tracking, CMS and plugin, Meta-data information, etc., following the categories used
by BuiltWith, a web technology search engine [36]. Some examples of these properties
are presented in Table 15. In addition to these properties extracted by WhatWeb,
we added the following properties to characterize cloud URLs, including the position
of the URL, the order in which different buckets appear in the web content and the
number of cloud platforms used in a page.
Based on these properties, again we utilized a topological metric to measure the
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overall similarity across sites. Specifically, the relations among all the sites (con-
necting to the same bucket) in the same category (Analytics and tracking, CMS and
plugin, etc.) are modeled as a graph G′ = (V ′, E ′, P ), where V ′ is the set of the
websites, which are characterized by a collection of properties P , and E ′ is the set of
edges: E ′ = {ei,j|website i and j share p ∈ P}, that is, both sites having a common
property. Over this graph, the site similarity is calculated as SiS = 1− n|V ′| . Here n
is the number of connected components in the graph.
In our research, we computed SiS across all the categories summarized from the
seed dataset, and compared those with Bars against those with the legitimate buckets.
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Again, the sites using Bars are found to share many more properties and therefore
achieve a much higher similarity value than those linking to a good bucket. This is
likely caused by mass-production of malicious sites using the same resources (tem-
plates, pictures, etc.) provided by a Bar or utilization of the same exploit tool stored
in a Bar for compromising the sites with the same vulnerabilities. Therefore, such
similarity is inherent to the attack strategies and can be hard to change.
5.2.2 BarFinder
Design. The design of BarFinder includes a web crawler, a feature analyzer, and
a detector. The crawler automatically scans the web for cloud buckets (embedded
in web content) and then clusters websites according to the buckets they use. From
each cluster, the analyzer constructs a redirection graph and a content graph as
described earlier (Section 5.2.1), on which it further calculates the values for a set
of collective features including disconnection ratio (D), bucket usage similarity (B),
landing similarity (L) and a series of content property/network property similarities
(S1 · · ·Sn) for n web-technology categories (e.g., analytics and tracking, CMS and
plugin, meta-data information, etc.). The output of this feature analysis is then
passed to the detector, which maintains a model (trained on the seed dataset) to
determine whether a bucket is malicious, based on its collective features.
Specifically, the crawler visits each website, inspecting its content, triggering
events, recording the redirection paths it observes and parsing URLs encountered
using the patterns of known cloud platforms to recognize cloud buckets. For ex-
ample, the repository on Amazon S3 is accessed through the URL formatted as
w + .s3{−w+}[?].amazonaws.com, and Amazon CloudFront produces resource URLs
in the form of w + .cloudfront.net. In our research, 20 cloud platforms were exam-
ined to identify the buckets they host. At the feature-analysis stage, for each bucket,
BarFinder inspects all its redirection paths, converts every node into an FQDN to
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compute their topological features, and then connects different nodes according to
their content and network properties to find out their site similarities, as described
in Section 5.2.1.
Next, each cloud bucket i is uniquely characterized by a vector: 〈Di, Bi, Li, Si,1 · · ·Si,n〉,
with each element a collective feature. Individual features have different power in dif-
ferentiating good and bad buckets, which we measured using the F-Score [33] (see
Table 16). Note that the feature with a large score can better classify these vec-
tors than the one with a small value. Therefore, a binary classifier with a model for
weighing the features and other parameters can be used to classify the vector set and
determine whether individual buckets are legitimate or not. Such a model is learned
from the seed dataset. In our research, we utilized a Support Vector Machine (SVM)
as the classifier, which showed the best performance among other classification al-
gorithms (see Table 17). Its classification model is built upon the F-Scores for the
collective features (D, B, etc.) and a threshold set according to the false positive and
negative discovery expected to achieve. For each bucket classified, the SVM can also
report the confidence of the classification.
Implementation. This simple design was implemented in our study into a prototype
system. The web crawler was built as a Firefox add-on. In total, 20 such crawlers
were deployed. We further developed a tool in Python to recover cloud URLs from the
web content gathered by Common Crawl. The feature analyzer includes around 500
lines of Python code for processing the data collected by the crawler and computing
the collective features (Section 5.2.1). Each feature in the vector is normalized using
the L1 norm before passed to the SVM classifier. In our system, we incorporated the
SVM provided by the scikit-learn open-source machine learning library [106].
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Connection ratio D 1− n|V | 0.084
Bucket usage similarity B 1− is 0.076
Landing similarity L 1− ls 0.072
CMS information S1 1− n|V ′| 0.037
Meta-data information S2 1− n|V ′| 0.033
Analytics and tracking S3 1− n|V ′| 0.032
Widget S4 1− n|V ′| 0.031
CloudURL information S5 1− n|V ′| 0.024
5.2.3 Evaluation
Here we report our evaluation of BarFinder on both the ground truth and the Un-
known sets. All the experiments were conducted within an Amazon EC2 C4.8xlarge
instance equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2666 36 vCPU and 60GiB of memory.
Evaluation on the seed set. We tested the effectiveness of BarFinder over our
ground-truth dataset (i.e., the seed set) through the standard five-fold cross vali-
dation: that is, 4/5 of the data was used for training the SVM and the remaining
1/5 for evaluating the accuracy of Bar detection. Specifically, we randomly chose 80
Bars (out of 100) from the Badset and 240 (out of 300) legitimate buckets from the
Goodset, together with the related websites (out of 141,149). These data were first
processed by our prototype to adjust the weights and other parameters for its model.
Then we tested the model on the remaining dataset (20 Bars, 60 legitimate buckets).
The process is then repeated 5 times. BarFinder achieved both a low false discov-
ery rate (FDR: 1- precision) and a high recall in detection: only 5.6% of reported
Bars turned out to be legitimate (i.e., 1.6% of false positive rate), and over 89.3%
of the Bars were detected. We further show the Area Under Curve (AUC) of the
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graph, which comes very close to 1 (0.96),
demonstrating the good balance we strike between the FD rate and the coverage.
This preliminary analysis shows that the collective features of the sites connecting to
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Table 17: Performance comparison under five-fold cross validation.
Classifier Precision Recall
SVM 0.94 0.89
Decision Tree 0.9 0.83
Logistic Regression 0.91 0.87
Naive Bayes 0.9 0.79
Random Forest 0.85 0.82
cloud repositories are promising in detecting Bars.
Evaluation on the Unknown set. We now use BarFinder to scan an unknown
set. This unknown set contains HTTP traffic collected using a crawler as described
in Section 5.2.1 to visit a list of websites. This list of websites is also extracted from
common crawl [46] by searching for websites that have loaded some content in the
past from the cloud platforms. As a result, the unknown data set contained HTTP
traffic generated from dynamically visiting 1M websites loading content from 20 cloud
platforms and 6,885 cloud buckets.
To validate our evaluation results, we employ a methodology that combines anti-
virus (AV) scanning, blacklist checking, and manual analysis. Specifically, for the Bars
flagged by our system, we first scan their cloud URLs with VirusTotal for malware
and check them against the list of suspicious cloud URLs collected from our Spamtrap
honeypot for Spam, Phishing, blackhat Search Engine Optimization (SEO), etc. In
the case of VirusTotal, a URL is considered to be suspicious if at least two scanners
raise the alarm. All such suspicious URLs (from either VirusTotal or the Spamtrap
list) are cross-checked against the blacklist of CleanMX. Only those also found there
are reported to be a true positive. Once a URL is confirmed malicious, its correspond-
ing bucket is labeled as bad. Those unlabeled but flagged (by BarFinder) buckets are
further validated manually.
In the experiment, BarFinder reported a total of 730 Bars, about 10.6% of the
6,885 buckets. Among them, the AV scanning and blacklist verification confirmed that
502 buckets were indeed bad. The remaining 228 were manually analyzed through,
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e.g., inspecting the resources in the buckets for phishing or scam content, running
scripts in the VM to capture binary code download. This validation further confirmed
192 Bars. The FDR was found to be at most 5% (assuming those not confirmed to
be legitimate), in line with the finding from the seed set.
5.3 Measurement and Discoveries
Based on the discoveries made by BarFinder, we further conducted a measurement
study to better understand the fundamental issues about Bar-based malicious ser-
vices, particularly how the cloud repositories help facilitate malicious activities, how
the adversary exploited legitimate cloud buckets and why the adversary uses Bars in
the first place. Our research shows that on the infrastructure, Bars play a pivotal role,
compared with the content kept on other malicious or compromised sites, possibly
because they are hosted on popular cloud services, and therefore hard to blacklist and
also easy to share across different campaigns. Also, in a malicious campaign, the ad-
versary may take advantage of multiple Bars, at different attack stages, to construct
a complicated infrastructure that supports her mission (Section 5.3.1). More impor-
tantly, we discovered that the adversary effectively exploited misconfigured legitimate
buckets to infect a large number of their front-end web services (Section 5.3.2), and the
cloud providers have not done much to counteract the threat, often leaving Bars there
for a long time (Section 5.3.3), possibly due to the privacy constraints and limited
means to detect individual components of a malicious activity. Such observations,
together with the challenge in blocking Bars, offer insights into the motivation for
moving toward this new trend of repository-based attacks.
5.3.1 Bar-based Malicious Web Infrastructure
Landscape. As mentioned earlier, BarFinder reported 730 suspicious repositories
from 6885 cloud buckets over 20 cloud platforms. Among them, we utilized 694 con-
firmed Bars (through AV/blacklist scanning or manual validation, see Section 5.2.3)
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Figure 21: Top 10 cloud platforms with most Bars, compared with their
total number of cloud buckets in our dataset.
for the measurement study. These Bars were found to directly serve 156,608 domains
(i.e., front-end websites), through which they are further attached to 6,513,519 redi-
rection paths involving 166,772 domains. Figure 21 illustrates the number of Bars we
found on different cloud platforms. Among them, Amazon S3 is the most popular one
in our dataset, hosting the most Bars (45%), which is followed by CloudFront (Ama-
zon’s CDN) 25.1% and Akamaihd 9.3%. Note that of these 20 clouds, seven of them
provide free storage services (e.g., 15GB free space on Google Drive, 5GB for Amazon
S3), and therefore easily become the ideal platforms for low-budget miscreants to dis-
tribute their illicit content. Also, eleven of them support HTTPS, on which malicious
activities are difficult to catch by existing signature-based intrusion detection systems
like snort and Shadow[107][113]. Interestingly, on some of the most prominent plat-
forms, the miscreants are found to take advantage of the cloud providers’ reputations
to make their Phishing campaigns look more credible: for example, we found that the
adversary continuously spoofed Gmail’s login page on Google Drive, and the software
download page for Amazon FireTV in an Amazon S3 bucket.
Figure 33 shows the distribution of Bars’ frontend websites across 81 countries,
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Figure 22: Impact of Bars’ front-end websites around the globe.
Table 18: Top 10 most popular Bars.
Rank Cloud bucket # of front-end sites Avg path len Popularity
1 s3.amazonaws.com content.sitezoogle.com 4,429 2.9 2.8%
2 cloudfront.net d3n8a8pro7vhmx 1,829 3.3 1.4%
3 s3.amazonaws.com assets.ngin.com 1,643 3.2 1.2%
4 s3.amazonaws.com publisher configurations.shareaholic 1,434 2.7 0.9%
5 cloudfront.net d2e48ltfsb5exy 1,340 4.0 0.9%
6 cloudfront.net d1t3gia0in9tdj 1,297 3.2 0.9%
7 cloudfront.net d2i2wahzwrm1n5 1,249 2.5 0.8%
8 cloudfront.net d202m5krfqbpi5 1,062 2.8 0.8%
9 s3.amazonaws.com files.enjin.com 1,020 7.1 0.7%
10 akamaihd.net cdncache3-a 976 6.4 0.6%
as determined by the geolocations of the sites. The number of Bars’ frontend sites in
each country is ranked and described with different levels of darkness in the figure.
We observe that most of these frontends stay in United States (14%), followed by
Germany (7%) and United Kingdom (5%).
Role in attack infrastructures. Actually, most nodes on a malicious infrastructure
are the malicious websites with newly registered domains and those that are compro-
mised. To better understand the critical roles of Bars, we compared those nodes with
the bad cloud buckets. Specifically, we first identified both types of nodes from the
redirection paths and then analyzed the number of unique paths each member in
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(a) Cumulative distri-
bution of degrees per
sites.
(b) Percentage of Bars in
each position of redirection
path (Ignoring those traces
with length of 2).
(c) Cumulative distri-
bution of number of
in-degrees per Bar.
Figure 23: Bars play critical roles in attack infrastructures.
either category is associated with and the position of the member on the path. Fig-
ure 23(a) presents the cumulative distribution of the paths going through a Bar and
that of a compromised or malicious site. As seen in the figure, compared with other
nodes on the infrastructure, Bars clearly sit on much more paths (47.4 on average vs.
8.6), indicating their importance.
Further, Figure 23(b) shows the histogram of position distributions (again, Bars
vs. bad sites). The observation is that more Bars (41%, 11%) show up at the begin-
nings and the ends of the paths than bad websites (22%, 5%), which demonstrates
that they often act as first-hop redirectors or attack-payload repositories. For ex-
ample, in our three-month-long monitoring of the campaign based on the Spyware
distribution Bar akamaihd.net_rvar-a, we found that besides the Bar, 320 newly-
registered websites participated in the attack; here the Bar acted very much like a
dispatcher: providing JavaScript that identified the victim’s geolocation and then
using an iframe to redirect her to a selected bad site.
Content sharing. Our research reveals that Bars have been extensively shared
among malicious or compromised websites, also across different positions on mali-
cious redirection chains. Figure 23(c) illustrates the cumulative distribution of Bars’
in-degrees in their individual redirection graphs: that is, the number of the sites uti-
lizing these Bars. On average, each Bar shows up on 252 sites and 12% of them are
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used by more than 200 websites. Table 18 lists the 10 most popular Bars we found.
Among them, eight, including s3.amazonaws.com_content.sitezoogle.com, s3.
amazonaws.com_publisher_configurations.shareaholic, etc., host services for
website generation, blackhat SEO or Spam. Particularly, akamaihd.net_cdncache3-
a turns out to be a distributor of Adware, whose scripts are loaded into the victim’s
browser to redirect it to other sites for downloading different Adware. Also, we found
that another Bar s3.amazonaws.com_files.enjin.com hosts exploits utilized by
1,020 bad sites. Finding Bars can help to effectively detect more sites with malicious
contents.
Another interesting observation is that malicious content is also extensively shared
across different Bars. To understand such content reuse, we grouped the mali-
cious programs retrieved from different Bars based on the similarity of their code
in terms of edit distance. Specifically, we removed the spaces within the programs
and ran the Python library scipy.cluster.hierarchy.linkage [103] to hierarchically clus-
ter them (now in the form of strings) according to their Jaro scores [43]. In this
way, we were able to discover three types of content sharing: intra-bucket sharing,
cross-bucket sharing, and cross-platform sharing. Specifically, within the Amazon
bucket akamaihd.net_asrv-a, we found that many of its cloud URLs are in the
form of http://asrv-a.akamaihd.net/sd/[num]/[num].js. The JavaScript code
turns out to be all identical, except that each script redirects the visitor to a dif-
ferent website. The similar code also appears in another Amazon bucket akamaihd.
net_cdncache-a. As another example, we discovered the same malicious JavaScript
(JS.ExploitBlacole.zm) from the Bars on CloudFront and Qiniudn respectively,
even under the same path (i.e., media/system/js/modal.js). Moreover, we found
that attackers used sub-domain generation algorithm to automatically generate sub-
domain for Bars, then further reused the same malicious contents for these Bars.
101
Specifically, we found that 28 content sharing Bars on Akamaihd have the same for-
mat in their names. Attackers utilized a word bank based sub-domain generation al-
gorithms [48], which concatenates fixed terms and a series of domain names (remove
dot), then truncates the string if its length is over 13, e.g., apismarterpoweru-a
(truncated from smarterpowerunite.com). The common patterns of Bars indicate
the potential of developing an accurate detection procedure.
Correlation. We further studied the relationships between different Bars, fetched by
the same websites. From our dataset, 11,442 (3.5%) websites are found to access at
least two Bars. Among them, 8,283 were served as front-end websites, and 3,159 other
sites on redirection chains. Also, 60.9% of these sites link to the repositories on the
same cloud platforms and 39.1% use those on different platforms. In some cases, two
buckets are often used together. For example, we found that a click-hijacking program
was separated into the code part and the configuration part: the former is kept on
CloudFront while the latter is on Akamaihd; the two buckets always show up together
on redirection chains. Such a separation seems to be done deliberately, in an attempt
to evade detection. Also we saw that Bars carrying the same attack vectors are often
used together, which are apparently deliberately put there to serve parties of the
same interests: as another example, a compromised website was observed to access
four different Bars on different cloud platforms, redirecting its visitors to different
places for downloading Adware to the visitor’s system. Our findings show that Bars
are widely deployed in attacks and serve in a complex infrastructure.
5.3.2 Bucket Pollution
Polluted repositories. To find polluted buckets, we searched the Alexa top 20K
websites for the Bars in our dataset and 276 Bars were found. When a legitimate site
links to a Bar, the reason might be either the website or the repository is hacked.
Differentiating these two situations with certainty is hard, and in some cases, it may
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(a) Cumulative distribu-
tion of Alexa global ranks
per Bars’ front-end sites.
(b) Cumulative distribu-
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per Bar’s front-end sites.
(c) Cumulative distribu-
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per Bar’s front-end sites.
Figure 24: Alexa global rank, bounce rate and traffic increase rate of Bar’s
front-end websites.
not be possible. All we could do is to get an idea about the prevalence of such bucket
pollution, based on the intuition that if a website is less vulnerable, then it is less
likely to be compromised. To this end, we ran WhatWeb, a powerful web vulnerability
scanner, on these sites and found 134 Bar’s front-end websites contain various flaws,
such as using CMS in vulnerable version (e.g. wordpress 3.9), vulnerable plugins (e.g.,
JCE Extension 2.0.10) and vulnerable software (e.g., Apache 2.2). The remaining 142
Bar’s front-end websites look pretty solid in web protection and therefore it is likely
that the Bars they include were polluted. This set of potentially compromised buckets
takes 19% of all the Bars flagged by BarFinder. These buckets, together with the
additional 30 randomly sampled from the set, went through a manual analysis, which
shows that indeed they were legitimate buckets contaminated with malicious content.
Misconfiguration and impact. It is even more challenging to determine how these
buckets were compromised, which could be caused by exploiting either the cloud
platform vulnerabilities or the bucket misconfigurations. Without an extensive test
on the cloud platform and the repositories, which requires at least direct access to
them, a comprehensive study on the issue is impossible. Nevertheless, we were able
to identify a misconfiguration problem widely existing in popular buckets. This flaw
has never been reported before but was likely known to the underground community






Authorization: AWS (access key):(secret key)
Figure 25: Constructed request header.
the vendors and they confirmed our finding.
Specifically, on Amazon S3, one can configure the access policies for her bucket
to defines which AWS accounts or groups are granted access and the type of access
(i.e., list, upload/modify, delete and download): this can be done through specifying
access control list on the AWS Management Console. Once this happens, the cloud
verifies the content of the authorization field within the client’s HTTP request
header before the requested access is allowed to go through. However, we found that
by default, the policy is not in place, and in this case, the cloud only checks whether
the authorization key (i.e., access key and secret key) belongs to an S3 user, not the
authorized party for this specific bucket : in other words, anyone, as long as she is a
legitimate user of the S3, has the right to upload/modify, delete and list the resources
in the bucket and download the content. Note that this does not mean that the
bucket can be directly touched through the browser, since it does not put anything
into the authorization field. However, the adversary can easily build his own HTTP
header, filling in his own S3 key, as illustrated in Figure 25, to gain access to the
misconfigured repository. In our research, we verified that all such operations can be
performed on any repositories with the configuration flaw, which suggests that site
operators need to take more caution when setting the configuration rules.
To understand the impact of this problem, we developed a simple web testing tool,
which checked a bucket’s configuration using our own S3 key. By scanning all 6,885
repositories (including both Bars and legitimate buckets), we discovered that 472 are
vulnerable, which were associated with 1,306 front-end websites. The Alexa global
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ranks and the bounce rates of their front-end websites are illustrated in Figure 35(a)
and Figure 24(b). 63% of them have bounce rates from 20% to 60%; 9 sites are ranked
within Alexa top 5000 (e.g., groupon.com, space.com).
Focusing on the 104 bad buckets with the flaws, we further manually sampled
50 and confirmed that these buckets were indeed legitimate, including high-profile
ones like s3.amazonaws.com_groupon. Further, looking into the these buckets’ file
uploading time (retrieved from the buckets through the flaw), we found that in some
cases, the attack has been there for six years. Particularly the Amazon bucket
s3.amazonaws.com_groupon, Groupon’s official bucket, was apparently compromised
five times between 2012 and 2015 (see Section 6.4.3 for details), according to the
changes to the bucket we observed from the bucket historical dataset we collected
from archive.org. We also estimated the volume of traffic to those Bar-related sites
using a PassiveDNS dataset [51], which contains DNS lookups recorded by the Secu-
rity Information Exchange. Figure 24(c) illustrates the traffic of the websites during
the time period when their buckets were compromised, which was increased signifi-
cantly compared with what those sites received before their compromise, indicating
that they likely received a lot of visits. This provides evidence that the impact of
such compromised buckets is indeed significant.
5.3.3 Lifetime and Evasion
In the presence of the severe threat from Bars, we found that cloud providers’ re-
sponses, however, are far from adequate. This is highlighted by the relatively long
lifetimes of malicious repositories we observed.
Lifetime. To understand the duration of Bars’ impacts, we continuously crawled
the front-end bad sites every five days to check whether they were still using the
same set of Bars, and also malicious cloud URLs to find out whether the repositories
were still alive. Figure 35(c) illustrates the distributions of such bad repositories’ life
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(a) Distributions of Bars’ life spans on
front-end sites and on cloud platforms.
(b) Percentage of Bars removed within 5
days in top 5 cloud platforms with most
Bars.
Figure 26: Lifetime of Bars.
spans within those front-end sites and on cloud platforms. As can be seen in the
figure, on average, the references of these Bars on the websites were removed much
faster than their cloud URLs and ultimately their accounts on the cloud platforms.
Apparently, the cloud providers are less aggressive, relative to the website owners,
in addressing Bar-related infections. In Figure 26(b), we further compare Bars’ life
spans on different platforms: interestingly, with more bad buckets on its servers,
Amazon AWS acted more promptly than other clouds; Google, however, moved much
slower: for example, on Google Drive, a repository hosting malware-serving pages,
googledrive.com_0B8D1eUrPT_z3OVpBTVJ3LUg2UEk, stayed there for over 150 days,
longer than the average duration of other exploit servers (non-cloud) reported by the
prior work [60][79] (2.5 hours). The observation indicates that cloud providers have
noticed such problem, but a likely lack of effective methods to identify and clean Bars.
Evasion. Such a long lifetime could be related to a spectrum of evading techniques
the adversary deploys to protect his cloud assets, which are described as follows:
• Content separation. Apparently, the adversary tends to break his attack assets
into pieces and store them at different places. As mentioned earlier, we found that
malware’s code and configuration files were placed in different buckets. Also, we
discovered in this study that there are 32 Bars that host nothing but images used
in various attacks, Phishing and Fake AV campaigns in particular. Since the images
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themselves do not contain any malicious code, these repositories typically stay on the
clouds for a long time, >30 days on average.
• Content change. Another interesting observation is that the malicious content
within Bars changes over time, in an attempt to avoid being linked to blacklisted mali-
cious websites. Specifically, looking into the history of the content (from archive.org)
retrieved from the Bar through the same cloud URL, we found that part of the con-
tent (e.g., the destination of a redirection) changes frequently, moving quickly away
from known malicious sites.
• Redirect cloaking. Like malicious or compromised websites, Bars are also found to
leverage cloaking techniques (rendering different content based on the visitor’ cookie,
IP, user agent, etc.) to avoid detection. However, different from websites, cloud
hosting services typically do not support server-side scripting. As a result, Bars
have to run the cloaking code on the client (browser) side, which makes the evasion
less stealthy. To make up for this weakness, the adversary was observed to place
redirection websites in front of Bars, running cloaking techniques there to hide the
repositories.
• Obfuscation. We found that the attack payloads in the repositories were often
obfuscated. Various kinds of obfuscation techniques were found from simply Base64
encoding to online obfuscation tools (e.g., api.myobfuscate.com). Actually, even
the links to refer to Bars within front-end websites were obfuscated in some cases,
apparently, for the purpose of protecting the repositories.
Further, our study shows that these techniques were also utilized together to make
identification of Bars even harder. Specifically, we manually choose 10 Bars with each
evasion technique (40 in total), combined with 10 Bars without evasion technique,
and then compare their life spans. It is clear that evasion techniques do allow Bars
to hide longer, as illustrated in Table 19.
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Table 19: Comparison of Bars’ lifetime under different evasion techniques.







Content separation 10 743
25-30
days
Content change 10 1045
> 30
days






None 10 984 5-10 days
5.3.4 Case Studies
In this section, we discuss two prominent examples.
PUP campaign. Our study reveals a malicious web campaign dubbed Potentially
Unwanted Programs (PUP) distribution: the attack redirects the victim to an attack
page, which shows her fake system diagnosis results or patch requirements through
the images fetched from a Bar, in an attempt to cheat the victim into downloading
“unwanted programs” such as Spyware, Adware or a virus. This campaign was first
discovered in our dataset. Altogether, at least 11 Bars from 3 different cloud platforms
and 772 websites (not hosted on the cloud) were involved in.
Through analyzing the redirection traces of the campaign, we found that two
Akamai Bars, akamaid.net_cdncache3-a and akamaihd_asrv-a, frequently inject
scripts into compromised websites, which serve as first-hop redirectors to move a
visitor down the redirection chain before hitting malicious landing pages (that serve
malicious content). Interestingly, all the follow-up redirectors are compromised or
malicious websites that are not hosted on the cloud. The scripts in the Bars were
found to change over time, redirecting the visitor to different next-hop sites (also
redirectors). On average, the life span of such sites is only 120 hours, but the Bar
was still alive when we submitted this paper. Such redirections end at at least 216
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malicious landing sites, which all retrieve deceptive images from an Amazon S3 bucket
s3.amazonaws.com_cicloudfront (a Bar never reported before and is still alive). An
example is a system update warning, as shown in Figure 18. From the repository,
we collected 134 images, including those for free software installation, updates on
all mainstream OSes, browsers and some popular applications. If she clicks and
downloads the program promoted on the site, the code will be fetched from multiple
Bars, such as s3.amazonaws.com_wbt_media where the PUP puts a Bitcoin miner on
the victim’s system, and cloudfront.net_d12mrm7igk59vq, whose program modifies
Chrome’s security setting.
Groupon Bar. We discovered that a misconfigured Amazon S3 bucket s3.amazonaws.
com_groupon belongs to Groupon (Alexa global rank 265), a global e-commerce mar-
ketplace serving 48.1 million customers worldwide. The bucket was used as the re-
source repository for Groupon’s official website (i.e., groupon.com) as well as its
marketing sites (12 websites observed in our dataset). When tracking its historical
content from archive.org, we were surprised to see that the Groupon S3 bucket
has been compromised at least eight times in the past five years (e.g., 2015/08/06,
2014/12/18, 2014/06/25, 2014/01/27, 2014/02/26, 2013/06/23, 2011/11/08, 2010/
09/28). These attacks caused different types of malicious payloads to be uploaded to
their repository, including Adware, Trojan, virus and others. Even though the bucket
owner changed the access control policy in 2012 to prevent the unauthorized party
from directly listing the bucket content through browser, it remained accessible by
our tool mentioned in Section 5.3.2, which constructs an Authorization field in HTTP
header, and unauthorized listing, upload and even modification can still occur.
5.4 Discussion
Limitations of BarFinder. As mentioned earlier, Bar detection is hard, since cloud
repositories cannot be directly accessed by the parties outside the cloud. Therefore,
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the goal of BarFinder is to leverage the sites served by Bars to find suspicious reposi-
tories. For this purpose, we chose to utilize the collective features of these sites, such
as their topological relations, content shared across sites, etc. This strategy could
make the approach more robust, as the collective features are more difficult to evade
compared with those from individual sites. On the other hand, it requires that the
party running the system first makes efforts to gather the sites using cloud buck-
ets, the more the better. Further, there are repositories that only serve a small set of
front-end sites: e.g., we found that among the Alexa top 3K sites, 67 sites are connect-
ing to the cloud buckets only used by themselves. Those “self-serving” buckets are
rather popular in reputable websites such as appspot.com_android-site only used
by android.com, s3.amazonaws.com_ttv-backgroundart only used by twitch.tv,
etc. This fact makes the bad apples among them hard to catch by BarFinder simply
because not enough sites using them are out there to allow us to differentiate these
two types of repositories. Detection techniques covering this type of Bars need to be
developed in the follow-up research.
Other defenses against Bars. Besides the detection effort made by the third
party, as BarFinder does, more can be done to mitigate the threats posed by Bars,
from the ends of the website owner, the bucket owner and the service provider. The
website owner could perform integrity checks on the resources her website retrieves
from the bucket, making sure that it is not compromised. The cloud bucket owner
should carefully configure her cloud bucket to avoid the issue we found and other
misconfiguration flaws. In this case, an automatic configuration checker could be
helpful. Most importantly, the cloud provider does have the responsibility to move
more aggressively on detecting and removal of Bars from their systems. This, however,
is non-trivial, given the privacy concern and the fact that some Bars can only be
considered to be malicious by looking at the malicious activities they are involved
in, such as those hosting Phishing pictures. Further research is needed to better
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understand what the provider can do to address the issue.
Ethical issues. Most findings of the paper were made through analyzing the data
crawled from the public domain. Regarding the study on the misconfiguration prob-
lem we found, our scanner was designed to minimize the privacy impacts on vulnerable
repositories: specifically, it only tried out the functionality like file listing, uploading
and downloading. The impact of such operations are very much in line with those
of running online web testing tools (e.g., Sucuri [112]) on others’ websites. Most im-
portantly, we did this with the full intention to protect such repositories from future
exploits, and also carefully avoided changing any existing content there and deleted
from our system all the files downloaded. Further, we have already contacted the
major vendors such as Groupon and the cloud providers like Amazon about those
security breaches, and will continue to notify others and help them fix the configura-
tion problem. So far, Groupon has acknowledged the importance of our findings and
expressed gratitude for our help.
5.5 Summary
The emergence of using cloud repositories as a malicious service presents a new chal-
lenge to web security. This new threat, however, has not been extensively studied
and little is known about its scope and magnitude and the techniques the adversary
employs. In this chapter, we report the first systematic study on malicious and com-
promised cloud repositories and the illicit online activities built around them. We
collected a small set of seeding Bars and identified a set of collective features from
the websites connecting to them. These features describe the effort made by the
adversary to protect Bars and utilize them to quickly build up a large campaign.
Using these features, we developed a new scanner that detected over 600 Bars on
top-of-the-line cloud platforms, including Google, Amazon, and others. Over these
Bars, we performed a large-scale measurement study that led to surprising findings
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of such attacks. Examples include the central roles those buckets play at each stage
of a web attack (redirection, displaying Phishing content, exploits, attack payload
delivery, etc.), the strategy to separate malware code and configuration files to avoid
detection, and a configuration flaw never reported before that was likely exploited to
compromise many cloud buckets. Our findings made an important step toward better




THROUGH SEMANTIC INCONSISTENCY SEARCH
6.1 Introduction
Imagine that you google the following search term: site:stanford.edu pharmacy.
Figure 27 shows what we got on October 9, 2015. Under the domain of Stanford
University are advertisements (ad) for selling cheap viagra! Using various search
terms, we also found the ads for prescription-free viagra and other drugs under
nidcr.nih.gov (National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research), counter-
feit luxury handbag under dap.dau.mil (Defense Acquisition Portal), and replica
Rolex under nv.gov, the domain of the Nevada state government. Clearly, all those
FQDNs have been unauthorizedly changed for promoting counterfeit or illicit prod-
ucts. This type of attacks (exploiting a legitimate domain for underground adver-
tising) is called promotional infection in our research. Promotional infection is an
attack exploiting the weakness of a website to promote content. It has been used to
serve various malicious online activities (e.g., black-hat search engine optimization
(SEO), site defacement, fake antivirus (AV) promotion, Phishing) through various
exploit channels (e.g., SQL injection, URL redirection attack and blog/forum Spam).
Unlike the attacks hiding malicious payloads (e.g., malware) from the search engine
crawler, such as a drive-by download campaign, the promotional attacks never shy
away from search engines. Instead, their purpose sometimes is to leverage the com-
promised domain’s reputation to boost the rank of the promoted content (either what
is directly displayed under the domain or the doorway page pointed by the domain)





Figure 27: Search findings of promotional injections in stanford.edu. Search
engine result is organized as title, URL and snippet.
her query. Such infections can inflict significant harm on the compromised websites
through loss in reputation, search engine penalty, traffic hijacking and may even have
legal ramifications. They are also pervasive: as an example, a study shows that over
80% doorway pages involved in black-hat SEO are from injected domains [109].
Catching promotional infections: challenges. Even with the prevalence of the
promotional infections, they are surprisingly elusive and difficult to catch. Those
attacks often do not cause automatic download of malware and therefore may not be
detected by virus scanners like VirusTotal and Microsoft Forefront. Even the content
injected into a compromised website can appear perfectly normal, no difference from
the legitimate ads promoting similar products (e.g., drugs, red wine, etc.), ideological
and religious messages (e.g., cult theory promotion) and others, unless its semantics
has been carefully examined under the context of the compromised site (e.g., selling
red wine is unusual on a government’s website). So far, detection of the promotional
infections mostly relies on the community effort, based upon the discoveries made
by human visitors (e.g., PhishTank [12]) or the integrity checks that a compromised
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website’s owner performs. Although attempts have been made to detect such attacks
automatically, e.g., through a long term monitoring of changes in a website’s DOM
structure to identify anomalies [34] or through computer vision techniques to recognize
a web page’s visual change [35], existing approaches are often inefficient (requiring
long term monitoring or analyzing the website’s visual effects) and less effective, due
to the complexity of the infections, which, for example, can introduce a redirection
URL indistinguishable from a legitimate link or make injected content only visible to
the search engine.
Semantic inconsistency search. As mentioned earlier, fundamentally, promotional
infections can only be captured by analyzing the semantic meaning of web content
and the context in which they appear. To meet the demand for a large-scale online
scan, such a semantic analysis should also be fully automated and highly efficient.
Techniques of this type, however, have never been studied before, possibly due to the
concern that a semantic-based approach tends to be complicated and less accurate.
In this paper, we report a design that makes a big step forward on this direction,
demonstrating it completely possible to incorporate Natural Language Processing
(NLP) techniques into a lightweight security analysis for efficient and accurate de-
tection of promotional infections. A key observation here is that for the attacks in
Figure 27, inappropriate content shows up in the domains with specific meanings: no
one expects that a .gov or .edu site promotes prohibited drugs, counterfeit luxury
handbags, replica watches, etc. Such inconsistency can be immediately identified and
located from the itemized search result on a returned search result page, which in-
cludes the title, URL and snippet for each result (as marked out in Figure 27). This
approach, which detects a compromised domain (e.g., stanford.edu) based upon the
inconsistency between the domain’s semantics and the content of its result snippet
reported by a search engine with regard to some search terms, is called semantic
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inconsistency search or simply SEISE. Our current design of SEISE focuses on spon-
sored top-level domain (sTLD) like .gov, .edu, .mil, etc., that has a sponsor (e.g.,
US General Service Administration, EDUCAUSE, DoD Network Information Cen-
ter), represents a narrow community and carries designated semantics (Section 6.2.1).
Later we show that the technique has the potential to be extended to generic TLD
(gTLD, see Section 6.4.2).
SEISE is designed to search for a set of strategically selected irrelevant terms
under an sTLD (e.g., .edu) to find out the suspicious FQDNs (e.g., stanford.edu)
associated with the terms, and then further search under the domains and inspect the
snippets of the results before flagging them as compromised. To make this approach
work, a few technical issues need to be addressed: (1) how to identify semantic incon-
sistency between injected pages and the main content of a domain; (2) how to control
the false positives caused by the legitimate content including the terms, e.g., a health
center sites on Stanford University (containing the irrelevant term “pharmacy”); (3)
how to gather the search terms related to diverse promotional content. For the first
issue, our approach starts with a small set of manually selected terms popular in illicit
activities (e.g., gambling, drug and adult) and runs a word embedding based tool to
calculate the semantic distance between these terms and a set of keywords extracted
from the sTLD’s search content, which describe the sTLD’s semantics. Those most
irrelevant are utilized for detection (Section 6.2.2). To suppress false positives, our
approach leverages the observation that similar promotional content always appear on
many different pages under a compromised domain for the purpose of improving the
rank of the attack website pointed to by the content. As a result, a search of the irrel-
evant term under the domain will yield a result page on which many highly frequent
terms (such as “no prescription”, “low price” in the promotional content) turn out to
rarely occur across the generic content under the same domain (e.g., stanford.edu).
This is very different from the situation, for example, when a research article mentions
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viagra, since the article will not be scattered across many pages under the site and
tends to contain the terms also showing up in the generic content under the Stan-
ford domain, such as “study”, “finding”, etc (Section 6.2.2). Finally, using the terms
extracted from the result snippets of the sites detected, SEISE further automatically
expands the list of the search terms for finding other attacks (Section 6.2.3).
We implemented SEISE and evaluated its efficacy in our research (Section 6.3).
Using 30 seed terms and 403 sTLDs (across 141 countries and 89 languages), our
system automatically analyzed 100K FQDNs and along the way, expanded the key-
word list to 597 terms. In the end, it reported 11K infected FQDNs, which have
been confirmed to be compromised1 through random sampling and manual valida-
tion. With its low false detection rate (1.5%), SEISE also achieved over 90% detection
rate. Moving beyond sTLD, we further explore the potential extension of the tech-
nique to gTLDs such as .com (Section 6.4.2). A preliminary design analyzes .com
domains using their site tag labeled by SimilarSites [15], which is found to be pretty
effective: achieving a false detection rate (FDR) of 9% when long keywords gathered
from compromised sTLDs are used.
Our findings. Looking into the promotional infections detected by SEISE, we were
surprised by what we found: for example, about 3% (175) of .gov domains and 3%
(246) of .edu domains are injected; also around 2% of the 62,667 Chinese govern-
ment domains (.gov.cn) are contaminated with ads, defacement content, Phishing,
etc. Of particular interest is a huge gambling campaign we discovered (Section 6.4.3),
which covers about 800 sTLDs and 3000 gTLDs across 12 countries and regions (US,
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and others). Among the victims are 20 US
academia institutes such as nyu.edu, ucsd.edu, 5 government agencies like va.gov,
1Note that in line with the prior research [71], the term “compromise” here refers to not only
direct intrusion of a web domain, which was found to be the most common cases in our research (80%,
see Section 6.5), but also posting of illicit advertising content onto the domain through exploiting its
weak (or lack of) input sanitization: e.g., blog/forum Spam and link Spam (using exposed server-side
scripts to dynamically generate promotion pages under the legitimate domain).
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makinghomeaffordable.gov, together with 188 Chinese universities and 510 Chinese
government agencies. We even recovered the attack toolkit used in the campaign,
which supports automatic site vulnerability scan, shell acquisition, SEO page gener-
ation, etc. Also under California government’s domain ca.gov, over one thousand
promotion pages were found, all pointing to the same online casino site. Another cam-
paign involves 102 US universities (mit.edu, princeton.edu, stanford.edu, etc.),
advertising “buy cheap essay”. The scope of these attacks go beyond commercial ad-
vertising: we found that 12 Chinese government and university sites were vandalized
with the content for promoting Falun Gong. Given the large number of compromised
sites discovered, we first reported the most high-impact findings to related parties
(particularly universities and government agencies) and will continue to do so (Sec-
tion 6.5).
Further, our measurement study shows that some sTLDs such as .edu, .edu.cn
and .gov.cn are less protected than the .com domains with similar Alexa ranks, and
therefore become soft targets for promotional infections (Section 6.4.2). By effectively
detecting the attacks on these sTLDs, SEISE raises the bar for the adversary, who
has to resort to less guarded gTLDs, which typically have much lower Alexa ranks,
making the attacks, SEO in particular, less effective.
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are outlined as follows:
• Efficient semantics-based detection of promotional infections. We developed a novel
technique that exploits the semantic gap between domains (sTLDs in particular) and
unauthorized content they host to detect the compromised websites that serve under-
ground advertising. Our technique is highly effective, incurring low false positives and
negatives. Also importantly, it is simple and efficient: often a compromised domain
can be detected by querying Google no more than 3 times. This indicates that the
technique can be easily scaled, with the help of search providers.
• Measurement study and new findings. We performed a large-scale measurement
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study on promotional infections, the first of this kind. Our research brings to light
several high-impact, ongoing underground promotion campaigns, affecting leading
educational institutions and government agencies, and the unique techniques the per-
petrator employs. Further we demonstrate the impacts of our innovation, which
significantly raises the bar to promotional infections and can potentially be extended
to protect generic domains.
6.2 SEISE: Design
As mentioned earlier, promotional infections often do not propagate malicious pay-
loads (e.g., malware) directly and instead only post ads or other content that le-
gitimate websites may also contain. This makes detection of such attacks extremely
difficult. In our research, we look at the problem from a unique perspective, the incon-
sistency between the malicious advertising content and the semantics of the website,
particularly, what is associated with different sTLDs. More specifically, underlying
SEISE are a suite of techniques that search sTLDs (.edu, .gov, etc.) using irrelevant
bad terms (IBT ) (the search terms unrelated to the sTLDs but heavily involved in
malicious activities like Spam, Phishing) to find potentially infected FQDNs, analyze
the context of the IBTs under those FQDNs to remove false positives and leverage
detected infections to identify new search terms, automatically expanding the IBT
list. Below we elaborate on this design.
6.2.1 Overview
Architecture. Figure 28 illustrates the architecture of SEISE, which includes Se-
mantics Finder, Inconsistency Searcher, Context Analyzer and IBT Collector. Se-
mantics Finder takes as its input a set of sTLDs, automatically identifying the key-
words that represent their semantics. These keywords are compared with a seed set
of IBTs to find the most irrelevant terms. Such selected terms are then utilized by


































Figure 28: Overview of the SEISE infrastructure.
Under each detected FQDN, Context Analyzer further evaluates the context of dis-
covered IBTs through a differential analysis to determine whether after removing
stop words, i.e., the most common words like ‘the’ from the context, frequently-
used terms identified there (e.g., the search result of site:stanford.edu pharmacy)
become rare across the generic content of the FQDN (e.g., the search result of
site:stanford.edu), which indicates that the FQDN has indeed been compromised.
Such FQDNs are reported by SEISE and their snippets are used by IBT Collector
to extract keywords. Those with the largest semantic distance from the sTLDs are
added to the IBT list for detecting other infected FQDNs.
Example. To explain how SEISE works, let us take a look at the example at the
beginning of the paper (Figure 27). For the sTLD .edu, SEISE first runs Semantics
Finder to automatically extract keywords to profile sTLD, e.g., “education”, “United
States” and “student”. In the meantime, a seed set of IBTs, including “casino”,
“pharmacy” and others, are converted into vectors using the word-embedding tech-
nique. Their semantic gap with the .edu sTLD is measured by calculating the cosine
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distances between individual terms (like “pharmacy”) and the sTLD keywords (such
as “education”, “United States” and “student”). It turns out that the terms like
“pharmacy” are among the most irrelevant (i.e., with a large distance with .edu).
It is then used to search Google under .edu, which shows the FQDN stanford.edu
hosting the content with the search term. Under this FQDN, SEISE again searches
for “pharmacy.” The results page is presented in Figure 27. As we can see, many
search result items (for different URLs) contain same topic words, similar snippet
and even URL patterns, which are typically caused by mass injection of unautho-
rized advertising materials. These items form the context for the IBT “pharmacy” in
stanford.edu.
Our approach then converts the context (the result items) found into a high-
dimensional vector, with the frequency of each word (except those common stop words
like ‘she’, ‘does’, etc.) as an element of the vector. The vector, considered to be a
representative of the context, then goes through a differential analysis: it is compared
with the vector of a reference, the search results page of site:stanford.edu that
describes the generic content under the FQDN. The purpose is to find out whether the
context is compatible with the theme of the FQDN. If the distance between them is
large, then we know that this FQDN hosts a large amount of similar text semantically
incompatible with its theme (i.e., most of the high frequent words in the suspicious
text, such as “viagra”, rarely appear in the common content of the FQDN). Also
given the fact that such text is the context for the search terms irrelevant to the
sTLD of the current FQDN but popular in promotional infections, we conclude that
the FQDN stanford.edu is indeed compromised.
Once an infection is detected, the terms extracted from the context of “pharmacy”
are then analyzed and those most irrelevant to the semantics of .edu are added to
the IBT list for finding other compromised FQDNs. Examples of the terms include





   bookmarkportlet:10, viewhandler:10, 
   online:8, promoter:6, dealers:6,     
   gambling:5, slot:5, roulette: 5, 
   … 
   ics:0, student:0, university:0, 
   graduate:0, alumni:0, department:0,     
   association:0, credit:0, center:0, 




"title":"Online Casino by DewaCasino.com: Live Casino Online ...”, 
"snippet":"DewaCasino is a promoter casino best online with live 




"title":"iGamble247.com :: Live Casino Online - Casino Agent”, 
"snippet":"Igamble247 is a promoter casino best online with live 
dealers reliable, Fair and is one of the largest in Asia today. Join!”
Query — site:mysau3.arbor.edu “casino”
Query — site:mysau3.arbor.edu
“url":"https://mysau3.arbor.edu/ics/Students/", 
"title":"Students - MySAU - Spring Arbor University”, 
"snippet":"To print a certificate (proof) of enrollment or order a 
transcript, go to the National Student Clearinghouse site."
“url":"https://mysau3.arbor.edu/ICS/Alumni/About_the_Association/
Default_Page.jnz", 
"title":"Default Page - MySAU - Spring Arbor University”, 
"snippet":"The Spring Arbor University Alumni Association exists to 
serve the University and its graduates by providing alumni with a 
continuing link among themselves and…”
( 
   bookmarkportlet:0, viewhandler:0, 
   online:0, promoter:0, dealers:0,     
   gambling:0, slot:0, roulette: 0, 
   … 
   ics:4, student:3, university:3, 
   graduate:3, alumni:2, department:2,     
   association:2, credit:2, center: 2, 
   … 
)
(a) Differential analysis of an injected site.
Cosine distance = 0.97
……..
……..
(   
   class:4, education:3, course:3, 
   management:3, center:2,     
   professional:2, unit:2, university: 2, 
   … 
   snack:0, amentity:0, 
   … 
)
( 
   PLus:0, 
   … 
   education:4, program:3, university:3, 
   student:3, course:2, school:2,     
   training:2, center: 2, social:2, 
   …  
)
Query — site:www.unlv.edu “casino”
“url":"https://www.unlv.edu/igi/online-courses", 
"title":"Online Courses | International Gaming Institute | University 
of …”, 
"snippet":"New online casino management classes are currently 
being developed by the Center for Professional & Leadership 
Studies at UNLV (PLuS Center). Please visit ..."
“url":"https://www.unlv.edu/igi/casino-marketing", 
"title":"Casino Marketing for Industry Professionals | International 
…”, 
"snippet":"Accreditation. You can earn Continuing Education Units 
(CEUs) upon successful completion of any of our online casino 
management courses. Please contact..."
Query — site:www.unlv.edu
“url":"https://www.unlv.edu/socialwork", 
"title":"School of Social Work | University of Nevada, Las Vegas”, 
"snippet":"Behavioral Health Workforce Education and Training 
Program for Professionals. The UNLV School of Social Work, 
Masters Program has been awarded the…”
“url":"https://www.unlv.edu/studentunion", 
"title":"Student Union | University of Nevada, Las Vegas”, 
"snippet":"Welcome. The Student Union offers conveniences and 
amenities for everyone, whether you need to grab a snack, hold a 
meeting, or just have some fun.”
(b) Differential analysis of a non-injected
site. Cosine distance = 0.14
Figure 29: Differential analysis of an injected site and a non-injected site.
infection is then generalized to detect other advertising targets (e.g., red wine) not
included in the initial IBT list (e.g., those for promoting illegal drugs). The same
technique can also be applied to find out compromised gTLDs like the .com FQDNs
involved in the same campaign.
6.2.2 Semantics-based Detection
In this section, we present the technical details for Semantics Finder, Inconsistency
Searcher and Context Analyzer.
Finding semantics for sTLDs. The first step of our approach is to automatically
build a semantic profile for an sTLD. Such a profile is represented as a set of terms,
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which serve as an input to the Inconsistency Searcher for choosing right IBTs. For
example, the semantic representation of the sTLD .edu.cn could be “Chinese univer-
sity”, “education”, “business school”, etc. SEISE automatically identifies these terms
from different sources using a term extraction technique. Specifically, the following
two sources are currently utilized by our prototype:
• Wikipedia: the Wikipedia pages for sTLDs provide a comprehensive summary of
different sTLDs. For example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.mil profiles the
sTLD .mil, including its sponsor (“DoD Information System Agency”), intended use
(“military entities”), registration restrictions (“tightly restricted to eligible agencies”),
etc. In our research, we ran a crawler that collected the wiki pages for 80 sTLDs.
• Search results : the search results page for an sTLD query (e.g., site:gov) lists high-
profile websites under the sTLD. As mentioned earlier, each search result includes a
snippet of a website, which offers a concise but high-quality description of the website.
Since the websites under the sTLD carry the semantic information of the sTLD, such
descriptions can be used as another semantic source of the sTLD. Therefore, our
approach collected the search result pages of all 403 sTLDs using automatically-
generated queries in the form of “site:sTLD”, such as site:edu. From each result
page, top 100 search results are picked up for constructing the related sTLD’s semantic
profile.
From such sTLD semantics sources, the Semantics Finder runs a content term
extraction tool to automatically gather keywords from the sources. These keywords
are supposed to best summarize the topic of each source and therefore represent
the semantics of an sTLD. In our implementation, we utilized an open-source tool
topia.termextract [19] for this purpose. From each keyword extracted, our approach
further calculates its frequency, which is assigned to the keyword as its weight. All
together, top 20 keywords are chosen for each sTLD as its semantics profile.
A problem is that among all 403 sTLDs, 71 of them are non-English ones, which
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include Chinese, Russian, French, Arabic, etc., 89 languages altogether. Analyzing
these sTLDs in their native languages is complicated, due to the challenges in process-
ing these languages: for example, segmenting Chinese characters into words is known
to be hard [123]. To solve this problem, we utilized Google Translate to convert the
search page of an non-English sTLD query into English and then extract their En-
glish keywords. The approach was found to work effectively, capturing non-English
promotional infections (see Section 6.4).
Searching for inconsistency. The Inconsistency Searcher is designed to find out
the IBTs with great semantic gaps with a given sTLD, and use the terms to search the
sTLD for suspicious (potentially compromised) FQDNs. To this end, we first selected
a small set of seed IBTs as an input to the system. These IBTs were collected from
spam trigger word lists [23, 24] and SEO competitive word list [25], which are popular
terms used in counterfeit medicine selling, online gambling and Phishing. From those
terms, the most irrelevant ones are picked up for analyzing a given sTLD. Such terms
are found by comparing them with the semantics profile of the FQDN, that is, the
set of keywords output by the Semantics Finder.
Specifically, such a semantic comparison is performed by SEISE using a word-
embedding tool called word2vec [21], a neural network that builds a vector repre-
sentation for each term by learning from the context in which the term occurs. In
our research, we utilized the English Wikipedia pages as the context for each term to
compute its vector and measure the distance between two words using their vectors.
In this way, the IBTs irrelevant to a given sTLD can be found and used to search
under the FQDN for detecting the suspicious ones. The approach works as follows:
• We downloaded all 30 GB Wikipedia pages and ran a program to preprocess those
pages by removing tables and images while preserving their captions. Individual
sentences on the pages were further tokenized into terms using a phrase parser.
• Given an input term (an IBT or a keyword in the sTLD’s semantics profile), our
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approach runs word2vec to train a skip-gram model, which maps the term into a
high-dimensional vector 〈d1, d2, ...di, ...〉 to describes the term’s semantics. This vec-
tor is generated from all the sentences involving the term, with individual elements
describing the term’s relations with other terms in the same sentence across all such
sentences in the Wikipedia dataset.
• Given the vectors of an IBT and an sTLD keyword, our approach measures the
semantic distance between them by calculating the cosine distance between their
vectors. For each IBT, its average distance to all the keywords is used to determine
its effectiveness in detecting promotional infections. In our research, we found that
when the distance becomes 0.6 (at least 20 terms are still there within our seed set)
or more, almost no compromised site is missing (see Figure 31(a) in Section 6.4).
The IBTs selected according to such a threshold are then sent to the search engine
together with the sTLD through the query site:sTLD+IBT (e.g.,site:edu casino).
From the search result page, top 100 items (URLs) are further inspected by the
Context Analyzer to determine whether related FQDNs are indeed compromised,
which is detailed in the followed subsection.
As an example, again, let us look at Figure 29: in this case, the IBT “casino”
has a distance of 0.72 with regard to the semantics of .edu and therefore was run
under the sTLD; from the search pages, top FQDNs, including mysau3.arbor.edu,
www.unlv.edu, were examined to detect compromised FQDNS.
Analyzing IBT context. As mentioned earlier, even the terms most irrelevant to
an sTLD could show up on some of its pages for a legitimate reason. For example,
the word ‘casino’ has a significant semantic distance with the sTLD .edu, which does
not mean, however, that the .edu sites cannot carry a poster about one’s travel to
Las Vegas or a research article about a study on the gambling industry. Actually,
a direct search of the term site:edu casino yields a result page with some of the
items being legitimate. To identify those compromised FQDNs, the Context Analyzer
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automatically examines the individual FQDN on the result page, using a differential
analysis (Figure 28) to detect those truly compromised.
More specifically, the differential analysis involves two independent queries, one on
the suspicious FQDN together with the IBT (e.g., site:life.sunysb.edu casino)
and the other on the FQDN alone (e.g., site:life.sunysb.edu) whose results page
serves as the reference. The idea is based on the observation that in a promotional
infection, the adversary has to post similar text on many different pages (sometimes
pointing to the same site) for promoting similar products or content. This is necessary
because the target site’s rank needs multiple highly-ranked pages on the compromised
site to promote. The problem for such an attack is that the irrelevant content, which
is supposed to rarely appear under the FQDN, becomes anomalously homogenous and
pervasive under a specific IBT. As a result, when we look at the search results of the
IBT under the FQDN, their URLs and snippets tend to carry the words rarely showing
up across the generic content (i.e., the reference) with much higher frequencies than
their accidental occurrences under the FQDN. On the other hand, in the case of
legitimate content including the IBT, the search results (for the IBT under the FQDN)
will be much more diverse and the words involved in the IBT’s context often appear
on the reference and are compatible with the generic content of the site; even for the
irrelevant terms in the context, their frequencies tend to be much lower than those in
the malicious context. This is because it is unlikely that the term irrelevant to the
theme of the site accidentally appears in similar context across many pages, which
introduces an additional set of highly-frequent irrelevant terms. As an example, let
us look at Figure 29(a) that shows a compromised FQDN and Figure 29(b) that
illustrates a legitimate FQDN. The highly-frequent words extracted from the former
under the IBT ‘casino’, such as ‘bookmarkporlet’, ‘dealers’, ‘slot’, never show up
across the URLs and snippets of the reference that represents the generic content of





















Figure 30: IBT SET Extension. The process to find IBTs in new category consists
of five steps: Injected URLs are collected to find the injected directory path (Ê). Then,
the injected directory path is used as search keyword, i.e., site:www.lgma.ca.govplay to list
more search result items (Ë). After fetching search result snippets(Ì), critical terms are
extracted (Í), and those that show semantics irrelevance are filtered for clustering (Î).
Once a new cluster is formed, we manually check and label it with its semantics.
of the legitimate FQDN using the same IBT yields a list of results whose URLs and
snippets have highly diverse content, with some of their words also included in the
generic content, such as ‘class’, ‘education’ and ‘university’, and most others (except
the IBT itself) occurring infrequently.
To compare the two search result pages for identifying the truly compromised site,
the Context Analyzer picks up top 10 search results from each query and converts
them into a high dimensional vector. Specifically, our approach focuses on the URL
and the content snippet for each result item. We segment them into words using
delimiters such as space, comma, dash, etc., and remove stop words (those extremely
common words like ‘she’, ‘do’, etc.) using a stop word list [16]. In this way, each
search item is tokenized and the frequency of each token, across all 10 results is
calculated to form a vector V =< w0, w1, ...wi, ... >, where wi is the frequency of a
word corresponding to that position. For the two vectors Vb (the search page under
the IBT) and Vg (the reference, that is, the search page of the FQND without the
IBT), SEISE calculates their Cosine distance: 1− Vb·Vg‖Vb‖‖Vg‖ .
In Figure 29(a), the distance of the vector for the IBT ‘casino’ with the reference
vector is 0.97. In Figure 29(b), where the FQDN is not compromised, we see that the
vector under the IBT ‘casino’ is much closer to that of the reference, with a distance
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of 0.14. In our research, we chose 0.9 as a threshold to parameterize our system:
whenever the Cosine distance between the results of querying an FQDN under an
IBT and the reference of the FQDN goes above the threshold, the Context Analyzer
flags it as infected. This approach turns out to be very effective, incurring almost no
false positives, as elaborated in Section 6.3.
Discussion. SEISE is carefully designed to work on search result pages instead of the
full content of individual FQDNs. This is important because the design helps achieve
not only high performance but also high accuracy. Specifically, a semantic analysis
on a small amount of context information (title, URL and snippet of a search result)
is certainly much more lightweight than that on the content of each web page. Also
interestingly, focusing on such context helps avoid the noise introduced by the generic
page content, since the snippet of each search result is exactly the text surrounding
an IBT, the part of the web page most useful for analyzing the suspicious content it
contains. In other words, our approach leverages the search engine to zoom in on the
context of the IBT, ignoring unrelated content on the same web page.
6.2.3 IBT SET Extension
A critical issue for the semantic-based detection is how to obtain high-quality IBTs.
Those terms need to be malicious and irrelevant to the semantics of an sTLD. Also im-
portantly, they should be diverse, covering not only different keywords the adversary
may use in a specific category of promotional infections, like unlicensed pharmacy,
but also those associated with the promotional activities in different categories, such
as gambling, fake product advertising, academic cheating, etc. Such diversity is es-
sential for the detection coverage SEISE is capable of achieving, since a specific type
of promotional attack (e.g., fake medicine) cannot be captured by a wrong IBT (e.g.,
‘gambling’).
As mentioned earlier, the seed IBT set used in our research includes 30 terms,
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which were collected from several sources, including spam trigger word lists [23, 24]
and SEO competitive word list [25]. These IBTs are associated with the attacks such
as blackhat SEO, fake AV and Phishing. To increase the diversity of the set, SEISE
expands it in a largely automated way, both within one category and across different
categories. More specifically, our approach leverages NLP techniques to gather new
IBTs from the search items reported to contain malicious content, and further cluster
these IBTs to discover new categories. Here we elaborate on this design.
Finding IBTs within a category. Once a compromised FQDN has been identified
using an IBT, the search results that lead to the detection (for the query “site:
FQDN+IBT”) can then be used to find more terms within the IBT’s category. This
is because the result items are the context of the IBT, and therefore include other
bad terms related to the IBT. Specifically, similar to the Semantics Finder, the IBT
Collector runs the term extraction tool on each result item, including its title, URL
and snippet, to gather the terms deemed important to the context of the IBT. Such
terms are further inspected, automatically, against the semantics of an sTLD by
measuring their average distances with the keywords of the FQDN (that is, converting
each of them into a vector using word2vec and then calculating the Cosine distance
between two vectors). Those sufficiently away from the FQDN’s semantics (with a
distance above the aforementioned threshold) are selected as IBTs.
Finding new categories. Extracting keywords from the context of an IBT can only
provide us with new terms in the same category. To detect the infections in other
categories, we have to extend the IBT set to include the terms in other types of illicit
promotions. The question is how to capture new keywords such as ‘prescription-free
antibiotic’ that are distinguished from the IBTs in the known category such as ‘gam-
bling’, ‘casino’, etc. A key observation we leveraged in our study is that the adversary
sometimes compromises an FQDN to perform multiple types of advertising: depend-
ing on the search terms the user enters, an infected website may provide different
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kinds of promotional content, for drug, alcohol, gambling and others. Further the ads
serving such a purpose are often deposited under the same directory, along the same
path under a compromised FQDN. This enables us to exploit the URL included in a
contaminated result item (as detected by SEISE) to find the promotional materials
unrelated to the context of the IBT in use.
Specifically, from each flagged FQDN, the IBT Collector first picks up all the
URLs leading to malicious content, and from them, identifies the most commonly
shared path under the FQDN. For example, from the URLs www.lgma.ca.gov/play/
popular/1*.html, www.lgma.ca.gov/play/home/2*.html and www.lgma.ca.gov/
play/club/3*.html (detected using the IBT ‘casino’), the shared path under the
FQDN is www.lgma.ca.gov/play. Using this path, our approach queries Google
again with ‘site:FQDN+path’: e.g., site:www.lgma.ca.gov/play. From the results
page of the query, critical terms are extracted by analyzing snippets under individual
result items. These terms are further compared with the semantics of the current
sTLD: those most irrelevant (with a cosine distance above the threshold 0.9) are
kept. Finally, the vectors of these terms are clustered using the classic k-Nearest-
Neighbor (k-NN) algorithm (with k = 10) together with all existing IBTs. Once a
new cluster is formed in this way, we manually look at the cluster and label it with its
semantics (gambling, drug selling, academic cheating, etc.). Note that this manual
step is just for labeling, not for adjusting the clustering outcomes, which were found
to be very accurate in our research (Section 6.3.3).
In the above example as illustrated in Figure 30, the query site:www.lgma.ca.
gov/play leads to the search results page. From the items on the page, the IBT
Collector automatically recovers a set of critical terms, including ‘goldslot’, ‘payday
loan’, ‘cheap essay’ and others. Clustering these terms, some of them are classified
into existing categories such as gambling, drug, etc., while the rest are grouped into
a new cluster, containing ‘cheap essay’, ‘free term paper’ along with other 15 terms.
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This new cluster is found to be indeed a new attack category, and labeled as ‘academia
cheating’. In our research, we ran the approach to extend our IBT set, from 30 terms
to 597 effective terms, from 3 categories (gambling, drug, etc.) to 10 large categories
(financial, cheating, politics, etc.). Our manual validation shows that the results are
mostly correct.
6.3 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we report our implementation of SEISE and evaluation of its efficacy.
Our study show that the simple semantics-based approach works well in practice: it
automatically discovered IBTs, achieved an low false detection rate (1.5%) at over
90% of coverage and also captured 75% infected domains never reported before (Sec-
tion 6.3.3).
6.3.1 Implementing SEISE
The design of SEISE (Section 6.2) was implemented into a prototype system, on top
of a set of building blocks. Here we briefly describe these nuts and bolts and then
show how they are assembled into the system.
Nuts and bolts. Our prototype system was built upon three key functional com-
ponents, term extractor, static crawler and semantic comparator. Those components
are extensively reused across the whole system, as illustrated in Figure 28. They were
implemented as follows:
• Term extractor accepts text as its input, from which it automatically identifies
critical terms. The component was implemented in Python using an open-source tool
topia.termextract.
• Static crawler accepts query terms, looks for the terms through search engines and
returns results with a pre-determined number of items. In our implementation, the
crawler was developed in Python and utilized the Google Web Search API [10] and
the Bing Search API [3] to get search results.
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• Semantic comparator accepts a set of terms and compares them with the keywords of
an input sTLD. It can return the average distance of each term with those keywords
or the terms whose distances are above a given threshold. This component was
implemented as a Python program that integrates the open-source tool word2vec.
As mentioned earlier, we trained the language model used by word2vec with the
whole Wikipedia dataset, from which our implementation automatically collected the
context for each term before converting it to a high-dimensional vector.
System building. Using these building blocks, we constructed the whole system as
illustrated in Figure 28. Specifically, the Semantic Finder was developed to run the
static crawler to gather the content under an sTLD and then call the term extractor
to identify the keywords for the domain. The Inconsistency Searcher invokes the
semantic comparator to determine the most irrelevant IBTs before using the crawler to
search for the terms. The Context Analyzer includes a differential analyzer component
implemented with around 300 lines of Python code. For each suspicious FQDN, the
analyzer calls the crawler to query the search engine twice, one under an IBT and the
other for getting the reference (the generic content). It reports the domain considered
to be compromised. Finally, the IBT Collector uses the crawler to search for the
selected URL path under the detected domain, then the extractor to get critical
terms from the search results and the semantics comparator to find out new IBTs.
Over these IBTs, we further integrated the k-NN module provided by the scikit-learn
open source machine learning library [106] to cluster them and discover new bad-term
categories.
6.3.2 Experiment Setting
Data collection. To evaluate SEISE, we ran our prototype on three datasets: the
labeled bad set and good set, and the unknown set including 100K FQDNs collected
from search engines, using 597 search terms, as explicated below.
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• Bad set. We collected the FQDNs confirmed to have promotional infections from
CleanMX [42], a blacklist of compromised URLs. A problem here is that these URLs
are associated with different kinds of malicious activities and it is less clear whether
they are promotional infection. What we did is to collect all the sTLD URLs from
the CleanMX feed from 2015/07 to 2015/08, and further manually inspected all these
URLs. Specifically, whenever we saw that advertising, Phishing, defacement content
showing up in the search results of a URL, it is considered to be exploited for promo-
tional infections. We further classified these URLs into different categories and also
manually identified related IBTs. In this way, we built a bad set with 300 FQDNs
(together with 15 IBTs in three categories).
• Good set. Using the IBTs collected from the bad set, we further searched under
the sTLDs for the FQDNs (“site:sTLD+IBT”) that contained those terms but were
not compromised. These domains were used to understand the false detections that
could be introduced by SEISE. Altogether, we collected a good set of 300 FQDNs
related to 15 IBTs and three categories.
• Unknown set. We gathered 403 sTLDs and manually selected 30 IBTs in three
categories. Running these IBT seeds on these sTLDs, we crawled Google and Bing
over three months, collecting 100K FQDNs. This dataset was used as the unknown
set for discovering new promotional infections.
Resources and validation. In all our experiments, our prototype system was run
within Amazon EC2 C4.8xlarge instances equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2666 36 vCPU
and 60GiB of memory. To collect the data for the unknown set, we deployed 20
crawlers within virtual machines with different IP settings. These crawlers utilized
the APIs provided by Google and Bing to dump the outcomes of the queries, from
2015/08 to 2015/10.
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(a) False detection rate in different se-
mantics distances. Color bar shows the cov-
erage rate.
(b) False positive rate in different seman-
tics distances. Color bar shows the coverage
rate.
Figure 31: Evaluation results on good set and bad set.
To validate the findings made on the unknown set, we employed a methodol-
ogy that combined anti-virus (AV) scanning, blacklist checking and manual anal-
ysis. Specifically, for the FQDN reported by our system, we first scanned their
URLs with VirusTotal and considered that the URLs were indeed suspicious when at
least two scanners flagged the domain. Then, all such suspicious URLs were cross-
checked against the blacklist of CleanMX. For those confirmed by both VirusTotal
and CleanMX, their FQDNs were automatically labeled as compromised. For other
domains also detected by SEISE, we randomly sampled 20% of them and manually
checked whether they were indeed compromised.
6.3.3 Evaluation Results
Over the aforementioned datasets, we thoroughly evaluated our prototype. Our study
shows that SEISE is highly effective: it achieved near zero False Detection Rate (FDR,
i.e., FP/(FP+TP)) and over 90% coverage (i.e., TP/(TP+FN)) or below 4.7% FDR,
4.4% False Positive Rate (FPR, i.e., FP/(FP+TN)) and nearly 100% coverage on
the labeled sets (the bad and good set); with the threshold chosen to balance FDR
and FPR, we further ran SEISE over the unknown set, which reported over 11K
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compromised sites, with an FDR of 1.5% and a coverage over 90%. Also importantly,
75% of infections discovered from the unknown set are likely never reported before,
including 3 large-scale campaigns, on which we elaborate in Section 6.4. All these
findings were made in a highly efficient and scalable way: on average, only 2.3 queries
were made for finding a new compromised FQDN and the delay caused by analyzing
the query results and other computing resources consumed for this purpose were
completely negligible.
Accuracy and coverage. We evaluated the accuracy and the coverage of SEISE
under a given set of IBTs. In this case, what can be achieved are all dependent
on the Context Analyzer, which ultimately decides whether to flag an FQDN as
compromised. In our research, we first studied our system over the labeled good set
and bad set, and then put it to test over the unknown set. Figure 31(a) and 31(b)
illustrate the results over the labeled sets, in response to different thresholds for
semantic distances (between the reference and the query of an IBT). As we can see
here, when the threshold goes up, the FDR goes down and so does the coverage.
On the other hand, loosening the threshold, which means that the IBT is becoming
less irrelevant to the semantics of the sTLD, improves the coverage, at the cost of
the FDR. Overall, the results show that SEISE is highly accurate: by setting the
threshold to 0.9, we observe almost no false detection (FDR: 0.5% and FPR: 0.4%)
with a 92% of coverage; alternatively, if we can tolerate 4.7% FDR (FPR: 4.4%), the
coverage becomes close to 100%. In our research, the threshold 0.9 was then utilized
to analyze the unknown set.
On the unknown set, we ran SEISE to query 597 IBTs under 403 sTLDs. Our pro-
totype inspected 100K FQDNs in total. 11,473 of them were flagged as compromised,
about 11% of the whole unknown set. Table 21 and Table 22 summarize our findings,
which are further discussed in Section 6.4. Among all that were detected, 3% were
confirmed by both VirusTotal [20] and CleanMX [42], 22% were found by at least one
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Table 20: Number of IBTs in each round.
Round # of categories # of IBTs per category Avg. length
0 3 10 2.6
5 5 18 3.0
10 8 25 3.1
15 10 40 3.2
20 10 60 3.8
of these two AV systems and further validated manually, and 1000 of the remaining
were inspected manually. All together, the FDR measured from the unknown set is as
low as 1.5%. We further randomly sampled 500 result pages related to 10 categories
of IBTs and found that our prototype reported 53 infections and missed 5, which
indicates a coverage of about 90%. Also, note that over 75% of the infections have
never been reported (missed by both VirusTotal and CleanMX). We have reported
the most prominent ones among them to related organizations and are helping them
fix the problem, and will continue to work on other cases.
IBT expansion. The effectiveness of SEISE also relies on its capability to discover
new IBTs and find new attack instances across different categories. As discussed
before, our prototype starts with a small set of seed IBTs, 30 terms in three categories.
After searching for all these terms under all the sTLDs, a set of compromised FQDNs
are detected, which are further used by the IBT Collector to extract new terms for
searching all 403 sTLDs again. In our research, we repeated such iteration 20 times,
expanding the IBT set to 597 terms and 10 categories. All the terms and categories
were manually confirmed to be correct. Table 20 presents the numbers for the terms
and the categories, together with examples of new terms detected, after the 1st, 5th,
10th, 15th and 20th iterations. As we can see here, the number of categories and
number of IBTs increase quickly (with a increase rate of 60% and 180%, respectively)
in the first 10 iterations, which indicate that our IBT expansion method is efficient
for both in-category and cross-category expansion. Also, Table 22 illustrates the total
categories of IBTs flagged by SEISE after these iterations.
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Table 21: Top 10 sTLDs with most injected domains.
sTLD Est. total # monitored # injected Volume Injected size
gov.cn 62,667 2,904 1,240 12% FQDN: 1,840 URL: 172,244
edu.vn 16,148 2,032 262 3% FQDN: 312 URL: 22,543
edu 8,955 2,502 246 3% FQDN: 250 URL: 29,580
edu.cn 3,912 1,173 238 2% FQDN: 403 URL: 34,308
edu.au 9,594 1,968 204 2% FQDN: 223 URL: 21,563
gov.co - 1,892 200 2% FQDN: 253 URL: 23,022
gov 6,251 1,562 175 2% FQDN: 178 URL: 15,720
gov.in 4,272 1,402 141 1% FQDN: 163 URL: 14,572
edu.in 3,892 1,243 132 1% FQDN: 172 URL: 12,034
edu.mx 8,232 1,372 126 1% FQDN: 144 URL: 11,056
Table 22: Categories of IBTs.
Category
Keyword Injected site
# kw. avg. len example # FQDN # domains Example
Gambling 62 3.5 casino, slot machine 3650 2134 ca.gov (Alexa: 649)
Drug 64 3.2 cheap xanax, no prescription 2047 1742 princeton.edu (Alexa: 3558)
General 83 3.4 nike air max, green coffee bean 1673 1572 nih.gov (Alexa: 196)
Cheating 52 4.2 fake driving permit, cheap essay 1107 1017 mit.edu (Alexa:789)
Financial 65 3.6 payday loan, quick loan 1092 947 nsf.gov (Alexa:16,303)
Travel 58 4.5 cheap airfare, hotel deal 972 924 gmu.edu (Alexa: 8058)
Luxury 59 3.2 cheap gucci, discounted channel 890 876 nv.gov (Alexa:25,875)
Adult 60 4.6 qvod, sex movie 922 843 tsinghua.edu.cn (Alexa: 6717)
Software 53 5.2 free download, system app 807 734 noaa.gov (Alexa:1126)
Politics 41 3.2 islamic state, falun gong 372 342 buaa.edu.cn (Alexa:33,807)
Performance. We further evaluated the performance of our prototype, in an attempt
to understand the scalability of our design. We found that except the delay caused
by receiving the results from Google, the overhead for analyzing search results and
detecting compromised sites are exceedingly low: by running 10000 randomly selected
queries (50 IBTs over 200 sTLDs), we observed that the average time for analyzing
1K result items, excluding the waiting time for the search engine, was 1ms, and also
the memory and CPU usages stayed below 5% respectively. The main hurdle here is
the delay caused by the search engine: for Google, it ranged from 5ms to 8ms per
one thousand queries. The design of SEISE already limits the number of queries that
needed to be made for detecting infected FQDNs: in the experiments, we found that
on average, a compromised FQDN was detected after 2.3 term queries. We believe
that by working with the search provider (Google, Bing etc.), SEISE can be easily
scaled with a quick turnaround of the search results.
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6.4 Measurement
Based upon what was detected by SEISE, we performed a measurement study to
understand the promotional infections on sTLDs, particularly the semantic incon-
sistency these attacks introduce. Our study brings to light the pervasiveness of the
attacks and their significant impacts, affecting the websites of leading academic in-
stitutions and government agencies around the world. Further discovered are a set
of surprising findings and their insights, which have never been known before. For
example, apparently sTLDs are soft targets for promotional infections, highly ranked
and also easier to compromise compared with gTLD sites of similar ranks; as a result,
by mitigating the threats to the sTLD domains, we raise the bar for the adversary,
depriving him of easy access to the resources highly valuable to the promotional at-
tacks, which rely on the compromised site’s rank to boost the rating of malicious
content. As another example, we show that semantic inconsistency can also be ob-
served in the promotional infections on gTLDs such as .com, .net, etc., even though
these domains tend to have a much more diverse semantic meaning. Based upon
this observation, a preliminary exploration highlights the potential of extending our
approach to protect gTLD sites, indicating that a semantic model can also be built
for some websites under the gTLD domains to capture the promotional attacks on
them. Finally, we elaborate on a study on some prominent attack cases discovered
in our research, which, from the semantic perspectives, analyzes the techniques the
adversary employ in the promotional infections.
6.4.1 Landscape
Scope and magnitude. Our study reveals that the promotional infections are
spread across the world, compromising websites in all kinds of sTLDs. Altogether,
SEISE detected around 1 million URLs leading to malicious content on 11,473 infected
FQDNs under 9,734 sTLD domains. The results are summarized in Table 21 and
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Domain Alexa Rank IBT Domain Alexa Rank IBT
nih.gov 196 General purdue.edu 1462 Drug
ca.gov 649 Gambling cdc.gov 1731 Drug
state.gov 719 Drug umich.edu 1781 Drug
mit.edu 789 Drug cornell.edu 1806 Drug
harvard.edu 1034 Cheating ed.gov 1816 Drug
weather.gov 1035 Software washington.edu 1905 Drug
stanford.edu 1050 Drug sp.gov.br 1986 Drug
noaa.gov 1126 Software ucla.edu 1989 General
psu.edu 1342 Drug utexas.edu 2012 Financial
berkeley.edu 1452 Drug wisc.edu 2199 General
Figure 32: Cumulative distribution of injected sTLD sites’ Alexa rank and Top
20 injected sTLD sites with highest Alexa rank.
Table 22.
To understand the magnitude of the threat towards individual sTLDs, we studied
the ratio of compromised FQDNs under each domain category. For this purpose, we
first tried to get some idea about how many FQDNs are under each sTLD, using
the passive DNS dataset from DNSDB [51]. The dataset includes the records of
individual DNS RRsets as well as first-seen, last-seen timestamps for each domain
and the DNS bailiwick from Farsight Security’s Security Information Exchange and
the authoritative DNS data. The number of FQDNs under an sTLD was estimated
from those under the sTLD queried between 2014/01 and 2015/08, as reported by
the passive DNS records. The results were further cross-validated by comparing them
with the estimated domain counts given by DomainTools [7] for each TLD.
Table 21 illustrates the top-10 sTLD with the largest number of infected domains,
together with the number of domains we monitored and the total number of domains
we estimated for each sTLD. According to our findings, gov.cn is the least protected
sTLD with a significant portion of the FQDNs compromised (12%), which is followed
by edu.vn 3% and edu.cn 3%. The top-3 sponsoring registrars with the most in-
fected gov.cn sites are sfn.cn, alibaba.com, xinnet.com. On the other hand, .mil
sites apparently are better protected than others. Among the 456 .mil domains we
monitored, only 8 domains are injected.
Figure 33 describes the distributions of the compromised sTLD sites across 141
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countries, as determined by their geolocation. Based upon the number of infected
domains, countries are colored with different shades of blue. As we can see here,
most of infected sites are found in China (15%), followed by United States (6%) and
Poland (5%).
Impacts of the infections. We further looked into the Alexa ranks of injected sTLD
websites, which are presented in Figure 32. Across different sTLDs, highly ranked
websites were found to be exploited, getting involved in various types of malicious
activities, SEO, Phishing, fake drug selling, academic cheating, etc. Figure 32 illus-
trates the cumulative distributions of the ranks: a significant portion of the infections
(75%) actually happen to those among the top 1M. Figure 32 further shows the top-20
websites with the highest Alexa ranks. Among them, 12 are under .edu, including the
websites of leading institutions like mit.edu (Alexa:789), harvard.edu (Alexa:1034),
stanford.edu (Alexa:1050) and berkeley.edu (Alexa:1452), and 7 under .gov, such
as nih.gov (Alexa:196), state.gov (Alexa:719) and noaa.gov (Alexa:1126). In gen-
eral, China is the country that hosts most injected sTLD sites; however, when it
comes to top ranked sites (Alexa rank < 10K), 67% of them are in the United States
and Australia.
Also interesting is the types of malicious activities in which those domains are
involved. Table 22 shows the number of the domains utilized for promoting each type
of content (across all 10 categories). As we can see here, most of the injected sTLD
sites (19%) are in the Gambling category, which is followed by those related to Drug
(15%) and General Product (14%) such as shoes and healthcare products. When we
look at the top-20 domains, many of them are infected to promote Drug. Also, many
.edu domains advertise unlicensed pharmacy, while .gov are mainly compromised
to promote gambling and fake AV. Interestingly, the injected domains associated
with different countries tend to serve different types of content. For example, the
most common promotions on Chinese domains are gambling (which is illegal in that
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country), while most injected US domains are linked to unlicensed online pharmacy.
Since the infected country code sTLDs (e.g., .cn) can make the content they promote
more visible to the audience in related countries (e.g., boosting the ranks of malicious
sites in the results of country-related searches), it is likely that promotional infections
target specific groups of Internet users, just like legitimate advertising.
Our study further shows that many of such infections have been there for a while.
Figure 34 shows the distribution of the infection time for the injected page in sTLD
sites. We estimated the durations of their infections by continuously crawling the
20K injected pages (which were detected in 2015/08) every two days from 2015/08 to
2015/11 to find out whether they were still alive. As we can see from the figure, most
infections last 10-20 days, while some of them have indeed been there for a while,
at least 1 months. A prominent example is the injection on ca.gov, whose infection
starts no later than 60 days.
6.4.2 Implications of Semantics Inconsistency
Our study shows that promotional infections, particularly for those under sTLDs, are
characterized by the inconsistency between the semantics of the promoted content and
that of an infected domain’s generic content: in our labeled bad set (the collection
of compromised domains reported by CleanMX; see Section 6.3.2), all sTLD-related
infections contain the malicious content inconsistent with the semantics of their host-
ing websites. The implication of this observation is that by exploiting this feature, a
weakness of the sTLD-based promotional infections, a semantic-based approach, like
SEISE, can effectively suppress such a threat to sTLDs. This is significant, since our
study, as elaborated below, shows that sTLDs are valuable to the adversary because
they are less protected and highly ranked. Further, even for gTLDs, which tends to
have highly diverse and less specified semantics, the malicious content uploaded there
also tends to be incompatible with the compromised websites’ themes. This indicates
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that our approach can be applied beyond sTLDs. Following we report our findings.
sTLD as a soft target. To understand the importance of sTLDs to the adversary, we
compared the compromised sTLD sites with those under the gTLDs, within the same
attack campaign. A campaign here includes a set of websites infected for promoting
unauthorized or malicious content and those sites share a set of common features,
specifically, they all pointing to the same target site being advertised, their malicious
URLs having the same features (such as same affiliate ID as URL parameter) and
they all share the same redirection chain. In our research, we discovered a campaign
through infected websites’ “link-farm” structure, i.e., a compromised site pointing to
another one. Following the links on the compromised sTLD sites enabled us to reach
a set of infected gTLD sites, mainly under .com. We then compared the features of
those sites with those of sTLD domains, in terms of Alexa rank, pagerank (PR) and
lifetime, in an attempt to find out what type of TLD domains are more valuable to
promotional infections.
Table 23 presents the top-3 campaigns (all organized as link farms) discovered in
our study. The largest one covers about 872 sTLDs and 3426 gTLDs across 12 coun-
tries and regions (US, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and others). Among
the victims are 20 US academic institution such as nyu.edu, ucsd.edu, 5 govern-
ment agencies like va.gov, makinghomeaffordable.gov, together with 188 Chinese
universities and 510 Chinese government agencies. Also among the victims are 1507
.com sites. Figure 35(a) and Figure 35(b) compare the Alexa global ranks and the
page rank (PR) of those gTLD and sTLD websites. As we can see from the figures,
50%-75% of sTLD sites are ranked within the Alexa top 1M, while only 10%-30% of
gTLD sites are at this level. Actually, more than 40% of the gTLD sites have Alexa
rank outside the top 5M. By comparison, less than 20% of sTLDs have ranks outside
the top 5M. In terms of PR, more than 30% of the sTLD sites have PR from 4 to 6,
while less than 5% of gTLD sites are PR4-PR6. Also, more than half of gTLD sites
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Campaign 1 872 3,426 12 Gambling
Campaign 2 148 5,210 7 Cheating
Campaign 3 60 5,198 15 Drug
have PR as 0, which have a weaker SEO effectiveness than those with high PR. This
indicates that the majority of sTLD sites have a stronger effect on the promoted sites
than gTLD sites with no or low PR.
We further compared the durations of the infections for these two types of do-
mains. Again, we continuously crawled the compromised pages (identified in 2015/08-
2015/09) every two days from 2015/09 to 2015/11 to check whether the infections were
still there. Figure 35(c) illustrates the distributions of the sTLD site’s life spans and
those of gTLD sites. As can be seen from the figure, gTLD sites were cleaned up
more quickly than the sTLD sites. Over 25% of the gTLD sites were cleaned within
10 days, while 12% of the sTLD sites were cleaned within 10 days.
Our study demonstrates that the sTLDs are ranked higher than the gTLD sites
and much more effective in elevating the ranks of promoted content, thereby more
valuable to promotional infections. In the meantime, they are less protected than
the gTLDs: once compromised, the infections will stay there for a longer period of
time. This indicates that, indeed, the sTLDs are valuable assets to the adversary and
effective protection of the site, as SEISE does, indeed makes the promotional attacks
less effective.
Extension to gTLDs. Compared with sTLDs, gTLDs (e.g., .com, .net and .org)
do not have fixed semantic meanings. However, we found that still the malicious
content injected here tends to be incompatible with the semantics of the sites, which
can be captured by the search engine results. Figure 36 presents an example of search
engine results for an injected gTLD site iceriversprings.com, which is the website
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of Ice River Green brand of bottled water. However, the injected page show the
semantically inconsistent content for “payday loan” promotion.
Then, we measure the semantics inconsistency on the 3,000 gTLD sites, which
are randomly sampled from the aforementioned campaigns. Specifically, we use
the Context Analyzer component in SEISE to calculate the semantic distance be-
tween the generic content of those known injected sites (the reference, e.g., the
search result of the query site:iceriversprings.com) and the results of query-
ing IBTs on these sites, which mostly contain injected malicious content (e.g., site:
iceriversprings.com "payday loan"). However, we also found that some compro-
mised gTLD sites show semantic consistent with the promotional content. For exam-
ple, online drug library druglibrary.org (in Campaign 3) was injected to promoted
“cheap xanax”. Hence, to identify those suspicious sites (before they are checked
with the Context Analyzer), we utilized the similarsites website query API [15] to
fetch the site tags (e.g., “recycling” and “water” for site:iceriversprings.com) to
determine a gTLD site’s semantics, and only use the gTLD sites showing semantic
inconsistency with the IBT (i.e., the site’s tags semantically distance away from the
IBT) as the suspicious candidates for the input of the Context Analyzer. This filtering
step (for the purpose of increasing the “toxicity level” [66] of the inputs) is built as
the Semantic comparator, which accepts the threshold for the IBT semantics distance
(Section 6.2.2) and outputs the candidate gTLD sites that have great semantic dis-
tances with the IBT used for the query. For example, iceriversprings.com, which
has the site tag “recycling”, “water” which shows semantic inconsistency (determined
by Semantic comparator Figure 28) with the IBT “payday loan”, will be regarded as
suspicious FQDNs and become the input of the Context Analyzer.
Figure 35(d) shows the semantic distances between the reference and the search
results of querying an IBT with and without the Semantic comparator. We observe
that the Context Analyzer can still identify the semantics inconsistency, particularly
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with the help of the Semantic comparator that selects sites with great semantic dis-
tances with the IBT: 97% of the injected sites have semantic distance larger than 0.8
when the threshold of Semantic comparator is set to 0.9; by comparison, 85% of the
injected sites have semantic distance larger than 0.8 in the absence of the Semantic
comparator.
Further, we measure the semantic inconsistency of unknown injected gTLD sites.
This is nontrivial because simply searching site:.com "payday loan" will return
mostly legitimate search results. Even though we could validate these FQDNs one by
one through the Semantic comparator and the Context Analyzer, the cost for finding
truly compromised sites becomes overwhelming. As mentioned earlier, with a similar
PR, gTLD sites are better protected than sTLD sites. Hence, when searching gTLDs
under the IBT (e.g., site:.com "payday loan"), high-PR gTLD sites tend to appear
on top of the search results, which are actually less likely to be compromised. For
example, when searching “payday loan”, many high-PR sites such as checkintocash.
com, wikipedia.org and www.acecashexpress.com will show up within the top-100
search results. None of them appear to be compromised. To address this challenge
and identify the sites likely to be compromised (which will be further determined
by the Context Analyzer), we utilized long IBTs (word length larger than 4) to feed
search engine to obtain suspicious FQDNs. Generally, longer query keywords have
less search competition [105], i.e., websites with lower PRs are more likely to appear
in the search results. For example, when searching for “payday loan no credit check”
under .com, bottled water website iceriversprings.com and ATM company website
carolinaatm.com are within the top-10 search results.
In our experiments, we utilized 1000 long IBTs in 10 individual categories to do
the search, and 23,098 gTLD FQDNs were collected for the semantic inconsistency
analysis. We set the threshold of the Context Analyzer to 0.9, and 7,430 of the
gTLD FQDNs were reported to have promotional infections. We further randomly
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sampled 400 results (200 injected and 200 not-injected) and manually checked the
findings. We confirmed that 182 were indeed infections and 196 were not injected,
which gives us an FDR of 9% and FPR of 8.4%. With this encouraging outcome,
how to detect compromised gTLDs through semantics-based approaches remains to
be an open question. Particularly, new techniques need to be developed to further
suppress FDR and improve its coverage. Also, query terms for detection should also
be automatically discovered.
6.4.3 Case Studies
Perhaps the most surprising findings of our study is the discovery of several large-scale
attacks, infecting many leading organizations around the world. In addition to the
aforementioned gambling campaign, we also found the infections for promoting coun-
terfeit products, fake essays and political materials on university and government
sites. Here we present the studies on two cases as examples to provide additional
information about what techniques the adversary uses and how the attacks are orga-
nized.
Exploit kit discovered. We found an exploit toolkit used in multiple gambling cam-
paigns, for example, Campaign 1. The toolkit, called xise, was discovered on a cloud
drive. By analyzing its code, we found that xise has the functionalities for automatic
site collection, shell acquisition, customized injected page generation and a series of
evasion techniques such as redirection cloaking and code obfuscation. More specif-
ically, it automatically discovers the domains of high-profile websites from Google
and other search engines, and also scans the websites for the vulnerabilities within
the components such as phpmyadmin, kindeditor, ueditor, alipay and fckeditor.
Further, it lets its user provide the promoted site’s URL and keywords and automat-
ically generates the pages to be injected to the compromised websites along a specific
path (e.g., filemanager/browser/default/images/icons). The tool also uploads
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Table 24: Example of signatures.
Signature
<!--google1-->...<!--googlee-->
<img width="20" height="20" border="0" hspace="0" vspace="0" src="http:
//count51.51yes.com/count1.gif">
<!--ZJEG_RSS.content.begin-->...<!--ZJEG_RSS.content.end-->
<iframe marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" hspace="0" vspace=
"0" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" src="" height="0" width="0">
a configuration file to the compromised web server to perform redirection cloaking:
i.e., it will redirect visitors based on their HTTP referers to protect the compromised
site. Also, to guarantee the malicious content to be indexed by search engines, xise
also uploads scripts to keep generating pages to guarantee SEO effectiveness. Note
that adding and changes is a freshness factor for high search engine ranking. In our
research, we manually generated signatures for xise as listed in Table 24. 1037 of
sTLD sites we detected are related to xise with the average semantics distance 0.87
to it sTLDs.
Academic cheating infections. Our research also discovered many infections pro-
moting academic cheating sites. Those sites provide online services for preparing any
kind of homework at the high school and college levels, and even taking online tests
for students. We found that such attacks mainly aim at .edu domains and the exam-
ples of the IBTs involved include ‘free essay’, ‘cheap term paper’ and others. These
terms were found to be very effective at finding such malicious activities. SEISE de-
tected 428 compromised sites, including high-profile .edu domains such as mit.edu,
princeton.edu, havard.edu, etc.
Table 25 compares the compromised .edu sites in different keyword categories.
We observe that such malicious activities have apparently already become a global
industry. 119 education TLDs in 109 countries have 428 infected domains to promote
academic cheating sites. The Top 3 education TLDs with most infected sites are edu
(23%), edu.mn (11%) and edu.cn (7%).
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Gambling 589 367 2.8
Drug 423 360 2.5
Financial 401 327 3
Adult 260 214 3.2
6.5 Discussion
Our research shows that semantics-inconsistency search offers a highly-effective so-
lution to the promotional-infection threat. In this section, we discuss the tricks the
adversary can play to evade our detection, limitations of our technique and future
research, together with the lesson learnt from our study and our communication with
the victims.
Evasion. The current implementation of SEISE is based upon the search results
returned from Google and Bing. While both are mainstream search engines targeted
by promotional infections, the data we crawled are limited to the sites that indexed
by Google and Bing. Hence, to evade SEISE, the adversary, who has full control
of a compromised website, may set robots.txt to prevent part of its content from
being scanned. Such evasion techniques, however, will cause the promotion pages to
lose the visitors from the search engines and also the high-profile links to the sites
being promoted. This defeats the purpose of the promotional infections, which are
meant to advertise malicious content through the search engines and therefore should
aggressively expose its content (promotional pages) to the search engines, instead of
hiding it from them. Other issues related to search results include the delay introduced
by page indexing and page expiration. Again, although our approach is not designed
to capture a promotional infection before it is indexed by the search engines, the
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impact of the infection is also limited at that time, simply because its whole purpose
is to advertise some malicious materials, which is not well served without the infected
pages being discovered by the search engine. For page expiration, we need to consider
the fact that as long as the URLs of the promoted content are still alive, the attack
is still in effect, since letting people find the URLs is the very purpose of the attack.
Whether the URLs are still there can be confirmed by crawling the links. Further,
the snippet of the search results, even for the pages that are already expired, can still
be utilized to find new keywords.
The adversary may play other evasion tricks, by adding more relevant keywords to
the infected page to make the content look more consistent with the website’s theme,
or hiding the inconsistent content by embedding it within images. However, even in
the presence of relevant content, the malicious keywords can still be recovered and
cause an observable semantic deviation from the theme of the original website, as
long as the keywords are sufficiently frequent to be picked up by the search engine
and contribute to the change of the malicious content’s rank in search results. Hiding
content in images results in neglect of malicious content in the search results, which
is not what the adversary wants. Fundamentally, no matter what the adversary
does, the fact remains that any attempt to cover the content being advertised will
inevitably undermine the effectiveness of the promotional effort. Another evasion
strategy is to just compromise the website with compatible semantics. This approach
will significantly limit the attack targets the adversary can have. Particularly, it is
less clear how this can be done for sTLDs. Note that even selling medicine on a
health institution’s site can be captured, as the infections of the NIH pages shown at
the beginning of the paper.
Limitations. As mentioned earlier, our current design is focused on detecting the
infections of sTLD sites, since they have well-defined semantic meanings and are a
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soft target for the adversary. In the meantime, gTLDs are also known to be exten-
sively compromised for promotion purposes. A natural follow-up step is to develop
the semantic technologies for protecting those domains. This is completely feasible,
as demonstrated in our preliminary study (Section 6.4.2): by leveraging the Alexa
categories, the semantics of even those more generic domains can also be identified
and compared with that of the content it hosts.
Moreover, our semantic-based detection technique does not differentiate between
server injected domains, blog/forum Spam and URL redirection [71] (e.g., posting ads
on a .edu forum or utilizing the server-side script of a .gov domain to dynamically
create a page under the domain with promotion content, see Section 6.1). In our
research, we randomly sampled 100 detected pages and found that about 20% of
them are Spam, which are also considered illicit advertising [71]. A follow-up step
is to develop automatic technologies to identify those cases, so we can respond to
them in a different way (e.g., through input sanitization). For example, a comment
page oftentimes can be detected from the keywords such as “comment” or “redirect”
involved in its link; such a page, once found to promote malicious content, can be
further analyzed to determine whether the content is link Spam or caused by an
infection.
Also, the use of search engines has a performance implication. Search service
providers often have limits on the crawling frequency one can have, which causes
delay in detecting malicious content and affects the scalability of our technique. On
the other hand, given the effectiveness of SEISE in catching promotional infections, we
believe that a collaboration with the search provider to detect Internet-wide infections
is completely possible.
Lesson learnt. Our study shows that sTLD sites are often under-protected. Partic-
ularly for universities and other research institutions, their IT infrastructures tend to
be open and loosely controlled. As a prominent example, in a university, individual
150
servers are often protected at the department levels while the university-level IT often
only takes care of network-level protection (e.g., intrusion detection). The problem is
that, oftentimes, the hosts are administrated by less experienced people and include
out-dated and vulnerable software, while given the nature of the promotional infec-
tions, they are less conspicuous in the network traffic, compared with other intrusions
(e.g., setting up a campus bot net). We believe that SEISE, particularly its Context
Analyzer, can play the role of helping the web administrators of these organizations
detect the problems with those less-protected hosts. Of course, a more fundamental
solution is to have a better centralized control, at least in terms of discovering the
security risks at the host level and urging the administrators of these hosts to keep
their software up-to-date.
Responsible disclosure. Since the discovery of infected domains, we have been
in active communication with the parties affected. So far, we have reported over
120 FQDNs to CERT in US and 136 FQDNs to CCERT (responsible for .edu.cn)
in China, the two countries hosting most infected domains. By now, CCERT have
confirmed our report, and notified all related organizations, in which 27 responded
and fixed their problems. However, it is difficult for us to directly contact the victims
to get more details (like log access) from the infected servers. On the other hand,
given the scale of the attacks we discovered, the whole reporting process will take
time.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we report our study on promotional infections, which introduce a large
semantic gap between the infected sTLD and the illicit promotional content injected.
Exploiting this gap, our semantic-based approach, SEISE, utilizes NLP techniques
to automatically choose IBTs and analyze search result pages to find those truly
compromised. Our study shows that SEISE introduces low false detection rate (about
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1.5%) with over 90% coverage. It is also capable of automatically expanding its IBT
list to not only include new terms but also terms from new IBT categories. Running
on 100K FQDNs, SEISE automatically detects 11K infected FQDN, which brings to
light the significant impact of the promotional infections: among those infected are
the domains belonging to leading educational institutions, government agencies, even
the military, with 3% of .edu and .gov, and over one thousand domains of .gov.cn
falling prey to illicit advertising campaigns. Our research further demonstrates the
importance of sTLDs to the adversary and the bar our technique raises for the attacks.
Moving forward, we believe that there is a great potential to extend the technique for
protecting gTLDs, as indicated by our preliminary study. Further, we are exploring
the possibility to provide a public service for detecting such infections.
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Figure 33: The geolocation distributions of the compromised sTLD sites across
141 countries.
Figure 34: The distribution of the infection time.
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Figure 35: Alexa global rank, PR and life span of sites in three campaigns,
and cumulative distribution of semantics distance per monitored sites.
153





The cyber threat landscape is quickly changing, and it is of vital importance to stay
abreast of emerging threats and to proactively work to improve security. At the
same time, piecing together a complete landscape of attacks by identifying the strate-
gies and capabilities of the adversaries requires establishing links among individual
observations. Also, defending against these attacks requires automatically generated
semantics-aware policies to complement manual analysis. While using data processing
techniques and semantic-aware inspection to address security problems is a promising
approach to evaluate security risks and to provide cyber intelligence, there exists a
gap between the security ontology and general data processing techniques primitives
needed for such an approach. This difference tends to be domain-sensitive, language-
specific, and computationally intensive which further complicates the use of such an
approach.
In this dissertation, data processing techniques and semantic-aware inspection
were applied in three components of the modern security system: cyber threat gath-
ering, cyber threat analysis, and cyber threat detection. From the developed modern
security system, three techniques are presented as contributions: (1) we present an
innovation solution for fully automated IOC extraction. It solved a name entity recog-
nition problem for security domain through an innovative graph mining technique.
Running on 71,000 articles collected from 45 leading technical blogs, this new ap-
proach demonstrated a remarkable performance: it generated 900K OpenIOC items
with a precision of 95% and a coverage over 90%, which is way beyond what the state-
of-the-art NLP technique and industry IOC tool can achieve, at a speed of thousands
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of articles per hour. Further, by correlating the IOCs mined from the articles pub-
lished over a 13-year span, our study shed new light on the links across hundreds
of seemingly unrelated attack instances, particularly their shared infrastructure re-
sources, as well as the impacts of such open-source threat intelligence on security
protection and evolution of attack strategies. (2) we analyzed emerging cyber threats
on cloud platform using big data analytics technique. We identified a set of collec-
tive features, which uniquely characterize malicious cloud repositories. These features
were utilized to build a scanner that detected over 600 malicious cloud repositories on
leading cloud platforms like Amazon, Google, and 150K sites, including popular ones
like groupon.com, using them. Highlights of our study include the pivotal roles played
by these repositories on malicious infrastructures, and other important discoveries in-
clude how the adversary exploited legitimate cloud repositories and why the adversary
uses Bars in the first place that had never been reported. These findings bring such
malicious services to the spotlight and contribute to a better understanding and ul-
timately eliminating this new threat. (3) we developed a semantic-based technique,
called Semantic Inconsistency Search (SEISE), for efficient and accurate detection
of the promotional injections on sponsored top-level domains (sTLD) with explicit
semantic meanings. Running on 403 sTLDs with an initial 30 seed IBTs, SEISE an-
alyzed 100K fully qualified domain names (FQDN), and along the way automatically
gathered nearly 600 IBTs. In the end, our approach detected 11K infected FQDN
with a false detection rate of 1.5% and over 90% coverage. Our findings further bring
to light the stunning impacts of such promotional attacks, which compromise FQDNs
under 3% of .edu, .gov domains and over one thousand gov.cn domains, includ-
ing those of leading universities such as stanford.edu, mit.edu, princeton.edu,
havard.edu and government institutes such as nsf.gov and nih.gov. We further
demonstrate the potential to extend our current technique to protect generic domains
such as .com and .org.
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